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Until the global financial crisis in 2008, hedge funds had relied on various safe 
harbor rules to remain unregulated. Since then, various subprime mortgage crisis-driven 
regulatory reforms have been made worldwide. Through the implementation of 
registration and reporting obligations the hedge fund regulatory framework has been 
changed to reinforce regulations that may provide financial stability, making hedge funds 
more like other regulated entities.  
Current hedge fund regulations are based on the policy grounds, on one hand, that 
macro-prudential regulations are necessary due to the potential adverse effects on the 
market from hedge fund size and leverage positions, and on the other hand, that 
conventional micro-prudential regulations are necessary due to the rising exposure of 
unaccredited and unsophisticated investors to the market (necessitating governmental 
protection). 
Based on observations of the hedge fund regimes in the U.S., the U.K., and Korea, 
this article concludes that the current regimes have succumbed to the pressure to 
overregulate: It would be prudent for future regulatory efforts to focus on making the 
hedge fund market accessible to only accredited investors, and the role of a visible 
regulatory hand in this market should be refrained from to the extent necessary to 
promote market competition and financial innovation, while mitigating potential systemic 




Table of Contents 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
A. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................... 1 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY ......................................................................... 4 
C. COMPOSITION OF THIS DISSERTATION ...................................................................... 9 
II. OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUND REGULATION ............................................ 12 
A. WHAT DOES THE TERM “HEDGE FUND” MEAN?..................................................... 12 
B. WHAT ARE THE COMMON FEATURES OF HEDGE FUNDS? ........................................ 14 
C. HOW ARE HEDGE FUNDS DISTINCT FROM OTHER POOLED INVESTMENT FUNDS?... 20 
1. HEDGE FUNDS VERSUS MUTUAL FUNDS .................................................................. 21 
2. HEDGE FUNDS VERSUS PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS ..................................................... 24 
3. HEDGE FUNDS VERSUS VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS .................................................. 28 
4. PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS VERSUS VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS ................................... 30 
D. WHAT BENEFITS MAY HEDGE FUNDS PROVIDE TO THE MARKET? .......................... 31 
 
 
III. MAIN ISSUES REGARDING HEDGE FUND REGULATION ..................... 35 
A. SHOULD HEDGE FUNDS BE REGULATED OR NOT ? .................................................. 35 
B. HOW TO REGULATE HEDGE FUNDS ?....................................................................... 42 
vii 
1. NO DIRECT REGULATION APPROACH ....................................................................... 43 
2. REGULATING FUND ONLY APPROACH ..................................................................... 47 
3. REGULATING MANAGER ONLY APPROACH .............................................................. 50 
4. REGULATING BOTH FUND AND MANAGER APPROACH ............................................ 56 
5. REGULATING INVESTORS ONLY APPROACH ............................................................. 58 
6. REGULATING COUNTERPARTIES ONLY APPROACH .................................................. 60 
C. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS .................................................................................... 63 
IV. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE U.S. ................................................... 69 
A. OVERVIEW .............................................................................................................. 69 
B. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE US : BEFORE THE DODD-FRANK ACT............... 78 
1. INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 ...................................................................... 78 
2. SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 ......................................................................................... 81 
3. SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ...................................................................... 84 
4. INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 ...................................................................... 87 
C. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE US : AFTER THE DODD-FRANK ACT ................. 94 
D. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS .................................................................................. 100 
V. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE U.K.  ............................................... 111 
A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................ 111 
B. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE U.K. : BEFORE THE AIFMD ........................... 112 
1. HEDGE FUND MANAGER REGULATION .................................................................. 112 
2. HEDGE FUND MARKETING REGULATION ............................................................... 117 
viii 
3. HEDGE FUND REGULATION .................................................................................... 120 
C. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE UK : AFTERTHE AIFMD ................................ 122 
1. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS DIRECTIVE.................................... 122 
2. THE IMPACT OF THE AIFMD TO THE UK HEDGE FUND REGULATION ................... 132 
D. SUMMARY AND COMMNETS .................................................................................. 136 
VI. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN KOREA ................................................... 145 
A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................ 145 
B. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN KOREA : BEFORE NEW HEDGE FUND REGIME  ...... 150 
1. HEDGE FUND MANAGER REGULATION .................................................................. 150 
2. HEDGE FUND REGULATION .................................................................................... 155 
3. HEDGE FUND MARKETING REGULATION ............................................................... 157 
4. HEDGE FUND OFFSHORE FUND MARKETING REGULATION .................................... 157 
C. HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN KOREA : NEW HEDGE FUND REGIME .................... 160 
1. HEDGE FUND MANAGER REGULATION .................................................................. 161 
(A) LICENSING REQUIREMENT ................................................................................... 161 
(B) REPORTING REQUIREMENT .................................................................................. 165 
2. HEDGE FUND REGULATION .................................................................................... 166 
(A) REPORTING REQUIREMENT .................................................................................. 166 
(B) HEDGE FUND MARKETING REGULATION ............................................................. 168 
(C) INVESTORS (QUALIFIED PURCHASERS) ................................................................ 170 
(D) INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT REGULATION .................................................. 173 
(E) FUND ASSETS CUSTODY ...................................................................................... 174 
ix 
(F) SUITABILITY ......................................................................................................... 175 
(G) PERIODIC REPORT ................................................................................................ 177 
D. SUMMARY AND COMMNETS .................................................................................. 178 
VII. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S., U.K., AND 
KOREA .......................................................................................................................... 183 
A. OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................ 183 
B. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE U.S., THE U.K., AND KOREA .................................... 186 
C. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S., THE U.K., AND KOREA .................................... 197 
D. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS .................................................................................. 210 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................... 224 
A. HOW TO REGULATE HEDGE FUNDS IN THE FUTURE ? ........................................... 224 
B. WHICH COUNTRY’S APPROACH IS MORE DESIRABLE ? ........................................ 228 
1. WHAT IF A NON-US PERSON RAISES CAPITAL IN THE US?................................... 228 
2. WHAT IF A US PRIVATE ADVISER RAISES CAPITAL IN THE US, UK, OR KOREA? 236 
3. WHAT IF AN OFFSHORE MANAGER RAISES CAPITAL VIA OFFSHORE FUNDS IN THE 
US, UK, OR KOREA? ........................................................................................... 241 
4. WHAT IF AN OFFSHORE MANAGER RAISES CAPITAL VIA ONSHORE FUNDS IN THE 
US, UK, OR KOREA? ............................................................................................247 
IX. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................252 





In late 2011, the Korean Financial Services Commission passed a set of 
rules for the introduction of Korea based hedge funds.12 Under the new regime, 
Korea based hedge funds were first launched in December 2011. This was an 
interesting legislative development given that other major jurisdictions such as the 
US and the UK introduced much more stringent regulations to curtail the activities 
of hedge funds since the global financial crisis of 2008.3   
Unsurprisingly, many differences can be found between the Korean hedge 
fund regulations and those in foreign jurisdictions. For instance, there is a clear 
distinction in place between private funds4 and so-called qualified purchaser funds5, 
                                                          
1 As illustrated infra, “hedge fund” is not a legally defined term, but it is a commonly used term 
referring to certain unregulated or lightly regulated fund or pooled investment vehicle around the 
world. In this article, I will use the term “hedge fund(s)” broadly to include any type of private 
pooled investment vehicles, regulated or not, but to exclude private equity funds and venture capital 
funds. 
2 See Jabon sijang gwa geungyung tujaeobe gwanhan beobryul sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree 
of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Presidential Decree No. 25050, Dec. 
30, 2013, art. 271-2, as amended (S. Kor.) [hereinafter PD], available at 
http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng. 
3 The Korean hedge fund regime was introduced first in Korea by amending the then-existing 
qualified purchaser fund provisions in the Presidential Decree of the Financial Investment Services 
and Capital Markets Act, and later it was codified into the FSCMA in 2013. See Jabon sijang gwa 
geungyung tujaeobe gwanhan beobryul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], 
Act No. 11758, May 28, 2013, art. 249-2, as amended (S. Kor) [hereinafter FSCMA], available at 
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=자본시장법#liBgcolor0.  
4 See FSCMA, art. 249. 
5 See id. art. 249-2. 
2 
and only the qualified purchaser funds are legally classified as a category of hedge 
fund under the Korean regime.  
Other jurisdictions, such as the US and the UK, treat both funds the same as 
hedge funds or unregulated funds.6 There is a clear distinction between hedge 
funds and private equity funds made under the Korean regime. By contrast, both 
funds have remained unregulated in the US and the UK by utilizing various safe 
harbor rules, and as a result, have not been legally differentiated.7   
Furthermore, private funds,8 including hedge funds and private equity funds, 
and the fund managers 9  are both regulated under the Korean regime. 10 
                                                          
6 This regulatory difference may arise because Korea defines the two terms (i.e., private fund and 
qualified purchaser fund) separately and differently to regulate them more lightly than mutual funds, 
and designate only qualified purchaser fund as hedge fund, while both the US and the UK define 
the terms as safe harbors for hedge funds to avoid the regulation. See infra Chapter VI, Part B.1, 
Chapter V, Part B.3; Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
7 For instance, the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 provides leeway for the hedge funds to 
avoid registration requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7). The U.K. fund regime also does 
not require onshore or offshore hedge funds to be authorized by the Financial Services Authority 
(currently Financial Conduct Authority) unless these funds are offered or sold to the investing 
public. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. XVII, c. 2, art. 8, 238(5) (U.K.) 
[hereinafter FSMA], available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8. 
8 Privately placed venture capital funds are not classified as ‘collective investment schemes’ (i.e., 
funds) under the FSCMA and are regulated under a separate statute due to special policy 
considerations in Korea even though those funds are still subject to certain provisions under the 
FSCMA to a very limited extent. See FSCMA, art. 6(5). 
9 The term, fund manager, is not a legal term, but it usually means investment adviser providing 
investment advisory services on a discretionary basis for the pooled investment vehicles. The fund 
manager is different from the adviser for segregated accounts in that the latter provides the advisory 
services to each individual account on a segregated basis while the former does so on a pooled basis. 
Therefore, both managers are similar in nature because the services they provide. The US and the 
UK regimes provide the same license and regulatory requirements on fund managers and on 
advisers although the fund manager is subject to additional fund-specific regulatory obligations. 
Korea provides separate licensing and regulatory requirements on them and treats them differently 
from the beginning. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), 3(b); FSMA, art. 19; FSCMA, art. 6(5)-(7), 
12(1). 
3 
Alternatively, it is more common in the US and the UK that only the fund 
managers are regulated - even under the new regulatory regimes promulgated after 
the financial crisis of 200811 - and the funds can remain unregulated as long as they 
satisfy certain safe harbor requirements.12 
Understanding the hedge fund regulations and underlying principles of 
major jurisdictions is essential to ensuring harmonious regulatory environments 
around the world and to minimizing the regulatory arbitrage problem. It is 
critically important to have a level playing field (in terms of hedge fund regulation) 
among these countries because certain regulations may be easily avoided by 
establishing the funds and the fund managers in offshore jurisdictions that provide 
lighter regulation, allowing those funds to be marketed to potential investors on a 
transnational basis through local private placement regimes.13  
                                                                                                                                                                
10 Private equity fund managers used to be exempted from direct regulation under the FSCMA until 
the FSCMA was amended to impose registration obligations on them from May 2013. But, they are 
still subject to relatively lighter regulation than hedge fund managers in Korea. See FSCMA, art. 
272-2(1). 
11 As further discussed infra, the US fund regime used to provide safe harbor rules for the private 
fund advisers, and they are exempted from registration and other compliance requirements if they 
satisfy the so-called “fewer than 15 clients” threshold condition until it was repealed and replaced 
by the foreign private adviser exemption under the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
12 See infra Chapter IV, Part B, C and Chapter V, Part B, for the details of the safe harbor rules 
available for the hedge funds and their managers in the U.S. and in the U.K. 
13 Considering the global nature of hedge funds in particular, it is more likely that the regulatory 
arbitrage problem will inevitably arise if a jurisdiction puts a very stringent regulatory regime in 
place while other jurisdictions provide relatively lenient regulatory environments. See e.g., Saeed 
Azhar & Parvathy Ullatil, Seeking Less Scrutiny, Hedge Fund Flock to Asia, REUTERS, May 17, 
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-asia-hedgefunds-analysis-
idUSTRE64G31W20100517.  
4 
For decades, there have been many discussions or debates going on in the 
US and in the UK on whether to and how to regulate hedge funds and their 
managers, culminating in mandatory registration requirements for the hedge fund 
managers through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter as “Dodd-Frank Act”) and the Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter as “AIFMD”).14 Thus, it is worth 
exploring these regulatory and/or legislative developments in the US and in the 
UK in particular, because it would be extremely helpful for Korea in best 
redesigning the hedge fund regime in the future.  
 
B. Purpose and Scope of this Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and identify desirable 
regulatory models to consider in the future, based on a comparative analysis of the 
regulations and underlying rationales in the US, UK, and Korea. While each 
country may have different views or different regulatory frameworks relating to 
hedge funds and their managers, there are some issues in common, among other 
things, to be revisited and resolved going forward.15   
                                                          
14 See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 11; Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 
(EC) [hereinafter AIFMD], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:174:0001:0073:EN:PDF.  
15 See generally Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
Final Report, The Regulatory Environment for Hedge Funds: A Survey and Comparison (Nov. 
2006), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD226.pdf. 
5 
First, given the fact that private funds are either unregulated or lightly 
regulated in many jurisdictions,16  and that both retail investors and accredited 
investors are allowed to invest (both directly or indirectly) 17  in the funds, 
controversies have arisen as to what governmental or regulatory protections should 
be afforded to such investors. At issue is whether, from the investor protection 
perspective, the unaccredited investors should be treated differently from the 
accredited investors who are presumably in the position to “fend for themselves”18, 
or if no further regulatory interventions are necessary to protect unaccredited 
investors, why not.19  
It is a well-known fact that hedge funds have been unregulated or 
minimally regulated, based on the ground that they are offered or sold on a private 
placement basis, and are not marketed to the investing public.20 As a consequence, 
target investors (i.e., accredited investors) need to rely on their own financial 
                                                          
16 See id. 
17 As further discussed infra, for example, the U.S. securities and fund regimes (i.e., the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940) provide that a limited number (up to 35 
persons) of retail investors are able to invest in hedge funds directly with sophistication test, and 
non-sophisticated investors are also allowed to indirectly invest in hedge funds through fund of 
hedge funds. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–12(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b).  
18 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953). 
19 Even under the pre-Dodd-Frank Act regimes, hedge fund advisers have been regulated to some 
extent in the U.S. That is, they owe fiduciary obligation to the fund and its beneficial owners and 
they are also subject to anti-fraud rules although they previously remained outside direct regulatory 
oversight by relying on various safe harbor provisions. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 80b–6(4); 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Hedge fund advisers are also obligated to check the sophistication 
status of the unaccredited investors before accepting capital from them. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b).  
20 See generally SEC Staff Report, Protecting Investors: A Half-Century of Investment Company 
Regulation, May 29, 1992, at 103-118 [hereinafter SEC Staff Report], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf. 
6 
expertise or on third party professionals when making investment decision 
regarding the hedge funds.  
Thus, it is very important issue whether those retail investors in the private 
funds should be treated differently from accredited investors, and whether more 
governmental protections should be provided, in case where retail investors is also 
limitedly accessible to the hedge fund market.21  Alternatively, it is also worth 
exploring the feasibility of completely barring the unaccredited investors’ access to 
the hedge funds, and allowing only indirect investment through fund of funds or 
other intermediating investment vehicles, such as segregated accounts or trust 
accounts.22 This alternative scenario is premised on the belief that hedge funds 
should be lightly regulated going forward. To do so, it is necessary to make the 
hedge fund markets purely private market for accredited investors to ensure that no 
investor protection concerns are raised.23  
                                                          
21 Due to this controversy, there is no private fund (i.e. something like Section 3(c)(1) fund under 
the U.S. regime) exemption available to the hedge fund and no unqualified purchaser-investor is 
allowed to invest in such hedge fund in Korea. In other words, there are no the private fund ideas in 
Korea regarding hedge funds, and only qualified purchasers-investors are allowed to invest in the 
hedge funds albeit limited number of non-professional investors are legally permissible to invest in 
the hedge funds subject to a suitability test. See FSCMA, art. 46, 249-2. 
22 Fund of funds, segregated account, or trust account (especially unspecified trust account) are 
some of the examples how the retail investors should be allowed to invest in hedge funds indirectly 
through financial intermediaries and it is based on the belief that the financial intermediaries are 
deemed financially sophisticated and they are obligated to invest in the hedge fund in the best 
interest of the underlying retail investors as a fiduciary. See e.g., FSCMA, art. 37, 79, 96, 102. 
23 Interestingly and confusedly, existing Korean hedge fund regulation provides that only qualified 
investors including certain wealthy individuals meeting the threshold requirement (i.e. minimum 
investment amount of 0.5 billion Korean Won or more) are permitted to invest in hedge funds, but 
some of the individual-qualified purchaser investors (i.e. wealthy individuals) are still classified 
unsophisticated investors and thus fall under the protections of the FSCMA suitability rule. Because 
of these apparently contradictory rules, as further explored infra Chapter VI, Part C, it is unclear 
7 
Second, another area of interest is how to best to regulate hedge funds and 
their managers.  As aforementioned, Korea regulates both hedge funds and their 
managers, while the U.S. and the U.K. regulate hedge fund managers only. 24  
Given the disparity in the way of regulating hedge funds and their managers 
between countries, it is worth exploring the policy rationales for why each 
jurisdiction takes different regulatory approaches in regulating hedge funds and 
their managers. This analysis is important because the more narrowing the 
regulatory gap between the countries, the more likely to minimize the possible 
regulatory arbitrage or regulatory shopping problem.   
Further, it should be also explored the extent of the hedge fund regulation 
assume that it is necessary to regulate them. That is, how differently hedge funds, 
private equity funds, and venture capital funds should be treated is another issue to 
explore. While some similarities exist between them as private funds, each fund 
category may still retain distinct features which merit different respective levels of 
regulation. Accordingly, it is difficult (or perhaps impossible) to apply a uniform 
set of regulatory standards given that various and different types of funds are 
available even within the hedge fund industry itself.   
                                                                                                                                                                
what the underlying rationale is for the government to protect some qualified purchasers-wealthy 
individuals and not others. See FSCMA, art. 47, 279-2. 
24 What is interesting and noteworthy is that, unlike hedge fund managers, private equity fund 
managers were exempted from registration or licensing requirement while the private equity fund 
itself is subject to registration and other regulatory obligations until the FSCMA was amended in 
2013 to require them to register with the FSC. Accordingly, it may be concluded that Korea takes a 
two-tiered or phased approach in regulating hedge funds and private equity funds based on the 
principle of proportionality. See FSCMA, art. 12(1), 249-2(1), 272-2(1). 
8 
Third, another area focus should be on is how differently onshore and 
offshore hedge funds are regulated from country to country.25 As a matter of fact, 
hedge funds are global in nature, and can very easily be moved offshore. As a 
result, the hedge fund market is the very market that various cross-border 
regulatory issues, such as licensing, marketing, and market manipulation, 
inevitably arise.  
Without a doubt, hedge fund related transnational regulatory issues are dealt 
with differently from country to country. There is no reason, however, why we 
should not explore ways in which to apply the same regulatory standards in 
between jurisdictions, assume that the investment objective and target investors are 
same. In that regard, it is worth exploring how to promote a hedge fund regulatory 
regime that would treat both onshore and offshore hedge funds the same to the 
extent possible.26   
In addition, I will also compare and contrast the level of regulation that 
existed before the global financial crisis of 2008 and how these regulations have 
evolved after the crisis focusing on the US, UK, and Korea respectively. As the 
evolution of these regulations would undoubtedly vary from country to country 
                                                          
25 For instance, the real estate funds or commodities funds are not regulated in the U.S., while such 
funds are typically regulated in the U.K. and Korea, among other countries. It is mainly due to the 
facts that U.S. fund regulation is applied only to the fund (i.e., investment company) primarily 
investing in securities, while other countries like the U.K. and Korea regulate any pooled 
investment vehicles whether or not they invest in securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA, 
art. 235; FSCMA, art. 6(5), 9(18). 
26 EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive may be one of the landmark regulatory 
attempts to make hedge fund regime among the jurisdictions even and consistent although it has a 
binding force only to EU member states. See AIFMD, explanatory note 4. 
9 
and from fund to fund (i.e. hedge fund vs. private equity fund vs. venture capital 
fund), I will explore their similarities and differences, and the underlying policy 
justifications of each.  
Furthermore, based on the observations and discussions outlined above, I 
will make certain recommendations for a future hedge fund regulatory scheme that 
will bring about a more equal treatment of hedge funds regardless of whether they 
are domiciled onshore or offshore from a transnational regulatory perspective. 
 
C. Composition of This Dissertation 
This dissertation is composed of nine chapters. Chapter II illustrates general 
features about hedge funds and their managers. It is important to understand this 
first because it would help us have better understanding about hedge fund related 
regulatory concerns and policy rationales which will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
Chapter III explores major issues about hedge fund regulation. In this 
chapter, I will cover the issues of whether or not to regulate hedge funds, how and 
to what extent to regulate them, and the underlying policy rationales for doing so. 
It is critically important to understand these issues first because hedge fund 
regulatory regimes across countries should be implemented based on these 
discussions and on policy grounds in general. 
Chapter IV provides an overview of hedge fund regulation in the US. In 
this chapter, I will explore the hedge fund related regulatory developments made 
10 
before and after the global financial crisis of 2008 and the underlying policy 
justificationations for the then-existing regime.  
The US hedge fund regime is very important because the US used to be, 
and currently is, the number one country around the world in the hedge fund 
industry, and because the US regime used to be regarded by hedge funds as 
friendly because it provides various safe harbor rules for a long time. In that regard, 
it is worth observing how the US hedge fund regime has been changed after the 
2008 global financial crisis and what made the US legislators and regulators 
change their regulatory philosophy.  
Chapter V explores the UK hedge fund regimes. It will be demonstrated 
and analyzed in the order of time sequence, including before and after the AIFMD 
was transposed to the UK regime. As one of the two major hedge fund 
jurisdictions in the world, it is also important to take a close look at the UK hedge 
fund regimes and how the UK regulators have responded to the 2008 financial 
crisis, as well as how they justify the change in their regulatory position.  
Chapter VI deals with Korean hedge fund regimes. Korea is a relatively 
young country in the global hedge fund market because it introduced its hedge 
fund regime just a few years ago in the wake of 2008 global financial crisis. In this 
chapter, I will illustrate about what the Korean hedge fund regulatory model looks 
like and under what policy grounds the Korean regulators justify the regulation.  
Chapter VII explores the regulatory similarities and differences between 
the three countries, based on the observations in Chapters IV through VI. In so 
doing, I will point out both strong points and weak points in each jurisdiction, and 
11 
address about which country’s regulatory approach is more appropriate and under 
what policy grounds.  
In chapter VIII, I will suggest some regulatory recommendations for a 
future hedge fund regulation based on the foregoing discussions and observations. 
To do so, I will use some hypothetical situations to illustrate how the hedge fund 
regimes in the three countries apply, and what regulatory gaps or regulatory 
loopholes may exist in each jurisdiction.  
Chapter IX concludes with a summary of this dissertation. I will also 
briefly discuss other relevant issues not thoroughly dealt with in this dissertation 
and potential limitations or counterarguments I may face in this dissertation. 
12 
II.  Overview of Hedge Fund Regulation  
 
A. What Does the Term “Hedge Fund” Mean? 
Hedge fund has been defined in various ways and from various 
perspectives over the decades mainly because there has been no generally accepted 
definition, nor has a statutory definition been available.27 Nonetheless, the term 
“hedge fund” can be generally defined, in part, as “an investment vehicle that 
pools the monetary contributions of multiple investors and employs a variety of 
investment strategies.”28 
                                                          
27 After the global financial crisis of 2008, there have been regulatory efforts to define “hedge fund” 
for the purpose of having them under the regulatory purview, but the concepts of “private fund” and 
“alternative investment fund” are also insufficient to clearly identify who they are and what they do. 
See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)(29) (defining private fund as “an issuer 
that would be a investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940, but for Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act); AIFMD, art. 4(1)(a) (defining alternative 
investment funds as “collective investment undertakings, including investment compartments 
thereof, which:  
(i) raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined 
investment policy for the benefit of those investors; and  
(ii) do not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC”).  
28 See Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail Investors in 
(Funds- of) Hedge Funds,  Feb. 2003, at 1 [hereinafter IOSCO Hedge Fund Report], available at 
http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/IOSCO%20PD142.pdf. Similarly, the SEC defines hedge 
fund as “an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not 
sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment company under the 
Investment Company Act.” Staff Report to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Sept. 2003, at 3 [hereinafter SEC Hedge Fund Report]. 
The IOSCO also defines hedge fund, focusing more on its practical characteristics, as “institutions 
which are significant traders for their own account in financial instruments and which take on 
significant leverage, subject to little or no direct prudential regulation, and subject to limited 
disclosure requirements as they are seldom public companies.” Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged 
Institutions, Nov. 1999, at 4, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD98.pdf. See also Erik J. Greupner, Hedge 
Funds are Headed Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 
1559 (2003) (defining hedge fund as “privately offered, relatively unregulated pooled investment 
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It should be noted, however, is that it is difficult to uniformly define “hedge 
funds”, and it is almost impossible to do considering the diverse and different 
nature of hedge funds. That may be the very reason why thus far there have been 
no recommendations or regulatory trials on how to legally define them. In that 
regard, it may be concluded that some current definitions of “hedge fund”, such as 
a private fund in the US or alternative investment fund in the European Union, 
may be regarded as regulatory efforts to indirectly define them so that they fall 
under regulatory purview to some extent.29 
As seen in its definition, hedge funds were originally devised with a view 
to hedging the risks inherent to the investment portfolio.30 That is, when the first 
hedge fund was created in late 1940s by Alfred W. Jones, it was recognized as 
relatively low-risk private investment vehicle, which made use of various hedging 
                                                                                                                                                                
vehicles in the form of limited partnership or limited liability company that have the flexibility to 
invest in a broad range of securities and commodities using broad range of trading techniques.”); 
Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market Crises: Hedge 
Funds, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 5, 6 (1999) (defining hedge fund as “private investment 
companies, usually in the form of limited partnership, limited liability company, or offshore 
corporation, that may or may not employ “hedging strategies; they are largely, but not entirely, 
unregulated; sometimes use leverage; use a variety of alternative investment techniques; such as 
such selling and derivatives, and often pay handsome compensation to those who run them.”); Rory 
B. O’Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation, 
79 TUL. L. REV. 461, 464 (2004) (defining hedge fund as “any pooled investment vehicle that is 
privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to 
the public”).  
29 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 126. 
30 Hedging typically means doing something to insure against potential loss or to mitigate the risk 
of loss, and accordingly the leveraged positions current hedge funds take in common is in a way 
deviated from the original meaning of hedging. But it has been a more familiar term in the 
marketplace for a long time regardless of the fact that its substance is a lot different from its name 
or its face, and because of that it is still commonly referred to that way. See e.g., Managed Fund 
Association, Comments for the SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds, May 6, 2003, at 2 [hereinafter 
MFA Comments], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-mfa.htm.  
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strategies to insure the invested portfolio against any possible drop in price of the 
portfolio assets, albeit the derivatives contract may be also utilized for speculative 
purpose.31 However, over time the hedge fund has evolved and transformed into a 
highly risky investment vehicle making the most of various speculative leveraged 
transactions.32 
 
B. What Are the Common Features of Hedge Funds?  
Hedge funds can be characterized in many different ways. Among other 
things, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter as 
“IOSCO”) summarizes the main characteristics of hedge funds as follows:33 
• Borrowing and leverage restrictions, which are typically included in CIS regulation, are not 
applied, and many (but not all) hedge funds use high levels of leverage; 
• Significant performance fees (often in the form of a percentage of profits) are paid to the 
manager in addition to an annual management fee; 
• Investors are typically permitted to redeem their interests periodically, e.g. quarterly, semi-
annually, or annually; 
• Often significant ‘own’ funds are invested by manager; 
                                                          
31 It have been publicly known and accepted that the first hedge fund was created in 1949 by Alfred 
W. Jones to achieve absolute return regardless of market ups and downs. He believed the theory 
that “within the universe of the efficient market, there exists at any given time considerable pockets 
of inefficiency which can be profitably exploited without incurring unacceptable risks.” Also he 
was the first manager to put a performance-based fee in place and make substantial commitments of 
his own capital to the fund he managed. See e.g., Greupner, supra note 28, at 1560; Douglas W. 
Hawes, Hedge Funds-Investment Clubs for the Rich, 23 BUS. LAW. 576, 577 (Jan. 1968). 
32 It should be noted, however, that the original hedge fund-like investment strategy (namely, long-
short equity or market neutral investment strategy) can be commonly observed in the marketplace, 
and they typically do not have highly leveraged positions. But it is also true that these are just part 
of the various hedge fund categories, and many of the hedge funds have been engaging in different 
types of leveraged transactions to a large extent. See MFA Comments, supra note 30. 
33 IOSCO Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 3. 
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• Derivatives are used, often for speculative purposes, and there is ability to short sell 
securities; 
• More diverse risks or complex underlying products are involved. 
First and foremost, hedge funds used to remain unregulated or lightly 
regulated, until new regimes were implemented after the 2008 financial crisis. As 
pointed out above, all the aforementioned unique features of hedge fund are 
derived from the fact that they have been outside direct regulatory supervision. For 
instance, the US has provided various safe harbor rules in the securities statutes, 
such as private offering, private adviser, and private fund exemptions, and hedge 
funds used to enjoy their unregulated status by relying on those safe harbor rules.34  
The UK also provides private placement safe harbor rules for onshore and 
offshore hedge funds, but not for UK based hedge fund managers, and let them 
stay outside the paternalistic fund regulation if they are not offered or sold to the 
general public.35  
Second, hedge funds have full discretion to enter into borrowing or other 
leveraged transactions, and it is possible because they are free from the leverage 
                                                          
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1),(7); 15 U.S.C. § 80b- 3(b)(3). Among the 
safe harbor rules, private adviser exemption (namely, “fewer than 15 clients” exemption) has 
become available only to foreign private advisers, and US based private advisers become subject to 
registration and other compliance requirements, subject to narrow size-based exemptions under the 
Dodd-Frank Act. But, what is clear is that even under the Dodd-Frank Act private fund exemptions 
are still available, and all the hedge fund’s unique features are to be observed generally although 
they become subject to regulatory supervision directly (namely, hedge funds designated by the 
FSOC as a systematically important non-financial institution) or indirectly (through private adviser 
regulation) under the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 403. 
35 See FSMA, art. 21, 238. This private fund or private offering exemption is still temporarily 
available for some more years to come even after the AIFMD is in force in July 2013. See AIFMD, 
explanatory note 10. 
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restrictions applicable to mutual funds.36 As a result, hedge funds may have highly 
leveraged portfolios depending on the investment strategies they utilize.37As noted 
above, while hedge funds are allowed to take on significant leverages, hedge funds 
and/or their managers are subject to little or no direct prudential regulation, and opt 
to provide no or limited disclosure.38  
Undoubtedly, high-leverage and low-transparency are the most commonly 
well-known features of hedge funds, and compared to registered and regulated 
mutual funds, hedge funds’ portfolios are much less diversified and less 
                                                          
36 For instance, among other countries, the US provides express safe harbor rules for private fund to 
avoid the registration requirement and other investment restrictions including borrowing and 
leveraged transactions applicable to the registered investment company, and the U.K. also provides 
an unregulated scheme if the fund interests are not offered or sold to the general public, and 
offshore based funds are also free from investment restrictions applicable to the authorized scheme 
under the UK regime. In contrast, Korea provides no safe harbor rule for domestic hedge funds, and 
they are subject to certain level of borrowing and leverage restrictions. By contrast, offshore funds 
are free from the leverage restriction although they are subject to registration obligation under the 
Korean regime in connection with the offer and sale of the fund interests to certain Korean 
professional investors. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1; Chapter V, Part B.3; Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
37 For example, fixed income arbitrage fund may have much more leverage ratio due to the unique 
nature of their investment strategy, while long-short equity funds are more likely to have by far less 
exposure in leveraged transactions. See e.g., Fin. Serv. Auth., Assessing the Possible Sources of 
Systemic Risk from Hedge Funds: A Report on the Findings of the FSA’s Hedge Fund Survey and 
Hedge Fund as Counterparty Survey, Aug. 2012, at 3 [hereinafter FSA Systemic Risk Report], 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/hedge_funds.pdf. 
38 For instance, in the US there used to be a private adviser exemption available for the hedge fund 
managers to avoid the registration requirement, as a result they are also free from prudential 
regulation, and at the same time they are free from mandatory disclosure requirements by relying 
on the private offering exemption. Korea also provides special exemptions for hedge fund managers 
not to be subject to the prudential regulation applicable to mutual fund managers, although they are 
still subject to authorization and other obligations like having internal control and risk management 
system in place, while they are relying on the private offering exemption to be free from the 
disclosure obligations. By contrast, the UK requires hedge fund managers, instead of the funds, to 
get authorization and be in compliance with broad principle based regulations, but it is relatively 
lightly applied to them compared to other regulated entities considering the fact that they carry on 
the business on a limited basis. See Infra Chapter IV, Part B.4; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part 
C.1. 
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transparent. All of this is possible because they are basically free from any 
investment restrictions (e.g., leverages and concentration limitations) imposed on 
the mutual funds relying on various safe harbor rules.39  
This has been justified on the grounds that hedge funds are accessible only 
to certain accredited investors, and that they are presumed to be sophisticated 
enough to protect themselves vis-à-vis the managers.40 
Third, performance based fee is a unique characteristic, commonly 
observed in hedge funds, that is generally unavailable to mutual fund managers.41 
What that means is that hedge fund managers typically charge 20% of the capital 
gain or capital appreciation of the fund portfolio as a performance fee, in addition 
to the general management fee (typically 1 or 2 percent of the assets under 
management), subject to some hurdle rate and/or high-water mark conditions.42  
                                                          
39 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
40 See e.g., S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 125. 
41 Interestingly, Korean regime provides express rules for mutual fund managers to charge 
performance-based fee in addition to the basic asset management fee based on the assets under 
management on a limited basis. But it is practically unworkable due to very stringent threshold 
conditions for that. See FSCMA, art. 86. See also SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 237-48 
(illustrating in detail about how the performance-based fee works in the fund industry). 
42 For instance, the US Investment Advisers Act prohibits any investment adviser from receiving 
performance fee from the client unless the client is limited to “qualified client”. Thus, practically 
speaking, under the US regime hedge fund manager is allowed to charge performance fee only to 
qualified clients because they are now subject to the Advisers Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2)(B); 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1). For the definition of hurdle rate and high 
water mark, see e.g., Sangheon Shin et al., For whom hurdle rate and high-watermark exist?, Sept. 
30, 2012, at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154639. 
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It may be mutually beneficial for the investors and the managers as well in 
that it may align the economic interests between them,43 and may provide the 
incentive for the managers to try to maximize the return. However, flipside here is 
that it may create potential conflicts of interest problem inherent in the 
compensation scheme particularly in terms of the valuation of portfolio assets.44 
Fourth, hedge funds often limit the right of investors to redeem the fund 
shares although it is basically up to mutual agreement, and it is not completely 
barred. This is different from mutual funds because in principle mutual fund 
investors are legally guaranteed the right to redeem the fund shares at any time at 
their discretion.  
It is also different from the private equity funds in that the private equity 
funds usually have lock-up periods of 2 years or longer to ensure the success of the 
private equity investment strategy; alternatively, hedge funds usually allow the 
investors the right to redeem the fund shares at intervals.45 
                                                          
43 Both performance fee arrangements and seeding managers’ capital into the funds they manage 
are pointed out as two primary tools to align economic interests between the managers and the 
investors; this encourages the managers to exercise investment discretion that is in the best interests 
of the investors. See e.g., Robert G. Grucht et al., No Direction: The Obama Administration’s 
Financial Reform Proposal and Pending Legislation Proposing the Registration and Further 
Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Pools of Equity are Overbroad and Fail to Address the 
Actual Risks That These Funds Pose to the Financial System, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 157, 164-
66 (Fall 2009). 
44 See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20. 
45 This two-year lock-up period provision has been used as a decisive indicator to distinguish 
private equity funds from hedge funds, and it has been used in defining investment company under 
the U.S. Investment Company Act. This distinction, however, has been under criticism in that 
hedge funds are also able to utilize this 2-year lock-up safe harbor to avoid their registration 
obligations if they intend to do so, and provide regulatory loophole accordingly. See e.g., Dissent of 
Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to Proposing Release No. IA-2266: 
Proposed Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia-2266.htm#dissent. 
19 
Fifth, hedge fund is generally organized as a limited partnership or as a 
limited liability company to avoid burdensome corporate regulation (e.g. corporate 
governance) and double taxation onshore or offshore.46 Special tax treatment is 
usually available to limited partnerships or limited liability companies, and hedge 
funds just make the most of the tax structure in choosing a jurisdiction as a fund 
base.  
This minimizes the potential negative tax implications for the managers 
and investors, which is the primary reason why most of the hedge funds choose 
these offshore “tax havens”. 47  That is, limited partnerships or limited liability 
companies help hedge funds operate as a pass-through vehicles to avoid being 
subject to double taxation, even if they are not registered or authorized as required 
by the relevant rules and regulations.48  
Sixth, the hedge fund market could be characterized as a so-called 
“accredited investors” market in terms of the investor pools. It is a very important 
                                                          
46 Because of regulatory and/or tax reasons, it is very common to see hedge funds set up offshore, 
which typically raises no or little regulatory concern in particular because, as explained infra, hedge 
funds are free from regulation in the US and in the UK based on the private offering and/or private 
fund safe harbor rules. As a result, there should be no serious jurisdictional conflict or jurisdictional 
shopping/ regulatory evasion issues whether or not the onshore or offshore manager chooses an 
offshore location for the fund base. However, it is more likely that extraterritorial application issue 
should arise depending on the factual circumstances if there is a regime that directly regulates the 
funds. See generally Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PA. J. 
BUS. & EMP. L. 783 (Summer 2008). 
47 See id. It should be noted, however, that it is not the only reason for hedge fund to choose 
offshore, but rather regulatory or privacy consideration may be also taken into account. Many times, 
offshore funds have been set up as a feeder fund to accommodate foreign investors’ needs and raise 
capital from both onshore and offshore investors. See MARTIN CORNISH & IAN MASON, UNITED 
KINGDOM, IN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO HEDGE FUND REGULATION, (co-eds 2009), at 483. 
48 See e.g., Donald J. Marples, Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers, June 20, 
2013, at 2-3, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22689.pdf. 
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feature that vividly distinguishes hedge funds from mutual funds, and one that is 
closely interconnected with the private offering or private fund exemption.  
Hedge funds have been able to avoid regulation primarily because of the 
fact that they are permitted to offer or sell their shares only to accredited investors, 
who are deemed financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves without 
regulatory intervention.49 
These safe harbor rules remain generally unchanged in the U.S. and the 
U.K., and around the globe; the unique features of hedge funds illustrated above is 
likely to be maintained without significant fundamental change, at least in terms of 
the hedge fund itself.50  
These features of hedge funds are not legally defined or legally recognized; 
rather these are some of the characteristics observed in common in their actual 
practices. Basically, all of these characteristics are the result of being unregulated, 
and serve to clearly distinct from more heavily regulated funds like mutual funds. 
 
C. How are Hedge Funds Distinct from Other Pooled Investment Funds? 
To understand why hedge funds should be regulated and/or how to regulate 
them, it is useful and important to figure out first how hedge funds are similar or 
different from other pooled investment vehicles, and if they should be treated same 
                                                          
49 See infra Chapter III, Part B.1. 
50 Some countries like Korea or Hong Kong provide regimes of directly regulating hedge funds in 
some degree, but offshore funds domiciled in tax haven jurisdictions are also available. In that 
sense, the hedge fund’s feature as an unregulated investment vehicle is still valid in general. For the 
details of hedge fund regulation around the countries, see Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge Funds Oversight: Consultation Report, March 
2009, at Annex 5, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf. 
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or differently accordingly. Below I will explore the similarities and differences 
between hedge funds and other pooled investment vehicles focusing on the mutual 
funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, among others.51 
 
1. Hedge Funds versus Mutual Funds  
Hedge funds and mutual funds are the same in substance in that they are 
pooled investment vehicles specially established for securities investment purposes 
on a collective basis.52 Thus, from a functional perspective, it goes without saying 
that both should be subject to the same type of regulations, unless there are other 
sufficient justifications for regulating them differently or for not regulating one and 
heavily regulating the other.53 However, as further illustrated below, hedge funds 
are different from mutual funds in many respects. 
                                                          
51 Hedge funds could be compared and contrasted with commodities pools or REITs (namely, Real 
Estate Investment Trusts) as well in that they all are also pooled investment vehicles, but the main 
difference between hedge funds and commodities pools or REITs is whether the invested assets are 
primarily composed of securities or not. This paper will not be further explored the comparison 
between hedge funds and commodities pool or REITs because commodities pools or REITS are 
also subject to securities regulation because the funds’ interests should fall within the definition of 
securities under the securities statutes, and they are outside the fund regulation under the US 
Investment Company Act at the outset while they are also subject to fund regulation under the UK 
and Korean fund regimes respectively. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA, art. 238; FSCMA, art. 
6(5), 9(18).  
52 See id. 
53 From a functional regulatory standpoint, the UK (EU) and the Korean fund regimes seem more 
reasonable compared to the US fund regime, because both broadly define the fund to cover every 
type of collective investment fund (including commodity pools and REITs), while the US fund 
regime (namely, the Investment Company Act) defines investment company narrowly to only cover 
certain pooled investment funds that have been set up primarily for a securities investment purpose. 
The UK and Korean regulatory approaches seem more desirable in terms of public interest and 
investor protection because there is little doubt that the same rules and regulations should be evenly 
applied to funds functioning equivalently in the market place, and investors should be protected 
equally under the same or comparable regime(s). See id. 
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First, hedge funds are similar to “mutual funds” (also known as regulated 
“investment companies” or “collective investment schemes”)54  in that both are 
basically collective investment vehicles that raise capital from a pool of investors 
by issuing securities, investing the capital in various assets such as securities or 
derivatives, and doing so to provide investors with ample benefits such as portfolio 
diversification and professional asset management by investment professionals 
who are responsible for the day-to-day management of the funds.55 Some mutual 
funds strive to mimic the hedge fund investment strategy, further making them 
look similar to hedge funds.56  
 Unsurprisingly, however, hedge funds are different from mutual funds in 
many respects. 57  The most distinguishable feature between them is that hedge 
                                                          
54 Typically, mutual funds refer to open-ended funds only, however, sometimes the term refers 
more generally to regulated investment companies including closed-end funds. In this article, the 
more general “regulated investment companies” will be used for mutual funds. 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA, art. 235; FSCMA, art. 6(4), 9(18). 
56 In reality, many mutual fund advisers follow or refer to hedge funds’ investment strategies in 
order to ensure stable return regardless of market fluctuation and to attract investors’ attention 
accordingly. For example, fixed-income arbitrage or long-short equity investment strategies are 
options for mutual fund advisers to pursue something comparable to absolute return or alpha 
strategy which hedge funds typically pursue. See generally Citi Fund Services Inc., The 
Convergence of Traditional and Alternative Investment Products: Regulatory and Operational 
Considerations, in 17 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1 (Dec. 2010), available at 
http://www.transactionservices.citigroup.com/transactionservices/home/securities_svcs/docs/71491
_eprint.pdf. 
57 Alan L. Kennard, for example, summarized the differences between mutual fund and hedge fund 
as follows: First, hedge funds are basically unregistered and thus are unregulated investment 
vehicles, while mutual funds are heavily regulated. Second, investment minimums for hedge funds 
are very large, while investment minimums for mutual funds are small and are not legally required. 
Third, the number of investors is limited and certain investor eligibility tests are required for hedge 
funds, while there are neither investor limitations nor investor eligibility tests are required for 
mutual funds. Fourth, active and aggressive management through short selling and leverage is 
available for hedge funds, while passive and defensive management are strongly recommended for 
mutual funds through limitations on short selling and leverage limitation. Finally, hedge funds 
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funds are typically free from onerous rules and regulations by relying on the safe 
harbor rules while mutual funds are not.58 What that means is that hedge fund is 
not typically subject to mandatory registration requirements and other regulatory 
requirements such as periodic reporting, valuation, conflict of interest and asset 
custody under the securities/fund regimes which are fully applicable to mutual 
funds.59  
In addition, although it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, hedge funds 
are different from mutual funds in terms of the manager regulation in that hedge 
fund managers used to be not regulated or relatively lightly regulated while mutual 
fund managers are to be registered with or authorized by the relevant regulatory 
authorities and subject to full scope of regulation.60 Both are also different in terms 
of fund governance because hedge funds typically have neither board of directors 
nor independent directors while mutual funds are compelled to have board of 
directors comprising the majority of independent directors.61  
                                                                                                                                                                
usually pursue absolute return strategy, while mutual funds pursue relative return strategy (i.e., 
mutual fund advisers typically try to beat the overall market index while hedge fund advisers 
typically try to achieve highest return regardless of market condition). Kennard, The Hedge Fund 
versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133, 133-34 (2003). 
58 See supra text accompanying note 7.  
59 See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1; Chapter V, Part B.3. 
60 This private adviser exemption used to be the case observed in the U.S. regime before the Dodd-
Frank Act has been in force since 2012, and under the Dodd-Frank Act this distinction becomes not 
that clear because large hedge fund managers have become subject to the Advisers Act to the full 
like mutual funds unless they are able to satisfy much more stringent private adviser exemptions 
available for the mid-sized private advisers. See Dodd-Frank Act § 403. 
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–16; Collect Investment Schemes Sourcebook 6 [hereinafter COLL], 
available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COLL/6; FSCMA, art. 197-99. 
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Additional difference can be found between them in terms of the scope of 
investors’ pool. That is, hedge funds advisers are strictly restricted to offer or sell 
the funds’ securities only to institutional investors or ultra-wealthy investors in 
order to comply with the private placement safe harbor rule, while mutual fund 
advisers have no problem selling the funds’ interests to unsophisticated and 
unwealthy investing public.62  
Based on this distinctive feature of hedge funds in terms of investor pools, 
as indicated above, hedge funds have been able to avoid a set of securities and 
fund regulation and no fundamental regulatory changes have been made even after 
the new financial regulatory reform measures have been taken in the wake of the 
global financial crisis of 2008.63  
 
   2. Hedge Funds versus Private Equity Funds   
Both hedge funds and private equity funds are similar in that both are 
unregulated or lightly regulated private pooled investment vehicles.  
First, both are structured in a way to avoid fund regulation by relying on 
various safe harbor rules. 64  The alternative investment strategies they operate 
                                                          
62 See supra text accompanying note 57.  
63 See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
64 It is true that they both may be subject to fund regulation to some extent depending on the 
jurisdictions (e.g. Korea or Germany), but it is also true that both are supposed to be structured to 
avoid the regulation as much as possible, and as a result they are subject to much lighter regulation 
even where they are subject to regulation under certain jurisdictions. Furthermore, the fund 
managers have flexibility to choose offshore as fund bases providing regulatory friendly 
environments, so it should not be misleading to state that both hedge funds and private equity funds 
are unregulated or unregistered fund in general. 
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become possible just because they are not subject to the paternalistic fund 
regulation typically applicable to mutual funds. To do so, they make their best 
efforts to avoid registration or other regulatory requirements by relying on private 
offering or private fund safe harbor rules although it varies from country to 
country.65 
Second, both are similar in that they are private funds. What that means is 
that they are supposed to only market the funds to certain sophisticated investors 
on a limited basis. That is the very reason why the regulators in many countries, 
such as the US and the UK, have left them free from securities and/or fund 
regulations, and why the regulators do not monitor the funds’ investment activities. 
As such, they are not clearly distinguishable legally because there is no positive 
legal definition available for them, and because they both rely on the same safe 
harbor rules.66 Because of their private nature, it is generally understood that no 
public advertisement or public solicitation is permitted for the funds because they 
both have to satisfy the registration exemption rules.67 As a corollary, both need to 
                                                          
65 For example, both the US and the UK provide private placement and/or private fund safe harbor 
rules for both onshore and offshore private funds to rely on, while Korea simply provides a lighter 
regulatory regime in terms of onshore hedge fund regulation. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1, 2; 
Chapter VI, Part B.2, 3; Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
66 What it implicates is that both funds are likely to become converged at some times depending on 
the market circumstances, and this convergence phenomenon is possible because they are outside 
the regulation and there is no clear and express legal distinction available for them. See e.g. 
Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together after the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private Equity and 
Hedge Funds, 29 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L L. & BUS. 603 (2009) (demonstrating the trend of 
convergence between the two major alternative investment markets especially after the global 
financial crisis of 2008). 
67 Section 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act requires that public solicitation or public 
advertisement be strictly prohibited in order to satisfy the private placement exemption. It is 
noteworthy, however, that a new rule (i.e. Section 506(c) of Regulation D) provides additional and 
more flexible safe harbor rules under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (hereinafter JOBS 
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offer or sell their securities by directly contacting affluent individuals or 
institutional investors, or through a broker-dealer who has a pre-existing 
relationship with the affluent investors to not violate the private offering or private 
fund threshold conditions.68 
Private equity funds are, however, different from hedge funds in some 
respects. 
First, private equity funds are more like closed-end funds, while hedge 
funds are more like open-ended funds. All of the structural differences between 
private equity funds and hedge funds may arise from this basic distinction. Open-
ended funds (i.e., hedge funds here in this case) are funds that have flexibility in 
raising capital from existing or new investors any time during the lifespan of the 
fund, and at the same time get ready to redeem their shares on a periodic basis 
upon investors’ request.  
                                                                                                                                                                
Act) that general solicitation or general advertisement be permitted on the conditions that the 
purchase is limited to accredited investors only, and the issuer takes reasonable steps to make sure 
that all purchasers are accredited investors. This new rule may affect a lot about the hedge fund 
marketing practice because hedge funds can raise capital utilizing public media without particular 
legal or regulatory concern about registration requirements under Section 5 of the Securities Act. 
The U.S. SEC expressly confirmed that this new safe harbor provision will apply to hedge funds 
without any limitations and consequently they can sell or offer the funds’ interests while 
maintaining their 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) based exempted fund status under the Investment Company Act 
if they meet this new safe harbor requirements. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General 
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Release No. 33-9354 
(Aug. 29, 2012) [17 C.F.R. Pts 230, 239 and 242], at 31-32, availablea at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf. 
68 The implication is that there should be little ground to treat them differently from an investor 
protection regulatory perspective because their target investors are same in scope and there is little 
need for direct regulatory intervention to protect them. See infra Chapter III. 
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Because of this characteristic, hedge fund portfolios are typically 
comprised of tradable assets and thus are more comparable to mutual funds.69 In 
contrast, closed-end funds including private equity funds are funds that limit 
investors’ right of redemption during the term of the fund to accommodate a 
strategy of investing primarily in illiquid assets such as private companies’ 
securities.70 
Second, private equity fund investors put their money into the fund for the 
life of the fund, and additional contributions from the investors are made only in 
response to the fund adviser’s request (commonly known as “capital call”). By 
contrast, hedge fund investors, in principle, can liquidate their shares any time and 
put all the capital in the fund initially. This difference arises because private equity 
funds typically raise capital from investors each time they find a target company to 
invest in, while hedge fund investors are free to choose when and how much to 
invest in the fund.  
In addition, private equity funds may distribute cash to its investors at the 
end of its terms by selling its portfolio assets or by sometimes distributing portfolio 
                                                          
69 There is no legal requirement for the hedge funds to be structured as open-ended funds, and in 
reality some of the hedge funds may have some limitation in place especially in terms of the 
availability of the redemption in the private placement memorandum or their constituent documents. 
However, hedge funds are typically structured in the form of an open-ended fund, and the structural 
deviations have been made intentionally to maintain an unregulated fund status by having the 2 
year lock-up provision in place under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act for some while until the 
Dodd-Frank Act eliminated this provision. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.4. 
70 For the legal definition of the closed-end fund, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a–5(a). 
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securities directly to investors, while hedge funds may repurchase or redeem 
investors’ securities at intervals during the life of the fund.71  
 
3. Hedge Funds versus Venture Capital Funds 
Both hedge funds and venture capital funds are of similar nature in that 
basically they are unregulated private pooled investment vehicles, and their target 
investors are limited to so-called accredited investors such as high net-worth 
individuals and institutional investors. Venture capital funds, unlike hedge funds, 
require investors to contribute capital over the life of the fund and to remain in the 
fund for a certain period of time. That is, hedge fund investors can receive 
distributions of capital at intervals by requesting that the adviser redeem their 
shares, or dissolve the fund and liquidate assets.  
Venture capital fund investors typically need to wait until the term of the 
fund is due. In addition, venture capital funds have no secondary markets available 
for their investors due to the illiquid nature of the invested portfolio (namely, 
primarily investing in private and closed startup companies), and investors can 
receive distributions only by liquidating the assets in the portfolio.72 By contrast, 
hedge funds may hold some liquid assets (i.e., exchange traded securities) in 
                                                          
71 For more detailed discussions about private equity funds, see e.g., Joseph W. Barlett & W. Eric 
Swan, Private Equity Funds: What Counts and What Doesn’t?, 26 J. CORP. L. 393 (2001); THOMAS 
P. LEMKE, ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE, 
at 282-84 (2009-2010 ed. 2009). 
72 See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 8; LEMKE, ET AL., supra note 71, at 284-85. 
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addition to illiquid assets, and thus can dispose of the assets to distribute the 
proceeds to investors relatively easily.73  
Another distinguishable feature of venture capital funds is that venture 
capital fund advisers are often actively involved in the target companies’ day-to-
day operations because they sit on the board of directors of the companies they 
invest in.74  
Further, under the US Dodd-Frank Act, venture capital funds have been 
legally defined in a way that exempts them from registration and other compliance 
requirements formerly required of them under the Advisers Act, making venture 
capital funds more clearly distinct from other private funds like hedge funds or 
private equity funds.75 
                                                          
73 See id. 
74 In this regard, venture capital funds are more like private equity funds, but remain different from 
them in that the former typically invest in small or mid-sized startup companies while the latter are 
more likely to invest in mature companies. See id. 
75 Rule 203(l)-1(a) under the Investment Advisers Act defines venture capital fund as “any private 
fund that: 
(1) Represents to investors and potential investors that it pursues a venture capital strategy; 
(2) Immediately after the acquisition of any asset, other than qualifying investments or short-term 
holdings, holds no more than 20 percent of the amount of the fund's aggregate capital contributions 
and uncalled committed capital in assets (other than short-term holdings) that are not qualifying 
investments, valued at cost or fair value, consistently applied by the fund; 
(3) Does not borrow, issue debt obligations, provide guarantees or otherwise incur leverage, in 
excess of 15 percent of the private fund's aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed 
capital, and any such borrowing, indebtedness, guarantee or leverage is for a non-renewable term of 
no longer than 120 calendar days, except that any guarantee by the private fund of a qualifying 
portfolio company's obligations up to the amount of the value of the private fund's investment in the 
qualifying portfolio company is not subject to the 120 calendar day limit; 
30 
      4. Private Equity Funds versus Venture Capital Funds 
As indicated above, both venture capital funds and private equity funds are 
similar in nature because they are private pooled investment funds, and because 
they used to rely on the private fund exemptions to avoid regulation. They are also 
similar in that they both target private companies for investment on a long-term 
basis, and are actively involved in the management of the companies they invest 
in.76  
On the other hand, venture capital funds are still distinguishable from 
private equity funds in that the former typically invest in early stage startup 
companies, while the latter usually invest in mature companies. Because of this 
distinctive investment nature, some differences can be observed between them in 
terms of target companies, deal structure, liquidity, and the like.77 
As indicated above, the demarcation between hedge funds, private equity 
funds, and venture capital funds are not legally made – rather, it has been made 
from the practical business perspectives. It has been traditionally perceived that in 
many respects private equity funds are more like venture capital funds, than hedge 
                                                                                                                                                                
(4) Only issues securities the terms of which do not provide a holder with any right, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, to withdraw, redeem or require the repurchase of such securities but 
may entitle holders to receive distributions made to all holders pro rata; and 
(5) Is not registered under section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and has not elected to 
be treated as a business development company pursuant to section 54 of that Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 
275.203(l)-1(a). 
76 Due to this nature of investment, a venture capital fund may be referred to as being part of a 
private equity fund in a broad sense of meaning. See LEMKE, ET AL., supra note 71, at 284. 
77 For the detailed comparisons between them, see David M. Freedman, The Difference between 




funds, although the boundary between them is not entirely clear. Also, there is a 
tendency for the funds to converge depending on the market situations.78 
 
D. What Benefits Hedge Funds May Provide to the Market? 
 
It has been generally acknowledged and accepted that hedge funds provide 
significant meaningful benefits to both investors and the financial market at large, 
as summarized below.79  
From an investor’ standpoint, the portfolio diversification effect, achieved 
through hedge fund investment, is very useful because unlike regulated mutual 
fund advisers, the hedge fund advisers typically pursue absolute returns regardless 
of whether market condition is bullish or not.  
The absolute return investment strategy utilized by hedge funds has been 
gaining more attention from potential investors - particularly when the market is 
bearish and mutual fund performance is not favorable - because hedge funds 
                                                          
78 Venture capital fund has been newly and legally defined under the Dodd-Frank Act intentionally 
for the purpose of exempting them from registration requirement under the US Advisers Act while 
the former two years of lock up safe harbor provision in place for the private equity fund has been 
eliminated, and they are also in principle subject to registration requirement. In so doing, there was 
a regulatory effort made intentionally to classify private equity funds into private funds, and treat 
private equity funds more like as hedge funds, rather than like venture capital funds, and this 
legislative or regulatory distinction has been justified on the ground that private equity funds have 
also the potential to pose systemic risk like hedge funds, while venture capital funds does not. That 
is, in terms of economic substance, private equity funds are more similar to venture capital funds, 
but legally and intentionally are treated more like hedge funds placing them under the regulatory 
purview similar to hedge funds. See Dodd-Frank Act § 403, 407, 408. 
79 See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 4-5; MFA Comments, supra note 30, at 4-6; 
PHOEBUS ATHANASSIOU, HEDGE FUND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: CURRENT 
TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 91-99 (2009). 
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achieve relatively positive returns regardless of market condition. In other words, 
hedge funds provide the investors with the opportunity to mitigate the portfolio 
volatility risk by diversifying the investors’ portfolio to achieve stable portfolio 
returns, and by actively participating in a wide variety of financially innovative 
products and markets typically unavailable in traditional financial markets.80  
Another advantage to investing in hedge funds is that hedge funds advisers 
typically contribute their own capital into the funds they manage, and their 
compensation is closely linked to the funds’ return via a performance-based fee. 
Consequently, the interest between investors and fund advisers is aligned, 
providing an incentive for the fund advisers to manage the fund in the best 
interests of the investors.81 
From the financial market standpoint, hedge funds also play a constructive 
role in various ways.82 First of all, hedge funds can function as buffer against 
market shock because hedge fund investment strategies such as arbitrage, hedging 
or other counter-market approaches help absorb market disruption.83 In so doing, 
hedge funds may provide liquidity to the market irrespective of the market 
                                                          
80 See id.  
81 Mutual fund advisers also put their capital into the fund when they organize funds. But the 
amount of contribution is usually minimal and they are able to at any time redeem or resell their 
shares in the fund by selling the shares in the market or exercise redemption right to the fund. 
Additionally, their fee structure is typically flat or fixed to a certain percentage of the assets under 
management. Thus, it is likely that mutual fund advisers have fewer incentives to do their best in 
the management of the fund compared to hedge fund managers. See supra text accompanying note 
43.  
82 See supra note 79.  
83 For the details of a variety of hedge fund investment strategies in general, see e.g., LEMKE, ET 
AL., supra note 71, at 2-6. 
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condition, may play an affirmative role as market stabilizer, and may reduce the 
possibility of severe price fluctuation in extremely serious market conditions.  
Second, hedge funds could also play a positive role in the market in that 
they might enhance market liquidity by actively participating in global financial 
markets on a continuous basis. For the same reason, they are also in the position to 
help improve pricing systems and to mitigate market instability by active trading 
based on extensive market research and capital commitment. Hedge Fund trading 
signals to other market participants that the price currently quoted in the 
marketplace may be distorted, which eventually helps narrow the price spread and 
mitigate the then existing pricing inefficiency and illiquidity.  
Third, hedge funds are likely to take contrary positions to those taken 
during the herding market behavior, which drives prices down to a reasonable 
market price, by serving as a counterbalance to the price bubbles and inflated 
market prices typically created by the herding market behavior.84  
Fourth, hedge funds can supply liquidity to illiquid markets. Hedge fund 
investors typically are not allowed to liquidate their investments for a certain 
period of time under their subscription agreement. During that time period, hedge 
                                                          
84 All these hedge funds’ market activities are possible because hedge funds are flexible enough to 
sell or buy the portfolio assets at any time to adjust the portfolio whenever they perceive other 
market participants’ unreasonable behavior. By contrast, mutual funds are not flexible enough to 
switch the fund portfolio in a timely manner because they are generally subject to buy-and-hold 
strategy as disclosed in the prospectus and their advisers have no discretion to change the fund 
investment policy without investors’ advance approval. See supra note 79. 
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fund advisers are able to invest in illiquid assets such as unlisted securities, 
speculative securities (e.g., junk bonds), or OTC derivative contracts.85  
In sum, it has been widely acknowledged that hedge funds play positive 
roles in the market in various ways leading many countries to decide not to 
regulate the hedge funds directly or to lightly regulate them, even after the 2008 
financial crisis. There has also been increasing sentiment worldwide that reinforces 












                                                          
85 Compared to hedge funds, mutual funds are usually limited to invest in illiquid assets because 
they have to be always ready to redeem their shares in response to the existing investors’ request. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–22.  
86 It would be the best and most efficient resolution to regulate hedge funds directly and restrict 
their investment activities in the marketplace like regulated mutual funds if their potentially 
negative impacts on the market were greater than the potential benefits from them. However, major 
jurisdictions like the US and the UK, where many hedge fund managers are based, choose not to 
regulate hedge funds directly because those countries acknowledge that the benefits from hedge 
funds far outweigh any negative impacts on the market. See infra Chapter III, Part B.2. 
35 
III. Main Issues Regarding Hedge Fund Regulation  
 
Unsurprisingly, hedge funds have been a regulatory “hot potato” over 
several decades partly because of their rapid growth in size and their bad 
reputations caused by some high-profile hedge fund episodes. But, nearly all the 
concerns and arguments about them have been derived from the fact that they have 
been outside the regulatory purview during a time when their role in the market 
continues to rise, and thus, when their potential impacts on the market at large 
have become substantial.87 Before having a closer look at the specific hedge fund 
regulatory regimes of the US, UK, and Korea, it is worth first exploring some of 
the fundamental issues underlying hedge fund regulation. 
 
A. Should Hedge Funds be Regulated or Not? 
It has been a controversial issue whether or not hedge fund should be 
subject to securities or fund regulation in full or in part. Various relevant parties 
have expressed their views, but there has been no consensus made about this issue 
among the countries worldwide or even within a particular country.88  
                                                          
87 See generally Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
Hedge Funds Oversight: Consultation Report (March 2009) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Oversight], 
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf; SEC Hedge Fund Report, 
supra note 28. 
88 See e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and Why of 
Securities Regulation, Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (Oct. 23-
27, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/tap.pdf; Andrew 
Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, In Financial Stability Review – Speicial 
Issue on Hedge Funds 19 (April 2007). 
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However, in the wake of high-profile hedge fund scandals and financial 
crises, the trend in the recent decades is toward pro-regulation.89  Nonetheless, 
major jurisdictions like the U.S. and the U.K., where most hedge fund managers 
are currently domiciled, have not changed their previous regulatory position that, 
despite the financial scandals that occurred in the past decades intermittently, 
hedge funds should not be directly subject to the heavy-handed securities or fund 
regulations applicable to mutual funds.90  
The position in the U.S. and the U.K. against direct fund regulation is based 
on the fundamental belief that fund regulations should focus on protecting 
unaccredited and unsophisticated investors from the potential risk of frauds and on 
ensuring their informed investment decisions through the use of mandatory 
disclosure requirements.91  
Considering the facts that hedge funds typically have been offered or sold 
only to sophisticated investors, such as affluent individuals and institutional 
investors, and that hedge funds have played an overall positive role in the global 
                                                          
89 For example, LTCM near-collapse in 1998 and financial market crises in late 1990s and late 
2000s were catalysts for this debate, and pro-regulatory efforts have been made in one way or 
another among the jurisdictions based on these empirical observations. It was premised on the 
belief or observation that those incidents were possible because hedge funds have not been tightly 
regulated or closely monitored although it is not clearly proven whether they really caused the 
systemic risk or overall market instability. See e.g. Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87, at Annex 
5; FSA Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37. See also Crockett, supra note 88; Robert J. Bianchi & 
Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 6 (2010). See 
contra Barbara Crutchfield George, et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry: 
Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 5 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 359 (Summer 2009). 
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); AIFMD, explanatory note 10. 
91 See e.g., Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 226 (1959-1960). 
37 
marketplace, there are not many persuasive grounds for regulating hedge fund 
directly.9293 
However, there may be counter arguments in support of regulation from 
investor protection, functional regulation, and market stability perspectives.94 
First, due to changes in market circumstances compared to the times when 
the relevant laws and regulations after the relevant laws and regulations were 
enacted, many substantively unaccredited investors have been exposed to the 
hedge fund market based on the lower accredited investor threshold conditions, or 
through pension funds or fund of hedge funds (commonly known as a 
“retailization” concern or problem).95  
                                                          
92 It should be noted that the private adviser exemption clause is a bit different from other safe 
harbor provisions under the US securities or fund regime. Other safe harbor provisions, like private 
offering exemption or private fund exemption, are based on the policy rationale that sophisticated 
investors are in a position to “fend for themselves”, and accordingly that there is no practical need 
to regulate the fund and its offering or sale of fund interests vis-à-vis so-called accredited investors 
or comparable financially sophisticated investors. Private adviser exemptions are based the 
rationale that private adviser’s client base is very limited and the size of the fund they manage is 
also insubstantial, and as a result they may have little impacts on the market and cause no serious 
concern for investor protection, although they may have a limited number of retail investors as their 
clients. In essence the private adviser safe harbor rule should be understood in the same way as 
private offering or private fund safe harbor rules in the hedge fund regulation context because it is 
premised on the fact that only accredited investors or comparable investors are accessible to the 
hedge fund market, and assumes that they engage in hedge fund business only. See S.E.C. v. 
Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40. See also Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investment Pools Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment 
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, U.S. SEC), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm.  
93 For more detailed discussions why not to regulate hedge funds and their managers, see e.g., Troy 
A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, 
and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 989, 997, n. 91 (2006). 
94 See id. at 991-92; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (2004). 
95 See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 80-82.  
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Based on this observation, it has been argued that the same rules and 
regulations applied to mutual funds should be applied to the hedge funds, at least 
to some extent; on the ground that hedge fund investors are not genuinely 
sophisticated enough to protect themselves, making direct regulatory intervention 
is necessary.96 In reality, in countries such as Germany, Hong Kong, and Korea, 
private funds are also subject to fund regulations; however, they are lighter 
regulations than those applied to mutual funds.97  
In addition, increasing hedge fund regulation may be argued from a 
functional regulatory standpoint as well. That is, even under the US or Korean 
private fund regimes, unaccredited or unsophisticated retail investors are likely to 
be involved in one way or another.98  
Thus, private fund advisers should be subject to regulation because they 
may have unaccredited or unsophisticated investors as their clients and because 
they provide essentially the same investment advisory services as mutual fund 
managers.99 
                                                          
96 See id. See also Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail 
Investors in Hedge Funds (Feb. 2003), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD142.pdf; Athanassiou, supra note 79, at 52-59; 
Wolf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV. 
B. & FIN. L. 581, 601-11 (2008-2009). 
97 See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 131-43, 187-210; FSCMA, art. 249-2. 
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2007); FSCMA, art. 249-2(1). 
99 See e.g., Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulations, and the Hedge 
Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (2011); Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal 
Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMP. L. 339 (Spring 2008) 
(exploring about why investment adviser regulation is necessary especially from the 
institutionalization perspective). 
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Second, from a market stability or systemic risk standpoint, there are 
concerns about and arguments made for more stringent and mandatory rule-based 
hedge fund regulations - particularly since the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 - 
and these concerns and arguments have been legislatively reflected in the Dodd-
Frank Act in 2010 in the US and the AIFMD in 2011 in the EU, among other 
countries.100  
Interestingly, systemic risk and financial market stability issues were 
initially discussed in the U.S. after the near-collapse and subsequent bailouts of 
Long Term Capital Management (hereinafter as “LTCM”) back in 1998, but 
regulatory concerns at that time were centered more on the investor protection or 
mandatory disclosure side, not on the systemic risk side.101  
From the systemic risk control standpoint, there was a broad consensus 
among local U.S. regulators and market participants that reinforcing market 
discipline through best practices, and not through direct governmental intervention, 
would be a more cost-efficient resolution for mitigating the systemic risk and for 
preventing the reoccurrence of LTCM-like incidents going forward.102  
                                                          
100 See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
101 The SEC issued a staff report about hedge fund problems in 2003, some years after LTCM 
episode in 1998, but the primary concern in the report was that many securities fraud cases had 
occurred where inadequate disclosure had been made by the hedge fund managers due to lack of 
regulation or safe harbor rules (i.e., private adviser exemption) despite the retailization problem. 
See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-88.  
102 See e.g., Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, Report 
of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, April 1999, at 25-26 [hereinafter PWG 
Report], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf; 
General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Long-Term Capital Management: 
Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter GAO 
Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228446.pdf; General Accounting Office, 
Report to Congressional Requesters, Hedge Funds: Regulators and Market Participants are Taking 
40 
However, after the subprime mortgage market collapse and the following 
global financial crisis of 2008, together with the securitization and regulatory gap 
problems with the over-the-counter derivatives market, hedge funds were 
pinpointed as the source of direct or indirect systemic risk despite having no clear 
empirical evidences for that.103  
Legislators and regulators around the world began paying attention to the 
hedge funds as one of the systematically important financial institutions, and have 
tried to regulate hedge funds and/or their managers accordingly. 104  As a 
consequence, the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was amended by the 
Dodd-Frank Act, and mandatory registration regime for hedge fund advisers was 
                                                                                                                                                                
Steps to Strenghthen Market Discipline, but Continued Attention is Needed (Jan. 2008), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-200;Technical Committee of the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities 
Regulators (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter IOSCO Systemic Risk Report], available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf. 
103 For example, the Amaranth Adviser’s case, i.e. another high-profile hedge fund’s collapse, took 
place in 2006 after the LTCM debacle in 1998. Unlike in LTCM, there was no public or private 
bailout occurred to deal with this incident, and the shock was absorbed by the market itself. For 
more information, see Hillary Till, The Amaranth Case : Early Lessons From The Debacle, 
EDHEC Risk & Asset Management Research Centre, October 2, 2006. Bear Sterns’ affiliated two 
hedge funds’ failures in 2007 are examples directly linked to subprime mortgage related financial 
product like CDOs, but it was also resolved among the relevant parties and there was no subsequent 
systemic risk related event resulting from this hedge fund failure. For the details about the Bear 
Sterns’ hedge funds’ failure, see Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds at Bear Sterns Face Shutdown, 
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118230204193441422. 
104 For instance, the U.S. tried to deal with hedge fund related systemic risk concerns indirectly 
through regulating hedge fund advisers and designating some hedge funds or their advisers as 
systematically important non-financial institutions, among other things. The EU also made 
regulatory efforts to put special regimes in place focusing on the alternative investment fund market, 
regulating hedge fund market indirectly by regulating the advisers. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113; 
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 
C.F.R. § 1310, Release No. 70, 70 Fed. Reg. 21637, (April 11, 2012); AIFMD, explanatory note 2, 
10, 49. 
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introduced in the U.S., and a similar regulatory regime targeting alternative 
investment fund managers was also put in place in the EU.105 
Insufficient regulatory access to the hedge fund market and a lack of 
regulatory monitoring tools over it were reasons why mandatory registration was 
necessary from the regulatory standpoint in the U.S.106 Many arguments have been 
made from this regulatory perspective, and hedge fund market monitoring was 
perceived to be essential to proactively preventing potential market disruptions 
from the hedge fund failures.107  
Third, the size of the hedge funds and their activities in the global financial 
market have become more notable over the recent decades, together with the 
institutionalization phenomenon, and there were increased concerns and pressures 
from both investors and legislators to more strictly regulate them than ever.108  
The then-existing “fewer than 15 clients” safe harbor rule under the 
Advisers Act was considered insufficient to effectively regulate hedge funds and 
mitigate their potentially negative impacts on the financial market, in part, because 
                                                          
105 More precisely speaking and as further discussed in infra Chapter IV, the mandatory registration 
requirements for the hedge fund advisers in the U.S. were firstly introduced in 2004 and 
implemented in 2006. However, it was short-lived until the Federal circuit court invalidated SEC’s 
amendment of the Rule under the Advisers Act based on the ground of lacking legislative authority. 
For more details, see Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
106 See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 74-75, 94-95. 
107 As pointed out supra, systemic risk based policy consideration was not taken into account when 
the SEC first endeavored to introduce a mandatory hedge fund adviser registration regime in 2003. 
Rather, this hedge fund information access concern was raised based more on other policy grounds, 
such as investor protection or fraud detection. See id. at 92-96. 
108 For example, Professor Troy A. Paredes illustrates the reasons why SEC has continuously made 
an effort to regulate hedge fund advisers over decades particularly based on these observations. See 
Paredes, supra note 93, at 989. 
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the “look through” rule was no longer in force after the court’s invalidation of the 
SEC’s 2006 hedge fund rule,109 and fund size, rather than the number of clients, 
became more important from the systemic risk regulatory perspective. In that 
regard, it seems appropriate for both legislators and regulators to seek to regulate 
hedge funds and their managers based on their size and/or leverage, not by their 
number of clients.110  
It should be noted, however, that no one-size-fits-all approach (i.e. an 
almost all inclusive rule-based registration requirement) would be appropriate, 
particularly in terms of hedge fund regulation, because of the heterogeneous nature 
of the private fund market, and because assessing and preventing systemic risk 
from hedge funds by the regulators (especially securities regulators) may not be an 
easy mandate to undertake. Further, it is likely that high-profile financial incidents 
will happen occasionally even with a rigorous regime in place.111  
 
B. How to Regulate Hedge Funds?  
Despite many conflicting opinions and arguments raised thus far, it appears 
that global consensus has been made since the global financial crisis of 2008 that 
more stringent regulation of hedge funds is necessary, despite the hedge fund 
                                                          
109 See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105. 
110 See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102. 
111 As a matter of fact, many big-sized and heavily regulated financial institutions such as Lehman 
Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and AIG were bailed out or merged in the turmoil of the 
subprime mortgage related financial crisis of 2008 in the US. See e.g., Steve Denning, Lest We 
Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES, Nov. 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/ (summarizing the background history 
of the crisis of 2008). 
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regulatory framework varying from country to country, and that this regulatory 
reform has been justified mainly from a macro-prudential or a systemic risk 
regulatory perspective.112 That being said, at issue now is how to regulate hedge 
funds and to what extent they should be subject to regulation. With regard to these 
issues, several different regulatory approaches may be taken into consideration as 
follows:113 
 
1. No Direct Regulation Approach 
The first possible regulatory alternative is to maintain the then-existing 
regimes and keep hedge funds and their managers outside the regulatory purview, 
as observed in the U.S. before the global financial crisis of 2008, and to take no 
further regulatory action to directly regulate them, basically counting on market 
participants to be self-disciplined.  
This regulatory approach used to be generally supported and was reflected 
into the regulatory regime in the U.S. before the Dodd-Frank Act came into effect 
in 2011.114 Basically, securities regulators refrain from directly exercising their 
regulatory power or authority and wait see what the relevant market players do in 
                                                          
112 See Dodd-Frank Act, preliminary note; AIFMD, explanatory note 2, 3; IOSCO Systemic Risk 
Report, supra note 102, at 12-13. 
113 For more detailed overview about possible regulatory alternatives, see e.g., Paredes, supra note 
88, at 4-15; ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, at 191-265. 
114 The U.K.’s regulatory model is somewhat similar to that of the U.S., at least from the fund 
regulatory perspective, in that onshore private funds are exempted from regulatory oversight 
provided that the fund units are not offered or sold to the general public and that their managers are 
subject to licensing and ongoing obligations, and offshore private funds are also outside the local 
regulatory purview unless they are marketed to the investing public. For more details, see infra 
Chapter V, Part B. 
44 
the marketplace, encouraging them to regulate themselves by relying on best 
practices or guidelines for the funds, fund managers, and their counterparties, 
made and released by (quasi) self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”) in cooperation 
with the regulators, effectively minimizing the regulators’ direct intervention.115  
This regulatory approach is based on the premise and belief that the then-
existing regulation and safe harbor rules, as well as the general anti-fraud rules, 
had sufficiently functioned without serious regulatory problems or concerns 
despite the fact that high-profile financial scandals took place occasionally.116  
In fact, hedge funds and their managers have been regulated to some extent 
even under the then-existing regime in the U.S.: They have been subject to anti-
fraud rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and they owe fiduciary duties-like disclosure, avoidance of 
conflicts of interest, and managing the fund assets in the best interest of the funds 
or their beneficial owners (i.e., underlying shareholders).117 In addition, they are 
subject to various securities related rules and regulations such as reporting 
                                                          
115 More precisely speaking, under the then-existing US regime, hedge funds and their managers are 
almost completely able to avoid regulatory oversight relying on the then-available safe harbor rules, 
and the securities regulators were in the position to enforce them on an ex-post basis against their 
malpractices under the general anti-fraud rules. For the detailed U.S safe harbor rules available to 
the hedge funds and their managers before the Dodd-Frank Act was in force in 2011, see infra 
Chapter IV, Part B. 
116 See supra note 103. 
117 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Regarding the broad applicability of the anti-
fraud rule (i.e., Rule 10b-5), see generally DONNA M. NAGI ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (MAR. 2013). 
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requirement for the holdings of the reporting companies and insider trading or 
market manipulation rules under the Securities Exchange Act. 118 
Overall, this approach is based on the conventional belief that the hedge 
fund market should be well-functioning even without direct governmental 
intervention119 because it is a market for accredited investors only and they are 
legally deemed sophisticated enough to “fend for themselves”. 120  Further, 
institutional investors like pension funds or financial institutions participate in the 
hedge fund market as investors, creditors and/or counterparties. There is little 
doubt that they are in the position to negotiate with the hedge fund managers on an 
arm’s length basis, and that they are economically self-incentivized and best-
positioned to oversee the managers’ activities themselves or with the help of third 
party service providers such as fund rating agencies.121  
Thus, at least in terms of a micro-prudential regulatory perspective (i.e., 
from investor protection and/or deterrence of market fraud standpoint), it appears 
that existing regimes may be working relatively well and there may not be 
sufficient changes in factual or regulatory circumstances to the extent necessary to 
                                                          
118 See infra Chapter IV, Part B. 
119 See e.g., Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation 
and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 240, 295-97 (2009) (arguing that flexible 
regulation allowing financial innovation together with performance based fee and managerial co-
investment would enhance investor protection even without further regulation). 
120 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40. 
121 See Paredes, supra note 88. See contra Schwarcz, supra note 94 (arguing that the deemed 
sophisticated investors are not sophisticated enough to understand certain complex financial 
products, and accordingly need governmental protection). 
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justify changing the existing rules and underlying principles for various safe harbor 
rules.122  
This approach, however, may have inherent problems in that unaccredited 
investors can access the hedge fund markets in some ways.123 In addition, due to 
the increasing complexity of innovative financial products, even accredited 
investors may have difficulty completely understanding about the hedge funds they 
invest in and their investment strategies or potential risks.124  
                                                          
122 Some may argue that with the institutionalization phenomenon on one hand, and the 
securitization phenomenon together with the increase in hedge fund exposure from retail investors 
on the other hand, the direct regulation of the funds and their managers may be justified. See e.g., 
Krug, supra note 99. However, these phenomena may not necessarily justifying the direct 
regulation of the funds market because in principle these ideas may be reflected implicitly in the 
original legislation and dealt with even under current regulatory regime based on mandated 
disclosure for the general public (i.e., unsophisticated investors) from investor protection standpoint. 
Even from a systemic risk perspective, although it has not reflected in the original securities 
regulation, it could be dealt with in a different way (by regulating products, counterparties, and/or 
investors as well as by market discipline), and accordingly it could not be concluded that the 
securities regulation must be shifted fundamentally to directly and fully regulate them to ensure the 
financial stability. See e.g., Crockett, supra note 88, at 19 et seq. 
123 For instance, unaccredited investors are directly accessible to the hedge funds subject to 
sophistication test under the US Regulation D on a limited basis, and they are also able to invest in 
the hedge funds indirectly via fund of funds, trust or segregated management account. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506(b)(ii). See also supra text accompanying note 22. 
124 This problem could be resolved by limiting unaccredited investors’ direct access to hedge funds 
or making higher threshold conditions for accredited investors. Nobody, including institutional 
investors, is sophisticated enough to understand everything for sure about the hedge funds and their 
investment strategies as well as investment risks, but assume that current securities regime based on 
mandated disclosure should be maintained and it is necessary and inevitable to distinguish private 
market from public market, accredited investors concept is necessary and they should be deemed 
financially sophisticated enough to be outside direct regulatory intervention. Otherwise, it is 
practically impossible to comply with the rules or it is more likely very time and cost inefficient. 
Recent SEC’s rulemaking under the JOBS Act that permits hedge funds to market to the investing 
public on the condition that the actual purchaser are strictly limited to accredited investors only 
may be regarded as one of the significant regulatory efforts made in this direction. See infra text 
accompanying note 227. 
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More than anything else, this regulatory option is problematic because it is 
not ready to answer for the systemic stability concerns raised in the wake of the 
global financial crisis of 2008; this is not what the then-existing securities and fund 
regimes had taken into consideration when they were originally enacted.125 
 
2. Regulating Funds only Approach 
Another option is to regulate the hedge fund directly, while leaving the 
managers unregulated or lightly regulated. This alternative should be based on the 
belief that the best way to deal with hedge fund problems in terms of investor 
protection, deterrence of market abuse, and market stability, is to directly regulate 
hedge funds’ highly risky and leveraged investment activities. 126  Regulatory 
concerns - such as insufficient disclosure, market frauds and market instability - 
posed by the hedge funds may be handled more effectively and efficiently if they 
are regulated directly.  
By imposing various disclosure and diversification requirements, business 
conduct rules, and leverage limitations, regulators will directly respond to the 
regulatory concerns raised, which is the very way that regulators deal with the 
mutual fund market.127  
                                                          
125 See supra note 107. 
126 Mutual fund-like regulation such as restricting leveraged transactions and/or mandating portfolio 
diversification would be the best way to directly regulate hedge funds, and it would be the most 
effective way to regulate them particularly from the systemic risk-based regulatory perspective.  
127 All these regulatory restrictions and governmental preemptive regulatory measures have been 
justified because the investing public may be directly exposed to the market, and they are the very 
persons that should be protected under the governmental regulatory umbrella. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 
80a–1(b). 
48 
This regulatory alternative cannot be commonly observed in many 
countries around the world, but Korea may be an example of a country adopting 
this approach.128 Under the FSCMA, both private equity funds and hedge funds 
have been subject to direct regulatory supervision while managers of the private 
equity funds had been exempted from direct regulations such as licensing or 
registration requirement.129 That is, on the one hand, there are some regulatory 
requirements about leverage, code of business conduct, valuation and reporting 
requirements in place governing private equity funds under the FSCMA, while, on 
the other hand, no registration or licensing obligation is required for the managers.  
As a consequence, the managers are allowed to do almost everything 
themselves without regulatory concerns, such as the fund establishment, the fund 
marketing, and the fund assets custody on the condition that their investment 
activities are made in compliance with the so-called management participatory 
investments such as 10% or more of the target company’s equity holdings with 
voting right and they raise capital on a private placement basis.130  
                                                          
128 What should be noted is that Korean regime took this fund regulation only approach vis-à-vis 
private equity funds, not hedge funds. But it is still somewhat meaningful in contemplating how to 
design hedge fund regulatory architecture in that they both are of similar nature in many respects 
and there is an increasing tendency to regulate them under the same regulatory regime. In 
accordance with this global regulatory consensus, the Korean regulator changed its position and 
now regulates the managers as well as the funds in terms of Private equity Fund regulation by 
amending the relevant rules and regulations in May 2013. See FSCMA, art. 272-2.  
129 As indicated in supra note 127, this fund only regulatory approach has been repealed in Korea, 
and the managers for private equity funds are now subject to registration and reporting 
requirements under the revised FSCMA, which took effect in May 2013, although they are subject 
to somewhat different and lighter regulation than hedge funds’ managers. See FSCMA, art 249-2, 
272-2.  
130 This is somewhat uncommon approach in that the manager, not the fund itself, is the very person 
responsible for day-to-day management of the fund’s investment activities. Thus it would be a very 
rare and exceptional case, and not easy to take this position in general in designing the regulatory 
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This regulatory option, however, has somewhat inherent critical limitations 
and accordingly is difficult to consider as a viable regulatory option, in part 
because fund-focused regulation may be easily avoided by establishing the fund 
offshore.131 Undoubtedly, the manager is also a more important and more relevant 
regulatory target in that the manager is a real entity, the very person in charge of 
day-to-day activities of the fund, while the fund itself is a kind of a special purpose 
investment vehicle utilized by the manager to achieve their goals.  
In addition, A fundamental problematic part of this option is that it may 
confuse the distinction between the mutual funds and the private funds; also, there 
are few justifiable grounds to regulate them directly, at least from the micro-
prudential regulatory standpoint, assuming that they are only marketed to a limited 
pool of accredited investors and that they are strictly prohibited from marketing to 
the investing public. Further, it is also problematic to only regulate the funds 
because doing so is likely to deter the financial innovation and market efficiency, 
promoted by a friendlier regulatory environment.132 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
framework vis-à-vis private funds including hedge funds and private equity funds. See 
ganjeobtuzajasanunyongebbeob [Indirect Investment Asset Management Business Act], Act. No. 
7221, Gwanbo 15811, Oct. 5, 2004, at 19. 
131 The extraterritorial application issue may arise in this situation, but it may be extremely difficult 
for the local regulators to detect these law evasion cases, largely because basically the funds and 
their managers both are out of the regulator’s oversight.   
132 That is the very reason why the U.S. and the EU take regulatory positions not to regulate the 
private funds directly, but to regulate the managers instead. See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, 
Part C. 
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3. Regulating Fund Managers Only Approach 
A third regulatory alternative is to regulate the hedge fund managers, while 
the funds remain unregulated. This approach is predicated on the belief that it 
would be better to leave hedge funds unregulated, considering the overall market 
benefits they create are derived from the fact that they have been unregulated.133 It 
is also premised on the ground that their negative impacts on the market could be 
controlled and manage by regulating fund managers, rather than the funds 
themselves, because the managers are the very persons that have unlimited 
direction in investing and managing the funds’ assets on a continuous basis.134  
This regulatory model has been adopted by some jurisdictions, such as the 
U.S. (post-Dodd-Frank Act), the EU (including the U.K., pre-AIMFD), and 
Singapore.135 This approach may be assessed as a less drastic regulatory measure 
than direct fund regulation or fund/manager regulation because it strikes a 
regulatory balance. It acknowledges that hedge funds have provided many benefits 
to the overall market and to investors, but that the funds have done so largely by 
staying outside direct regulatory intervention. By regulating the managers, the 
potentially negative impacts that the funds may pose to the market and to investors 
is minimized.136  
                                                          
133 See supra Chapter II, Part D. 
134 See e.g., Michael McDonald, Notes and Comments, Containing Systemic Risks: New 
Developments in Trans-Atlantic Hedge Fund Regulation, 34 LOY. L. A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237, 
241 (Fall 2011). 
135 See Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87. 
136 The U.K. used to prefer this regulatory option, and the U.S. takes the U.K.’s lead under the 
Dodd-Frank Act. In so doing, they expect to maintain their competitive edge against other 
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Regulating fund managers allow them to set up hedge funds onshore or 
offshore at their discretions without any legal limitation, and as a result they are in 
the position to pursue absolute return (i.e., maximization of the fund’s potential 
return regardless of market situation). The fund managers can them utilize various 
alternative investment strategies including leveraged transactions (i.e., borrowing, 
short sale, and/or over-the-counter derivatives transactions) because they can avoid 
the stringent investment restrictions imposed on the mutual funds.137  
However, highly leveraged investment activities by the hedge funds may be 
restricted indirectly. That is, under this scenario, hedge fund managers are under 
regulatory oversight and are required to implement risk management policies and 
procedures, and to report their holdings and highly risky leveraged transactions to 
the regulators periodically. Regulators can take regulatory action against fund 
managers if they believe it is necessary.138  
This regulatory approach may also be justified from the investor protection, 
anti-market abuse, and financial market stability perspectives.  
First, in terms of investor protection, hedge fund investors may be better 
protected than ever because the managers are directly subject to onerous regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                
jurisdictions, and they believe this would keep the local market efficient, competitive and 
financially innovative. See e.g., Callum McCarthy, FSA Chairman, Speech at European Money and 
Finance Forum, Hedge Funds: What Should be the Regulatory Response?, Speech at the European 
Money and Finance Forum (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-
resources/news/hedge-funds-what-should-be-the-regulatory-response-speech-by-callum-mccarthy-
cha/. 
137 See e.g., Alexander Ineichen & Kurt Silverstein, AIMA’s Roadmap to Hedge Funds (November 
2008), at 30-31, available at 
http://www.tsakunov.com/lectures/aima_sroadmaptohedgefunds2008_12205.pdf. 
138 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4; AIFMD, art. 22, 24; FSCMA, art. 249-2. 
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requirements; such as code of conduct, code of ethics, and performance fees, in 
addition to the registration/authorization and reporting requirements.139  
Investor protection may be achieved through self-regulation in the forms of 
market discipline by making default rules or by providing guidance, rather than by 
directly mandating that they comply with regulatory requirements. In this scenario, 
hedge fund investors have less protection because best practices and guidances are 
not legally binding, and also details on practices and guidances are often left 
unclear and managers have discretion on whether or not to adopt it internally.140  
This may not be strong argument, however, because there are no 
sufficiently justifiable grounds to regulate hedge fund managers if the hedge fund 
investors are limited to accredited investors or qualified purchasers meeting some 
threshold test about their financial sophistication.141  
Further, because the beneficial owners of the funds are deemed financially 
sophisticated investors, such as accredited investors or qualified purchasers, any 
unaccredited investors are tested for their financial sophistication before they 
invest in the fund, there seems no practical need to directly regulate hedge fund 
managers, and this accredited investor market was not originally intended to be 
                                                          
139 These rules and regulations used to be applied to mutual fund advisers. Private fund advisers 
were exempted in the U.S. based on the private adviser safe harbor rule under the Advisers Act 
until the Dodd-Frank Act has been implemented. However, hedge fund advisers have become 
subject to the Advisers Act in the same as mutual fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-3. 
140 See e.g., Paredes, supra note 88, at 10-15. 
141 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 230.215, 506(b)(ii). 
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under direct regulatory oversight when the relevant laws and regulations was 
enacted.142  
Second, regulating fund managers on an anti-market fraud policy ground is 
not persuasive because market fraud issue is basically a matter of law enforcement. 
Hedge fund managers have already been subject to anti-fraud rules and they are 
subject to administrative, civil, and/or criminal sanctions if found in violation of 
the rules.143  
Thus, market fraud issue can be efficiently and effectively tackled if 
regulators are vigilant in bringing enforcement actions against hedge fund 
managers engaging in fraudulent market activities. Considering equal negotiation 
powers, many things could also be resolved between fund managers and fund 
investors, and regulators could further investigate the alleged frauds if necessary. 
Finally, it is inevitable that market fraud cases involving hedge fund managers 
                                                          
142 See id. Some may argue the so-called private adviser exemption is different from private 
offering or private fund exemptions, and it was based on the policy ground that their business is 
relatively small and limited in nature and in scope, and their impacts to the market or investors are 
not that substantial enough to governmental intervention when it was originally enacted in the U.S. 
It may be true in that, at the time of the legislation (i.e., in 1940), the legislators had never 
contemplated about the hedge funds as clients because hedge funds did not emerge in the market 
until late 1940s. See e.g., Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial 
Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J.INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 1, 51 (Fall 2007). See also Sec. Exch. Comm., Registration under the Advisers Act of 
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,069 (Dec.10, 2004). 
However, suppose that there is only accredited investors or qualified purchasers involved in the 
hedge funds, then it becomes doubtful why regulators are necessary in the market at least from the 
micro-prudential regulatory standpoint, and in that regard it may be more reasonable and consistent 
to say that hedge fund managers are not the right target for direct regulation at least in terms of 
investor protection. 
143 See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5; FSCMA, art. 178. 
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would occur regardless of whether there are detailed and paternalistic regulatory 
provisions in place.144  
Third, the systemic risk or market stability-based policy argument might be 
the strongest for the direct hedge fund manager regulation. With the increase of the 
size of hedge funds and their role in the global financial market, it becomes crucial 
to keep an eye on their asset sizes, portfolios, and leveraged positions on an 
ongoing basis. By doing so, the regulators are able to take appropriate measures to 
prevent or mitigate any potential market disruption on a timely basis.145  
However, this argument has some weak points because of the following 
reasons:  
First, system risk may be not something the government can prevent 
preemptively and completely because of the technical complexity involved and 
because it is something that will inevitably occur even under heavily regulated 
market environments.146  
                                                          
144 See e.g., Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the 
Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 
31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 637, 683 (Summer 2011) (arguing that the Madoff’s Ponzi scheme could 
have been prevented, despite the fund and fund managers being unregulated, if the regulator had 
kept alert while examining the relevant regulated entities affiliated with the Madoff fund and its 
managers). 
145 See e.g., Jon Danielson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, in Financial Stability 
Review: Special Issue on Hedge Funds 29 (April 2007), available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/r
sf_0407.pdf. 
146 See e.g., Carl Hasselbarth, How Should We Regulate Hedge Funds?, 16 PIABA B.J. 233, 263-64 
(2009). 
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Second, securities regulators may not be capable of monitoring systemic 
risk because of the burden in undertaking this regulatory mandate. 147  Rather, 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter as “FSOC”) under the Dodd-
Frank Act may be a more appropriate regulatory body to undertake systemic risk 
oversight. As a matter of fact, the FSOC has been contemplating taking regulatory 
action to designate certain hedge funds and the managers as systematically 
important non-financial institutions.148  
In addition, systemic risk may be avoided or minimized if relevant 
counterparties or creditors vis-à-vis hedge funds, such as investors, prime brokers, 
and/or lenders, are properly monitored because most of them are also regulated 
entities.149 
In short, direct governmental direct intervention against the hedge fund 
managers should be minimized, even if the regulators seek to gather information 





                                                          
147 See e.g., C. George Nnona, In the Wake of the Mortgage Bubble and Financial Crisis: What 
Should Securities Regulation Become?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 31, 35-41 (2010). 
148 See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 
supra note 104. 
149 See e.g., Paredes, supra note 93.  
150 For more detailed discussion about this, see infra Chapter VII, Part D. 
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4.  Regulating Both Hedge Funds and Managers Approach  
This regulatory alternative may be viewed as the most conservative and 
stringent in that it aims to directly respond to all possible hedge fund problems 
raised. It seems, however, practically difficult to be implemented in jurisdictions 
such as the U.S. and the U.K. because those jurisdiction have traditionally 
provided relatively friendly regulatory environments for hedge funds and their 
managers; indeed, that is the primary reason why those two countries have 
maintained an advantageous status as hedge fund habitats than other 
jurisdictions.151  
In countries where the hedge fund markets have not been well-developed in 
the past, the governments play a more paternalistic role – preferring to regulate 
both hedge funds and managers. For example, in Germany and Korea, the hedge 
fund market has not come into existence for a long time; rather the governments in 
those two countries took initiatives and played a leading role in promoting the 
local hedge fund market.152  
This regulatory alternative has strengths from a regulatory perspective 
because it is more likely to accommodate every possible regulatory concerns raised, 
such as investor protection, anti-market fraud, and market stability. The 
government would implement rules and regulations applicable to hedge funds and 
                                                          
151 See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 483-521; MERYL E WEINER, UNITED STATES, IN 
INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO HEDGE FUND REGULATION (Martin Cornish & Ian Mason eds., 2009), 
at 525-84. 
152 See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 131-44. See also infra Chapter VI, Part A. 
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their managers, and hedge fund regulation would become more like mutual fund 
regulation in nature and in substance.  
Hedge funds and their managers would be subject to specific regulatory 
obligations, like those governing mutual funds and their managers, although those 
regulatory obligations may be relatively lighter than those applied to the mutual 
funds. In that regard, hedge funds and their managers become no more unregulated 
entities, and they become somewhat regulated entities in nature.153 
This regulatory approach has a fundamental weak point, however, in that it 
is more likely to become a government-led market, not based on the market 
demand and supply, and hedge funds and their managers may face many 
regulatory hurdles in accommodating market demands, including adapting 
themselves to the changes in market circumstances in a timely manner and on a 
continuous basis. That is, this direct regulatory intervention is more likely to 
prevent them from utilizing various absolute return strategies because this 
regulatory regime is not likely to be flexible enough to accommodate the diverse 
and complex nature of the hedge fund market.  
Similarly, another problem with this option is that it is more likely to deter 
the natural development of the private market, including the hedge fund market, 
and make market participants more reliant on regulators. An overreliance on 
regulators creates increased opportunities for moral hazard, while at the same time 
                                                          
153 Any issue about hedge fund regulation may be converged into this direction eventually because 
any regulatory efforts should be made to treat them more like mutual funds assume that there is 
little difference between them and same regulatory concerns exist in both industries. 
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giving investors the impression that they may be protected by the government in 
case something bad happens.154  
Further, considering the global nature of hedge funds, a regulatory regime 
that governs both hedge funds and managers is likely to create serious conflict with 
other jurisdictions around the world. As a consequence, the market becomes more 
localized and force hedge funds and their managers are forced to move offshore in 
pursuit of friendlier regulatory environments.155  
 
5. Regulating Investors Only Approach 
This approach is to regulate hedge funds and their managers indirectly, 
relying on self-regulation and market discipline in combination with strict 
threshold requirements in determining who is sophisticated enough to invest in 
hedge funds without governmental protection.156  
Undoubtedly, this regulatory approach is worth taking into consideration in 
that, provided that only sophisticated investors invest in hedge funds, it provides 
ample autonomy and flexibility to the market, encouraging financial innovation 
and encouraging self-competence. That is, under this regime hedge funds are in the 
position to police themselves by making and implementing best market practices 
                                                          
154 See e.g., Crockett, supra note 88, at 25. 
155 See e.g., Barney Jopson & Peter Thal Larsen, International Watchdog to Probe Risk from Hedge 
Funds, FIN. TIMES, October 6, 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8cb5e920-3606-
11da-903d-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2ngNCe3cL. 
156 See e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 279 (March 2000). 
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for both the managers and the counterparties, while considering changes in market 
circumstances.  
Regulatory concerns over investor protection can be mitigated through 
fine-tuning of the threshold conditions to become an accredited investor.157 Under 
this regulatory option, accredited investor and qualified purchaser eligibility 
requirements are more likely to be revised reflecting the changes in market 
environment and the regulators may revisit the issues of who are really financially 
sophisticated enough to protect themselves and whether existing criteria or 
threshold conditions for the accredited investor and qualified purchaser are 
sufficient to justify the self-regulation or market discipline.158 
By so doing, investor protection concern may be mitigated without serious 
regulatory concern and systemic risk issue also may be able to be dealt with in 
between the hedge fund managers and their counterparties/creditors by developing 
and implementing appropriate internal control system including risk management 
policy and procedures internally.159  
                                                          
157 This apparently somewhat progressive regulatory approach is premised on the assumption that if 
the hedge fund market is entirely comprised of accredited or sophisticated investors, and all other 
parties involved in the market such as creditor-bank or counterparty-prime broker are regulated 
entities and institutional investors at the same time, then there is no practical need for the regulator 
to directly intervene in the market on an ex-ante basis. Because they are all sophisticated investors, 
deemed to be capable of making informed decisions themselves, and the regulator has the ability to 
monitor and intervene in the market if necessary via creditor or counterparty-regulated entities. See 
generally ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, at 215-36 (neutrally illustrating about self-regulation 
versus external regulation, and direct regulation versus indirect regulation as well). 
158 See id. 
159 See id.  
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In sum, this regulatory option may be desirable - particularly from the 
micro-prudential or investor protection regulatory perspective - but it seems like a 
weak option from the macro-prudential or systemic risk regulatory perspective 
because it is less likely that market discipline will work properly under this 
scenario particularly when serious market disruptions occur because hedge funds 
and other relevant market participants are most likely to behave in their own best 
economic interests.160 
 
6. Regulating Counterparties Only Approach 
This counterparty oriented regulatory option is based on the idea that 
regulating hedge fund counterparties, like prime brokers or other financial 
institutions having a close business relationship with hedge funds, is sufficient and 
more cost-efficient in dealing with hedge fund problems. These counterparties 
have a good understanding of hedge funds and are in the best position to oversee 
the hedge fund manager’s daily investment activities and to evaluate any 
potentially negative implications.161  
This approach is premised on the belief that it could be implemented 
without direct governmental regulation of hedge funds because these 
counterparties are all regulated entities; hedge funds could be effectively 
monitored and controlled indirectly through these regulated counterparties 
                                                          
160 See id. at 226-36. 
161 See id. See also United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, House of 
Representatives, Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and 
Investment Challenges (Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director of Financial Markets and 
Community Investment), May 7, 2007, at 11-14, available at http://gao.gov/assets/130/122480.pdf. 
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accordingly.162 In other words, counterparties’ positions and risk exposures from 
hedge funds could be managed by mandating that they keep appropriate levels of 
capital, and at the same time by mandating that they put proper risk management 
policies and procedures in place.163  
It is anticipated that excessive leverage by hedge funds would remain 
within a controllable scope.164 With this regulatory approach, governments can 
minimize direct regulatory intervention into the hedge funds market by focusing on 
counterparties and/or creditors as a means to prevent or mitigate their negative 
impacts on the markets.165  
What is problematic with this scenario is that, on the one hand, these 
lenders, investors, and/or transactional counterparties are well-positioned to protect 
themselves by conducting due diligence investigations before investing, lending, or 
entering into transactional agreements. However, their economic interests are so 
closely interconnected with the funds that they are likely to be less vigilant in 
                                                          
162 See supra text accompanying note 157. See also Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables? 
The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2008) 
(arguing that a system of disclosure for derivatives be implemented by emphasizing the role of 
traders in the derivatives market). 
163 For instance, the Volcker Rule under the Dodd-Frank Act, which strictly restricts banking 
entities from proprietary trading and limits the banks’ stakes on the private funds such as hedge 
funds or private equity funds, may be regarded as a vivid example of this counterparty regulatory 
approach because it may substantially reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of systemic risk 
especially arisen from the credit channel. For more details of the text of the final common rules 
between the US regulatory agencies regarding Volcker Rule, see Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency & Securities and Exchange Commission, Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in and Relationships with Covered Funds, available at 
http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/id/cbre-9e9guh/$File/Volcker%20Reg%20Text.pdf. 
164 See supra note 157. 
165 See id. See also PWG Report, supra note 102, at 25-26. 
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monitoring and evaluating the funds and their managers’ investment activities 
because hedge funds are a primary source of their income.166  
As illustrated above, this regulatory approach has some advantages in 
ensuring market stability.167 However, a problem exists in that it is more likely to 
work well in ordinary situations and it is not likely operate properly during high-
profile financial scandals.168  
Additionally, this regulatory approach will likely encounter problems 
gathering the hedge fund related information (i.e., hedge fund activities, leveraged 
positions etc.) on an integrated basis because multiple service providers exist to 
serve hedge funds – resulting in information that may be fragmented and 
ultimately insufficient to measure overall risks.169 Further, monitoring the hedge 
fund market from a macro-prudential regulatory perspective is not something for 
counterparties to do, rather it is what financial regulators need to undertake.170  
Regulators’ role becomes more important in this regulatory regime because 
regulators may be the only appropriate entities for gathering hedge fund 
information on a consolidated basis - with the help of the regulated counterparties-
financial institutions, and as a result need to have a close eye on hedge funds’ 
                                                          
166 See id.  
167 This regulatory option assumes that investor protection concerns are not critical because all of 
the investors in this market must be deemed sophisticated investors before participating. See supra 
Chapter III, Part B.5. 
168 See PWG Report, supra note 102. 
169 See supra note 161. 
170 See e.g., FSA Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37, at 3-4, 20. 
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activities and their leverage positions to ensure market stability, and minimize the 
possibility of a hedge fund-led market dismantling.171  
The success of this regulatory approach is heavily dependent on the level of 
cooperation between regulators and regulated counterparties-financial institutions, 
and may require technical support from key market players to fully understand the 
complex and diverse nature of hedge funds involved.  
Further, self-regulatory organizations are as important as regulators in this 
regulatory approach for the role they play in making/implementing best practices – 
ensuring that regulated counterparties-financial institutions not only put proper risk 
management policies and procedures in place, but also rigorously implement 
them.172 
 
C. Summary and Comments  
Every regulatory option illustrated above has strong points and limitations, 
as illustrated supra. Some useful implications, however, can be garnered from each 
of them. First of all, it is important to acknowledge first that both investor 
protection concern and systemic risk concern are equally important, and should be 
taken into consideration simultaneously when comtemplating hedge fund 
regulatory architecture.173  
                                                          
171 See supra note 159. 
172 See id. 
173 See e.g., Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, 
Hedge Funds Oversight: Final Report, June 2009, available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf. 
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Among the possible scenarios, the first regulatory option (no regulation 
approach) and the fifth regulatory option (investor regulation approach) are 
difficult to recommend and may be the least viable options. The sixth regulatory 
option (counterparty regulation approach) is also less likely to be fully justified or 
supported because it does not touch the investor protection issue directly and it 
does not respond to the systemic risk issue in a convincing way.174 Therefore, the 
second (fund regulation approach), third (manager regulation approach), and/or 
fourth regulatory options (both fund and manager regulation approach) are worth 
exploring further. 
First, it should be noted that the investor protection issue has been 
sufficiently contemplated and incorporated into current securities and fund related 
statutes, and that they have arguably been functioning relatively well so far 
considering the fact that there has been a clear distinction made between the 
accredited investors market and the unaccredited investors market under each 
jurisdiction.  
It remains unchanged until now even after the global financial crisis of 
2008 and it is unlikely that this regulatory differentiation between the two investor 
groups will be changed in the foreseeable future, albeit some controversies do 
surround the criteria for the distinction and the threshold conditions, because the 
                                                          
174 In this scenario, both the government and the regulated counterparties are likely to have 
imperfect and incomplete hedge fund information, making it harder for the regulators to monitor 
hedge fund activities and leverage positions on a consolidated and continuous basis. The global 
nature of hedge funds’ domiciles and their investment activities under this approach will make it 
much harder for the regulators to oversee them because local regulators are likely to have limited 
access to hedge funds who have transactional relationships with local regulated counterparties. See 
supra note 161. 
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underlying rationale behind the regime has been also well-preserved and 
respected. 175  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that merely fine tuning 
approach (i.e., redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions) is sufficient 
to deal with the investor protection problem.176  
The accredited investor standard should be periodically re-examined, and 
perhaps heightened in accordance with the changes in economic situations. At a 
minimum, the standard should be set to ensure that both institutional investors and 
affluent individuals have no problem understanding the complex nature of hedge 
funds and the accompanying risks inherent in hedge fund investments, and to 
ensure that they are competent to assume the risk themselves.177  
There is no doubt that nobody (including institutional investors) can be 
confident in knowing everything for sure about hedge funds and their investment 
strategies. This regulatory concern, however, should not be heavily weighted 
because securities and fund regimes have been in place focusing on protecting the 
investing public (i.e., unaccredited investors), and despite many safe harbor rules 
being available in private markets focusing on accredited investors, it has been 
functioning well without serious problems thus far.178 
                                                          
175 See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C. 
176 See e.g., Choi, supra note 156. 
177 See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 412. 
178 The best way to ensure that only financially sophisticated investors can partake in the hedge 
fund market would be to require accredited investors to go through a sophistication test before 
investment, but it would be practically impossible and cost-inefficient in that it may entail 
unbearable compliance costs and a burden to both market intermediaries and investors as well. As a 
result, regulatory efforts to distinguish private markets from public markets, and to treat them 
become void. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no fundamental regulatory change needed in 
this regard. See supra note 175. 
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On the other hand, from a systemic risk-related information gathering 
perspective, it is necessary that regulators be in a position to obtain hedge fund-
related information on a consolidated basis and in a timely manner. In that regard, 
and because hedge fund managers are responsible for the fund’s day-to-day 
investment activities, it looks reasonable to mandate that they (and not the fund 
itself) either register with the regulator, or be required to be authorized by the 
regulator.179  
The problem under this regime, however, is that registration or 
authorization requirements for hedge fund managers inevitably entails many 
onerous ongoing compliance burdens, and it is doubtful that those regulatory 
obligations are really necessary from the macro-prudential or systemic risk 
regulatory perspective.180  
Thus, it is worth thinking about narrowing the scope of regulation placed 
on hedge fund managers. That is, provided that unaccredited and unsophisticated 
investors’ direct exposure to hedge funds are strictly barred, regulations must 
ensure that hedge fund managers be treated differently from mutual fund advisers 
and that mandatory compliance obligations, other than registration/authorization 
                                                          
179 See Mcdonald, supra note 134.  
180 As pointed out supra, many rules and regulations applicable to the hedge fund managers are 
somewhat irrelevant to systemic risk other than registration/authorization, reporting and 
recordkeeping, and examination requirements, and rather are more relevant to investor protection. 
But, as emphasized earlier, there seems to be no strong regulatory necessity in applying those rules 
and regulations to the hedge fund managers, assuming that there is no investing public directly 
accessing the private market, because most of the rules and regulations are in place to protect the 
investing public. See e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 6 DUKE L. J. 1081, 1133-34 (1988); Loomis, supra note 91, at 226. 
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and periodic reporting/recordkeeping requirements, be imposed on them as little as 
possible.181 
 
Table 1: Comparisons between the Hedge Fund Regulatory Alternatives 
 Strong Points Weak Points 
No Direct Regulation 
Approach 
-Ensure self-regulation 
and market discipline 
-Maximize market 
efficiency and financial 
innovation 
-Vulnerable to market 
shock 
-No contingency plan in 
place 
-Likely to cause a “race 
to the bottom” problem 
Fund Only Regulation 
Approach 
-Directly respond to the 
risks and problems 
inherent in hedge funds  
-Deter market efficiency 
and financial innovation 
-Likely to cause moral 
hazard 
-Likely to make the 
distinction between the 
mutual fund market and 
the private fund market 
blurry  
Fund Manager Only 
Regulation Approach 
-Less drastic than 








-Likely to cause moral 
hazard 
-Likely make it look a  




Manager/Fund -Directly respond to the -Highly likelihood of 
                                                          
181 This does not necessarily mean that unaccredited investors’ access to the hedge fund market 
must be curtailed at all times. Rather, it is premised on the belief that unaccredited investors should 
be guided by third party fiduciaries in investing in hedge funds with suitability or sophistication 
tests. See e.g., Choi, supra note 156. 
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Regulation Approach  risks and problems 
inherent in hedge funds  
-Most powerful approach 
to ensure market stability  
creating an 
overregulation problem 
-Most cost-inefficient  
-Highly likelihood of  
making it look like a 
heavily regulated market 
(moral hazard problem) 
-No more hedge fund-led 
benefits to expect 
Investor Only 
Regulation Approach 
-Ensure market friendly 
approach 
-Likely to keep the 
market more private 
-Likely to encourage 
financial innovation  
-Silent to the systemic 
risk concern 




-More market friendly 
than direct regulation 
-Encourage self-
regulation or market 
discipline 
 
-Likely inefficient for 
dealing with systemic 
risk concerns 
-Likely to not properly 
work during a period of 
market shock 






IV. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S. 
 
A. Overview  
Hedge funds and their advisers used to be unregulated, or minimally regulated, 
until the mandatory private fund adviser registration requirement was 
introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.182 Both hedge funds and their 
advisers have been exempted from various securities and fund related 
regulations by relying on safe harbor rules under the securities or fund related 
statutes.  
However, hedge fund advisers, not hedge funds, become subject to mandatory 
registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (reflected into the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940), and that the funds themselves will not fall 
under direct regulatory purview - even after the Dodd-Frank Act is in force in 
July 2012 - because private fund safe harbor rules under the Investment 
                                                          
182 More precisely speaking, even before the Dodd-Frank Act was implemented, hedge fund 
managers were required to register with Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) in 
2004 for the first time under the then existing rule from the Investment Advisers Act. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.203(b)(3)-2. At that time, mandatory registration requirements were enforced by amending 
the private adviser exemption rule relating to the method of calculation of the number of “fewer 
than 15 clients” (hereinafter Look-Through Rule or the Rule), and the Look-Through Rule provides 
that the underlying beneficial owners in the hedge fund be aggregated when counting the number of 
the clients in determining whether any private adviser could satisfy the threshold conditions for the 
exemption. As a consequence, most of the then existing hedge fund managers were forced to 
register with the SEC because they were deemed to have more than 15 clients under the Look-
Through Rule. But the Rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit court in 2006. See Goldstein v. S.E.C., 
supra note 105. It should be noted, however, that the then effective mandated private adviser 
registration requirement was a lot different from that of the Dodd-Frank Act because the Dodd-
Frank Act repealed the then effective “fewer than 15 clients” private adviser exemption, and instead 
introduced brand-new registration requirements that depend on the assets under management the 
adviser has. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2010). 
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Company Act of 1940 have remained unchanged under the new regime (the 
Dodd-Frank Act).183  
It has been indicated that the hedge fund market in the U.S. was formed and 
developed as an unregulated private market due to the availability of various 
safe harbor rules in securities related statutes. However, despite the fact that 
safe harbor rules were not put in place with the intent to focus on hedge funds 
and their advisers, hedge fund advisers have been relying on the safe harbor 
rules to make a special private market to avoid regulatory intervention to the 
extent possible for certain of their institutional investors and ultra-wealthy 
individuals.184  
The hedge fund market has maintained its legal status as an unregulated 
private market based on the assumption, among other things, (i) that it is only 
accessible to a limited selection of professional investors who are presumably 
sophisticated enough to protect their economic interests themselves without 
any extensive regulatory intervention, 185  (ii) that the market conduct its 
business on a limited basis - in terms of the size of the funds they manage, 
and/or the number of clients they have in those funds,186 and (iii) that almost 
                                                          
183 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7). 
184 For a general overview of the hedge fund market from the regulatory standpoint, see e.g., SEC 
Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 11-33; SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 103-118; PWG 
Report, supra note 102, at Appendix B. 
185 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18. See also SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 
103-118. 
186 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-(3)(b)(3) (2006). See also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain 
Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 142 (explaining that, although not entirely clear, the legislative 
intent of the private adviser exemption is that their impacts on the market are relatively small, and 
accordingly, there is no critical need for regulatory protection). 
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all-encompassing anti-fraud rules should be able to deter or enforce any 
potential market malpractices.187  
In other words, based on the two conventional rationales for securities 
regulation - such as protecting investors through mandated disclosure and as 
deterring market frauds through anti-fraud provisions - hedge funds have been 
able to retain its unregulated fund status. Until the SEC raised regulatory 
concerns against them in 2003, and made a regulatory effort to subject them to 
compulsory registration requirements in 2004, there have been no serious 
regulatory concerns raised against hedge funds for a long time.188  
When the SEC tried to intervene in the hedge fund market, and directly 
regulate hedge fund managers like general investment advisers through 
mandatory registration requirements in 2004, 189  there were no particular 
systemic risk concerns raised – despite having gone through the LTCM near-
collapse scandal in 1998, and observing potential negative impacts on the 
overall market from a big-sized hedge fund failure.  
Instead, despite the fact that the SEC paid particular attention to the rapid 
growth of the hedge fund industry over several decades, investor protection 
concerns (i.e., retailization problem) and market fraud concerns were 
                                                          
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). 
188 See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28. See also Registration under the Advisers Act of 
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 142. 
189 Mandating hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC means that they become subject to the 
full scope of the Advisers Act because all the substantive rules in the Act are applied to registered 
investment advisers. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3. 
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highlighted as the primary regulatory concerns.190 What this indicates is that 
neither systemic risk concern nor systemic risk related rationales came into 
play to justify the imposition of compulsory registration and reporting 
requirements on the hedge fund advisers, but rather it was regarded as a matter 
of self-regulation or market discipline between the advisers and regulated 
counterparties/creditor banks.191  
Because the SEC paid no special attention to the systemic risk issue from the 
LTCM failure, they made an effort to regulate hedge funds by amending the 
private adviser safe harbor rule, instead of by amending the relevant provision 
of the Advisers Act, regarding the method of the calculation of the number of 
clients in determining whether the private adviser satisfies the “fewer than 15 
clients” threshold condition. 192  As a result, almost all of the then-existing 
hedge fund managers have become subject to mandatory registration 
requirements without sufficient legislative justifications for doing so.  
The SEC’s new regulatory attempt to directly regulate hedge fund advisers 
was invalidated by a court decision made in favor of the hedge fund advisers 
                                                          
190 See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-88. 
191 See id. See also PWG Report, supra note 102, at 29-31; GAO Report, supra note 102, at 29-34 
(The report emphasized the potential systemic risk from big-sized hedge fund failure, but its 
recommendation focused more on indirect regulatory approaches than on direct hedge fund and/or 
its adviser regulation).  
192 In fact, there were no arguments about the reasonableness of the SEC’s new rule-making 
initiative, but rather at issue was whether or not the SEC had been empowered by the Advisers Act 
to amend the method of calculation of the number of the clients with respect to the private adviser 
exemption rule. For a detailed discussion about the SEC’s lack of legislative authority relating to 
the newly amended hedge fund rules, see Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105. 
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in 2006. 193  Following the court decision, it became an open question of 
whether or not hedge fund advisers should be regulated, and how to regulate 
them, until the Dodd-Frank Act set forth new hedge fund registration rules in 
the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
In response to the court decision, the SEC endeavored to regulate hedge funds 
indirectly by amending the anti-fraud provisions under the Advisers Act. 194 
The accredited investor threshold for affluent individuals under the Securities 
Act was also heightened based on the conventional rationales like investor 
protection and deterrence of market abuse.195 
Hedge funds have been pointed out as one of the important players that 
provided the momentum for the 2008 financial crisis directly and/or indirectly, 
based on the observations that the crisis arose primarily from the sub-prime 
                                                          
193 See id. at 884 (holding that the new hedge fund rules are “arbitrary” and therefore invalid). 
194 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008).  
“It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of business for 
any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to: 
(1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make 
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, 
to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle; or 
(2) Otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or 
manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.” 
195 It was made by defining “accredited natural person” to focus on the protection of individual 
investors by way of providing much higher threshold conditions for accredited investors-
individuals. Accredited natural person was defined as “any natural person who meets either the net 
worth or income test specified in 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a) (2008) or 17 C.F.R § 230.215 (2008), as 
applicable, and who owns at least $2.5 million in investments individually or jointly with a spouse.” 
However, this new “accredited natural person” idea was not reflected into the law. See Prohibition 
of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain 
Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (proposed Jan.4, 2007). 
74 
mortgage related market collapse, and that many investment banking firms 
were actively involved in the market as sub-prime mortgage related financial 
product providers, and at the same time were involved as services providers 
for the hedge funds, such as prime broker or counterparty creditor, whereas 
hedge funds used to be there to purchase the products from the investment 
firms and to trade those products in the market.196  
For this reasons, fundamental changes in hedge fund regulatory structure has 
been made since the global financial crisis of 2008. 
Based on the macro-prudential regulatory rationale, the hedge fund managers, 
not the funds, should be subject to mandatory registration, reporting, and 
                                                          
196 Counter-arguments have been made from various sectors, such as academia, hedge fund market 
participants, and even within regulatory bodies, that the hedge fund was irrelevant in causing the 
collapse of the subprime mortgage market, and rather that they should be treated as a victim of the 
crisis. See e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis (Mercatus on Policy No. 
34, January 2009), at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564847; Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund 
Regulation via BASEL III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 438-39 (March 2011).  
It is particularly important to note that even the major regulatory bodies in the U.S. and the U.K. 
take similar position that hedge funds should not be blamed s a catalyst of the crisis. See e.g., FSA 
Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37, at 4; Alan Greenspan, former FRB Chairman, Risk Transfer 
and Financial Stability, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-First Annual 
Conference on Bank Structure, May 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505; Ben S. Bernanke, FRB 
Chairman, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 
2006 Financial Markets Conference, May 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm.  
Albeit it is still a controversial issue, but there has been consensus made from the regulatory bodies 
around the globe that hedge funds may have the potential to adversely affect the overall market 
stability in an extreme market disruption due to their size, highly risky activities like leveraged 
transactions and lack of transparency, and accordingly direct hedge fund regulation should be in 
place based on these regulatory concerns ever since the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008. See e.g., 
Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87. See also Llyod Dixon et al., Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk 
(2012), at 39-62, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf (illustrating 
how the hedge fund may contribute systemic risk in the wake of 2008 financial crisis). 
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recordkeeping requirements based on the size of the funds they manage, and 
regardless of the number of clients they have. What that means is that the long-
standing private adviser exemption based on the number of clients was 
repealed, and instead bring a size-based compulsory registration regime come 
into play.197   
The new registration requirements is that hedge fund advisers meeting the 
assets under management threshold condition are required to register with the 
SEC, while mid-sized advisers (i.e., advisers with between 25 million dollars 
and 100 million dollars in assets under management) are required to register 
with a state regulator, and are not allowed to opt in registration with the SEC, 
subject to certain exceptions. 198  That is, the traditional private adviser 
exemption is no longer available under the Dodd-Frank Act, replaced by a 
size-based mandatory registration regime. Under the new regime, basically any 
private adviser with 150 million dollars or more in assets under management 
are forced to register with the SEC regardless of whether they have less than 
15 clients.  
Other private advisers with between 25 million dollars and 100 million dollars 
in assets under management are required to register with the applicable state 
regulator, instead of the SEC.199 Mid-sized advisers and exempted reporting 
advisers (including private fund advisers and venture capital fund advisers) are 
                                                          
197 See Dodd-Frank Act § 408. 
198 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1 (2012).  
199 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (2012). 
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also subject to certain reporting requirement under the new regime, and are 
indirectly subject to SEC supervision although they are exempted from 
registration and other compliance obligations.200  
All these new requirements have been implemented and justified in the name 
of preventing systemic risk, and most private fund advisers in the U.S. come 
under the regulatory purview in full or in part. Particularly, large-sized private 
advisers are required to comply with the paternalistic rules and regulations in 
the Advisers Act exactly the same as other general investment advisers 
carrying on business that targets the general public.201 
However, even under the new regime the hedge fund itself is not subject to 
direct regulation, and the traditional private fund exemptions have been 
maintained without significant changes.202  
This regulatory approach has been widely supported and justified considering 
the facts that (i) hedge funds have played many affirmative roles in the market 
- all possible because they have been unregulated or lightly regulated, (ii) the 
adviser manages the fund investment activities on a daily basis, and (iii) 
systemic risk concerns could be handled more efficiently and effectively by 
                                                          
200 As further illustrated infra, in addition to the mid-sized adviser exemption, among other things, 
more exemptions are also available under the new regime, such as a venture capital fund adviser 
exemption or a foreign private adviser exemption. What is also noteworthy is that the two year lock 
up safe harbor provision has been eliminated under the Investment Company Act, and as a 
consequence, private equity fund advisers become subject to mandatory registration requirements 
while venture capital fund advisers are still exempt from the registration requirements. See 15 
U.S.C. § 3(b)(8) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 202(a)(30)-1, 203(l)-1 (2012). 
201 See e.g., Seth Chertok, Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 23-25 (Spring 2011).  
202 See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1), (7) (2012). 
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regulating the advisers, not by regulating the funds directly.203 This may be 
regarded as a regulatory effort to strike a balance in between direct regulation 
and indirect regulation, in that the new regime has tried to keep the market 
competitive and to encourage financial innovation while mitigating the 
potential negative impacts on the markets and while focusing on the macro-
prudential regulatory perspective.204 
In short, hedge funds and their managers have been exempted from 
registration and other regulatory requirements under the securities or fund 
related statutes for a long period of time. It has been widely accepted that they 
made many positive contributions to the markets through their unregulated 
status. 205  On the other hand, as with the rapid growth in the hedge fund 
industry over time, hedge fund advisers have become subject to registration 
and reporting requirements, among other things, depending on the size of the 
funds they manage and based on the new policy consideration of preventing or 
mitigating systemic risk.206 
 
 
                                                          
203 See e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, Speech by former SEC Commissioner, Should Hedge Funds be 
Regulated? (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111704hjg.htm. 
204 Id. See also Jenny Anderson, Lessons from the British Way of Policing Hedge Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2006, at C6 (emphasizing the importance of the balanced approach done by the FSA 
in the U.K. that enhanced regulatory oversight is needed, while also avoiding any overregulation 
issue that may adversely affect the efficiency and competitiveness of the hedge fund market, and 
the positive effects hedge funds can have on the overall market). 
205 See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 4-5. 
206 Id. at 76-88. See also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-(3)(m), 80b-(4)(b).  
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B. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S.: Before the Dodd-Frank 
Act  
As briefly illustrated supra, hedge funds and their advisers have been 
outside of the regulatory oversight for a long time, relying on the various safe 
harbor rules available under the securities related statutes. Below is a brief 
summary of the four major safe harbor rules that, among other things, the hedge 
fund industry used to rely on to maintain its unregulated status before the Dodd-
Frank Act was enacted. 
 
 
1. Investment Company Act of 1940 
Hedge fund typically falls within the definition of “investment company” 
under the Investment Company Act, 207 but two safe harbor rules are available for 
hedge funds to avoid the application of the Investment Company Act. The first 
safe harbor rule is Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act. It provides 
hedge funds with a safe harbor to exempt them from a bunch of paternalistic 
regulations, such as registration and continuous reporting requirements, and 
specific investment restrictions.208 Basically, it provides that hedge funds are not 
required to register with the SEC, and as a result they are free from regulation 
                                                          
207 Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines investment company as “an issuer 
which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the 
business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities”, and Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Act also 
defines an investment company as “an issuer that is engaged or proposes to engage in the business 
of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire 
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percent of the value of its total assets on an 
unconsolidated basis.” See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A), (C). 
208 See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1) (2004). 
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under the Investment Company Act, provided that (i) they do not sell or offer the 
fund interests to the public, and (ii) the number of beneficial owners (i.e., 
purchasers) in the fund is less than 100.209210  
In addition, hedge funds are exempted from ongoing periodic reporting 
obligations because those requirements are applied only to registered investment 
companies.211 This private fund safe harbor rule was made with the legislative 
background that small pooled investment vehicles such as private funds are more 
likely to be composed of the people with “personal, familial, or similar ties”, and 
that there is little practical need for governmental intervention.212   
As a matter of practice, any individuals or entities who are not accredited 
investors under the Regulation D are not allowed to directly invest in the hedge 
funds because of the suitability or sophistication test concerns, despite the fact that 
they are not completely barred from that investment opportunity in that the 
Regulation D does not prohibit hedge funds from accepting any person not 
satisfying the accredited investor threshold conditions up to 35 persons, subject to 
advance sophistication test.213 
                                                          
209 See id. 
210 What is important to note is that in calculating the number of investors in 3(c)(1) fund, corporate 
legal entities are not counted as one person if they have 10 percent or more shares of the fund, and 
the underlying beneficial owners of the corporate entity are included in determining whether the 
fund satisfy the threshold requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1)(A) (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-1(b) 
(2004). 
211 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (2004). 
212 See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 106. 
213 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2). 
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Additional exemption can be found at Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act, and it provides another safe harbor for hedge funds if they satisfy a 
two-prong test: (i) no public offerings are made, and (ii) they offer or sell the fund 
interests only to so-called “qualified purchasers”.214 215  Unlike the private fund 
exemption under Section 3(c)(1), the Section 3(c)(7) exemption does not provide 
the maximum number of investors (i.e., purchasers) provided that the offer or sale 
is made only to the qualified purchasers.216  
However, it has been understood that the qualified purchaser fund is 
indirectly required to limit the total number of the investors in the fund to 499 
                                                          
214 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) for the definition of qualified 
purchaser (defining “qualified purchaser” as  
“(i) any natural person (including any person who holds a joint, community property, or other 
similar shared ownership interest in an issuer that is excepted under section 3(c)(7) with that 
person’s qualified purchaser spouse) who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined 
by the Commission;  
(ii) any company that owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments and that is owned directly or 
indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons who are related as siblings or spouse (including 
former spouses), or direct lineal descendants by birth or adoption, spouses of such persons, the 
estates of such persons, or foundations, charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the 
benefit of such persons;  
(iii) any trust that is not covered by clause (ii) and that was not formed for the specific purpose of 
acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or other person authorized to make decisions 
with respect to the trust, and each settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a 
person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iv); or  
(iv) any person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the 
aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000 in investments.”) 
215 For the legislative background of the qualified purchaser fund, see SEC Staff Report, supra note 
20, at 110-14. 
216 Because of this advantage, Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act has been more 
commonly used in the market than 3(c)(1) funds. Also the fact that performance fee can be charged 
only to qualified clients under the Investment Advisers Act also indirectly affect this market 
practice. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a), (d)(1) (providing that qualified purchaser under the 
qualified purchaser fund falls within one of the qualified clients). 
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persons; otherwise they may be obligated to register and comply with periodic 
reporting requirements under Section 12(g)(1)(a) of the Securities Exchange Act if 
they have assets of 10 million dollars or more and a class of equity securities is 
held by 500 or more shareholders.217 Accordingly, it may be concluded that the 
qualified purchaser fund exemption is available only if the number of the investors 
in the fund is 499 or fewer, and no public offering is made.218  
This safe harbor rule was created on the assumption that highly 
sophisticated investors, such as qualified purchasers, raise no particular regulatory 
concern in terms of investor protection because they are presumably able to protect 
themselves.219 
 
2. Securities Act of 1933 
As indicated supra, hedge fund falls within the definition of investment 
company under the Investment Company Act, and the interests it offers or sells to 
prospective investors are also deemed securities under the Securities Act 
                                                          
217 See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(a) (2004). 
218 It should be noted, however, that the threshold conditions for the registration requirement under 
the Securities Exchange Act has been changed by the JOBS Act, and it has been relaxed to 2,000 
equity shareholders or 500 non-accredited investors. Consequently, hedge fund now is able to rely 
on this newly amended safe harbor to avoid the registration and continuous reporting requirements 
under the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2013). 
219 SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 110. It should be noted, however, that the threshold 
requirement for qualified purchaser is much higher than that for accredited investor threshold under 
the Regulation D, and as a result it is a reasonably inferred that qualified purchaser should be 
regarded as highly sophisticated investor who are able to protect themselves vis-à-vis hedge fund 
adviser in that even accredited investors are presumed to be sophisticated enough to protect 
themselves without the help of mandatory disclosure regime regardless of their actual sophistication. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
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regardless of the legal form of the fund (i.e., it does not matter whether or not the 
fund has been set up as a corporation, a business trust or a partnership because any 
one of them is deemed to be a legal entity under the Investment Company Act).220 
As a consequence, hedge funds are subject to registration requirements under the 
Securities Act when they offer or sell the fund interests to prospective investors, 
subject to certain limited private offering exemptions or safe harbor rules available 
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act or Rule 506 thereunder.221  
First, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts any issuer, including 
hedge funds, from registration requirements when they sell or offer securities (i.e., 
fund interests) on a private placement basis.222 This private offering exemption is 
based on the same premise as the private fund exemptions in that private funds 
need to satisfy the private offering safe harbor conditions as a prerequisite to 
satisfy the threshold conditions for the private funds, and accordingly the investors 
in private offerings are limited to accredited investors who are deemed to have 
financial sophistication to protect themselves in terms of their knowledge, wealth, 
and experience.223  
                                                          
220 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8), 3(a)(1).  
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. After the JOBS Act went into effect in 2012, 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act has been recodified as Section 4(a)(2). See Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, Sec. 201(b)(1), (c)(1), 126 Stat. 306 (2012). 
222 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2). 
223 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 127. More precisely speaking, under the Reg 
D accredited investors are automatically deemed sophisticated regardless of whether they are really 
sophisticated or not, and up to 35 non-accredited investors are also accessible to the private offering, 
subject to sophistication test. Thus, based on the Reg D, it is reasonable to conclude that all the 
offerees in the private offering could be treated as sophisticated investors, and that there is no need 
to protect them through mandated disclosure. This is a precondition for the hedge fund to comply 
with and to satisfy the threshold conditions for the private fund, and that is the reason why private 
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However, this exemption is only available where the offerees, not the 
actual purchasers, are able to access to the kind of information required to be 
included in registration statement under the Securities Act at time of the 
investment. 224 Because of that, this exemption is, in practice, very difficult to 
satisfy and not that commonly relied upon by hedge funds; instead, another safe 
harbor rule, Rule 506 in Regulation D, is more frequently relied.  
Second, Rule 506 of the Regulation D provides hedge funds with a useful 
safe harbor in the private offering exemption because it does not require 
compliance with Section 4(2). In other words, the safe harbor rule (i.e., Rule 506) 
enables hedge funds to claim Section 4(2) exemption if they meet the conditions 
under the Rule.225 However, that Rule 506 is not necessarily the only way for the 
hedge funds to be exempted from registration requirement under the Securities Act. 
Rather, hedge funds are still entitled to claim the private offering exemption if they 
can prove that they have done the offering in compliance with the Section 4(2) of 
the Securities Act.226  
                                                                                                                                                                
funds can be exempted from the registration requirements as an investment company under the 
Investment Company Act. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 106. 
224 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 223.  
225 Among other things, Rule 506(b)(2)(i) provides a “35-purchaser limit”, so there is no problem in 
making an offer or sale to non-accredited investors so long as actual purchasers are within the 35-
purchaser limit. The SEC takes the position that it is not a violation of the no general solicitation or 
advertising requirement under the Rule. It is not, however, applicable to accredited investors, so 
hedge funds can sell or offer the fund shares to unlimited number of investors so long as they all are 
accredited investors under Rule 506(e)(1)(iv). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. See also Proposed Revision 
of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for 
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, Aug. 7, 1981, at 
n.30. 
226 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500(c).  
84 
In addition, general solicitation and general advertisement are not allowed 
when relying on this safe harbor rule. General solicitation and general 
advertisement are very broadly defined to include advertisements, articles, notices 
or other communications published in a newspaper, magazine, or similar media, 
mass mailings, broadcasts over television or radio, materials contained on a 
website available to the public, or an email messages sent to a large number of 
previously unknown persons.227  
Further, hedge funds relying on the Rule 506 safe harbor must exercise 
reasonable care to assure that their investors are not investing with the intent to 
distribute their shares in the fund to the general public; otherwise they are subject 
to registration obligation pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Securities Act.228 This 
resale restriction is to prevent the abuse of the Rule 506 safe harbor through the 
resale of the exempted securities, which are originally qualified for.229 
 
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, dealer is defined as 
“any person who is engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for its 
own account”, and dealer is required to register with the SEC. Trader, who also 
                                                          
227 Id. This no general solicitation or no general advertisement requirement may be avoided under 
the JOBS Act if (i) the purchaser is limited to accredited investors, and (ii) the issuer takes 
reasonable steps to ensure that the purchasers are accredited investors at time of investment. This is 
one way to offer securities under Regulation D, however, existing safe harbors are also available. 
Thus, at their discretion, private fund advisers can choose one of these two options to offer the fund 
shares on a private placement basis. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation 
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 67, at 35-36. 
228 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d). 
229 Id. 
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buys and sells securities like dealer, but not as part of a regular business, however, 
is not required to register with the SEC.230 Hedge funds used to rely on this trader 
exemption to avoid registering as a dealer. 
In addition, issuers with 500 or more equity holders and assets in excess of 
$10 million as of its most recent fiscal year-end are required to register with the 
SEC, under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 12g-1 
thereunder.231 As a result, most hedge funds seek to avoid the registration and 
accompanying reporting requirements by keeping fewer than 500 equity holders or 
less than $10 million in assets.  
Further, Section 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act require 
any person who, after acquiring beneficial ownership of any equity securities 
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, beneficially owns 5% 
or more of the class of equity securities, file a beneficial ownership statement.232  
Because the hedge funds and their advisers may exercise investment 
discretion over the equity securities held by the fund, they will generally be 
deemed to beneficially own any equity securities owned by the fund. As a result, 
once a hedge fund or its adviser is subject to the reporting obligations under 
Section 13(d) or 13(g) of the Exchange Act, they must update the previously filed 
                                                          
230 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b), (g) (2004). 
231 This threshold test applies on a yearly basis, not on a permanent basis. Thus, an issuer, which is 
not subject to the registration requirement, can be subject to the requirement once it reaches the 
threshold, and vice versa. Also as indicated supra note 218, the threshold condition for registration 
under the Securities Exchange Act has been relaxed under the JOBS Act. See supra text 
accompanying note 218. 
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g) (2004). 
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beneficial ownership statements when there is a change made in the statement 
under Rule 13d-2.233  
Hedge fund advisers may be also subject to the quarterly reporting 
obligations under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, which apply to any 
“institutional investment manager” exercising investment discretion with respect to 
accounts having an aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million in equity 
securities.234 Finally, Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act requires 10% shareholders 
or insiders (e.g., officers or directors) of the reporting companies to report on a 
continuous basis the shares they hold and any change in the shares they hold on a 
continuous basis, and they all are also subject to a short swing profit provision 
under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.235  
In sum, although hedge funds may be exempted from registration and 
accompanying reporting requirements relying on the safe harbor provision in the 
Securities Exchange Act, they remain subject to other reporting and insider trading 
regulations such as the 5% report, the 10% report, and the short swing rule; These 
requirements are applicable to them regardless of their status as a registered 
company under the Exchange Act. 
 
 
                                                          
233 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2.  
234 Section 13(f)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act defines “institutional investment manager” 
as “any person other than a natural person investing in or buying and selling securities for its own 
account, and any person exercising investment discretion with respect to the accounts of any other 
person.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A). 
235 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), (b). 
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4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940  
Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act defines investment 
adviser as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, 
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates 
analyses or reports concerning securities.” 236 Investment advisers are subject to 
registration requirements unless they satisfy certain limited exemptions available 
under the Advisers Act. Unsurprisingly, hedge fund advisers fall within the 
definition of the investment adviser under the Advisers Act.  
However, many hedge fund advisers avoid the registration obligations by 
relying on the safe harbor provision of Section 203(b), which exempts any 
investment adviser that (i) had 14 or fewer clients during the preceding 12 months, 
and that (ii) does not hold themselves out to the public as an investment adviser.237  
What that means is that so long as it satisfies the “no hold out” requirement, 
and it has no registered investment company or business development company as 
their client, they are allowed to manage up to 14 hedge funds, regardless of the 
number of underlying beneficial owners, without registering as an investment 
adviser under the Advisers Act.238 By relying on the safe harbor rule, hedge fund 
                                                          
236 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2004). 
237 Any investment adviser providing investment advice vis-à-vis registered investment company 
(i.e., mutual fund) or business development company is not entitled to the Section 203(b) 
exemption even if they have 14 or fewer clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2004). 
238 This has been possible because the legislative intent and the SEC’s previous interpretation about 
the meaning of the “client” have supported the idea that the fund, not the underlying investors, 
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managers are almost completely free from onerous compliance requirements, 
except anti-fraud provision under the Advisers Act.239 
As demonstrated above, the private fund market has relied on various safe 
harbor provisions in the securities related statutes to maintain its unregulated status, 
and there has been no particular regulatory concerns raised against them because 
they used to be relatively small in size and they used to have insignificant negative 
impacts on the market.240  
In addition, their client base has been limited to certain presumably 
sophisticated investors only (e.g., accredited investors or qualified purchasers). 
Because the hedge fund market has been restricted to sophisticated investors and 
they are deemed to “fend for themselves”, there had been no necessity for direct 
regulatory intervention into the market (indeed, until the LTCM near-failure 
occurred in 1998, there were few regulatory concerns raised against them for a 
long time). 241 
Thus, it is not that surprising to see that basically the hedge fund market 
has been formed and developed based on the market supply and demand - 
successfully settling as an unregulated private market – with the help of the safe 
                                                                                                                                                                
should be counted as a client in terms of the private adviser exemption unless the adviser provides 
separate investment advice to the underlying investors. See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105, at 
883-84. 
239 Even if they are qualified for the exemption, some hedge fund advisers opt in and register as 
investment advisers to accommodate clients’ requests or to maintain their competitiveness. See 
SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at FN 76.  
240 See id. at Appendix A (summarizing the history of previous studies or investigations of hedge 
funds done by the SEC). 
241 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18. 
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harbor rules available for them, and there were few regulatory concerns raised to 
the market because only sophisticated investors are allowed to access the 
market.242  
Even after the LTCM near-failure in 1988, which was a representative 
example of the potential negative impacts hedge funds could have on the overall 
market due to their size and highly risky nature of their excessively leveraged 
positions, this legislative and regulatory position has remained unchanged. 243 
Instead, various indirect regulatory initiatives have been made more focusing on 
market self-discipline or on self-regulation, rather than on direct regulatory or 
governmental intervention.244 
However, in 2003 the SEC raised some regulatory concerns about the 
hedge fund industry when they found, among other things, that (i) the market had 
grown rapidly within a relatively short period of time and that this trend was 
anticipated to continue going forward, while there was little information about 
them available to investors and regulators, and (ii) more and more substantively 
unsophisticated investors (albeit legally treated them as sophisticated investors) 
were exposed to the market, both directly through the accredited investor or 
qualified purchaser threshold rules and indirectly through fund of funds or pension 
                                                          
242 See e.g., Michael J. Schmidt, Notes and Comments, “Investor Protection” in Europe and the 
United States: Impacting the Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L. J. 161, 166-68 (Spring 2007) 
(summarizing the US hedge fund regime as an “indirect regulation approach” primarily relying on 
mandated disclosure and investor restrictions). 
243 See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28. See also Registration under the Advisers Act 
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140. 
244 See e.g., PWG Report, supra note 102; GAO Report, supra note 102. 
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funds, and (iii) law enforcement tools against their potential malpractices or 
misconducts were only limitedly available; leaving regulators to rely on anti-fraud 
rules while many market malpractices continuously took place in the market.245  
Based on these regulatory backgrounds, the SEC made an attempt to 
regulate hedge funds directly by making the hedge fund advisers subject to 
mandatory registration requirement.246 In doing so, the SEC amended the private 
adviser exemption to change the method of calculating the number of the clients 
regarding funds in determining whether the hedge fund advisers satisfy the “fewer 
than 15 clients” threshold conditions.247  
This new hedge fund rule was referred to as the “look through” rule, under 
which almost all the then existing hedge fund advisers became subject to 
mandatory registration, and consequently became subject to direct regulatory 
oversight because underlying investors in a fund were to be included in calculating 
the number of clients with respect to the private adviser exemption.248 
The SEC strived to justify the mandatory registration regime by focusing 
on micro-prudential regulatory standpoints (i.e., conventional rationales for 
                                                          
245 See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-87; William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds (April 10, 
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm. See also Registration 
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140, at 76-88 (illustrating, 
among other things, that the (i) growth of the hedge fund market, (ii) increase in the hedge fund 
fraud cases, and (iii) retailization (i.e., retail investors’ broad exposure to hedge funds market) are 
primary concerns from a regulatory perspective, and set the grounds for the mandatory registration 
requirement). 
246 See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140. 
247 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2006). 
248 Id.  
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securities regulation) such as investor protection or deterrence of market fraud, not 
on a systemic risk regulatory standpoint, despite the fact that they went through the 
LTCM episode in 2003.  
The LTCM episode was widely pointed out as a leading landmark case for 
demonstrating how even one big-sized hedge fund failure may negatively affect 
the overall market directly (through liquidity channel) and indirectly (through the 
counterparty credit channel).249  
Based on traditional rationales for securities regulation, the SEC made 
efforts to have hedge funds under their regulatory purview by implementing the 
new “look through” rule in conjunction with the private adviser exemption. That is, 
by changing the method of calculating the number of clients targeting hedge funds, 
and including the beneficial owners of the funds in determining if private fund 
advisers meet the fewer than 15 clients threshold conditions.250  
The SEC also paid special attention to the facts that hedge fund information 
was very limitedly available to investors and regulators, while the hedge fund 
market was rapidly growing and many unaccredited investors were being exposed 
                                                          
249 This implicates that, until the time when the new hedge fund rule was released in 2004, system 
risk was not been seriously taken into account as a rationale for securities regulation, rather it was 
regarded as a ground for regulating other entities (e.g., banks or prime brokers). There has been a 
consensus that it is more important and efficient to regulate the counterparty or creditor banks, and 
through them the hedge fund default issue could be handled. In other words, it appears that 
systemic risk concern was not considered critical in contemplating a hedge fund regulatory 
framework even after the LTCM scandal, and it was broadly accepted even from the regulators’ 
side that an indirect regulatory approach based on the best practices or market self-disciplines 
would be more appropriate and efficient for dealing with the systemic risk issue. See PWG Report, 
supra note 102, at 29-44; GAO Report, supra note 102, at 33-39. 
250 See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140, 
Chapter II, Part D. 
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to the highly risky hedge fund market under the accredited investor thresholds or 
through fund of funds/pension fund schemes.251  
The SEC also tried to justify the regulation based on the assumption that it 
is more likely to deter hedge fund frauds, stressing that many fraudulent market 
malpractices took place in the hedge fund industry such as mispricing, 
misappropriation, and conflicts of interest, and that it is harder for regulators to 
proactively take action without having proper regulation in place.252  
These SEC’s regulatory efforts ended up with success to some extent 
because it was reflected in the SEC Rule and in force early 2006 until it was 
eventually vacated by the U.S. court later in 2006 based on the ground that the 
SEC had no rule-making authority to amend the rule in violation of the relevant 
                                                          
251 This regulatory argument may be somewhat persuasive in the sense that even general public is 
able to access the hedge fund market indirectly through the fund of funds or pension funds. In that 
respect, mandated disclosure issue becomes relevant, and mandatory registration requirement may 
be justified to some extent. Despite the SEC’s attention to this issue, it may be not that critical, and 
at the same time may be a bit misleading because there should be a fiduciary there in the fund of 
funds or pension fund scheme, who is obligated to make investment decision on behalf of the 
underlying investors and in the best interest of them. These fiduciaries are deemed accredited 
investors with expertise, knowledge and experience in negotiating with the hedge fund managers on 
an arm’s length basis. More important thing is that basically they are regulated entities and subject 
to regulatory obligations when investing in hedge funds. Thus, it seems not that persuasive ground 
to justify the mandatory registration requirement in terms of the private adviser exemption. In 
particular, the rapid growth of the hedge fund market is more relevant to systemic risk issue, than 
mandated disclosure issue, and it should be more appropriate to deal with the hedge fund problem 
in that direction. Considering the facts that it is a private market in compliance with the private 
offering exemption and it is based on the assumption that all the investors in this market are 
composed of sophisticated investors, this regulatory approach may lose the ground to justify the 
regulation. Regulator’s limited access problem to the market is understandable to some extent, but 
it may be also handled without much difficulty through regulated counterparties or creditor-
financial institutions or simply imposing reporting requirement, instead of imposing full registration 
and other compliance obligations, is sufficient to that end. See e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Statement by 
SEC Commissioner at Open Meeting Considering Proposed Regulation Under the Advisers Act of 
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, July 14, 2004, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071404psa.htm. 
252 See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140. 
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law (i.e., Investment Advisers Act).253 After the court’s negative decision about the 
new hedge fund rule, the SEC tried to regulate hedge funds indirectly through the 
amendments of the anti-fraud rule in the Advisers Act and the accredited investor 
threshold conditions in Regulation D, instead of revisiting the mandatory 
registration issue again.254 
In sum, a new hedge fund rule was in force in early 2006 to regulate hedge 
fund managers through mandatory registration and reporting requirements, based 
on the traditional rationales for securities regulation, not based on the systemic risk 
regulatory rationale. However, the rule was short-lived until late 2006 because of 
insufficient legislative background and was invalidated by the court’s ruling. The 
regulatory concerns raised at that time were perhaps relevant and agreeable, but 
were inappropriately and disproportionately responded to because mandatory 
disclosure and registration requirements created an overly extensive regulatory 
regime that was not in line with the legislative intents for private offering or 
private adviser exemption.255  
Investor protection concerns may be resolved or substantially mitigated by 
heightening the accredited investor threshold conditions and regulating third party 
fiduciaries (e.g., pension funds or fund of funds managers) to behave more 
prudently and exercise due diligence in choosing the hedge funds they invest in the 
                                                          
253 See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105, at 883-84. 
254 See 17 C.F.R. 203.207 (2007). See also Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled 
Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 195. 
255 For the legislative history of the Advisers Act, see SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 
20-21. 
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funds they manage. By doing so, the private fund market could be distinguished 
more clearly from the public fund market, and this would be more consistent with 
the well-established rationales for securities regulation and exemptions.256  
Hedge fund fraud issues could be also tackled without difficulty by 
regulators’ applying the anti-fraud rules more strictly, or by leaving the fraud 
issues to the relevant parties to resolve through civil litigation.257  
 
C. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S.: After the Dodd-Frank 
Act 
As briefly indicated supra, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, 
hedge funds have been pointed out for their roles in causing the crisis in one way 
or another.258 The systemic risk issues, like those highlighted after the LTCM near-
                                                          
256 See e.g., Choi, supra note 156; Schmidt, supra note 242. 
257 In fact, that was advocated for and acted upon by the SEC chairman after the new hedge fund 
rule was invalidated by the court. The SEC revised the anti-fraud rule under the Advisers Act to 
prevent any loophole in enforcing any fraud cases against the hedge fund advisers. See Statement of 
Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals on Phillip Goldstein, et al. v. 
SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm. See also 
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in 
Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 195. 
258 For instance, put aside the LTCM scandal in 1998, the Amaranth Adviser episode in 2006 (the 
biggest hedge fund failure in terms of the size of loss,; the U.S. based hedge fund adviser lost about 
6 billion dollars due to huge bets on natural gas futures), the Bear Stearns episode where two hedge 
funds were bankrupted due to its heavy bet on mortgage backed securities (i.e., CDOs) in 2007, and 
Lehman Brothers was also went bankrupt, among other things, due to unbearable loss in its sub-
prime mortgage financing deals in 2008. In common in between the two large investment banking 
firms in big trouble was that they both had been heavily involved in the sub-prime mortgage related 
financial transactions, and had maintained unbearably concentrated positions on the products. See 
e.g., Scott Hamilton & Matt Turner, The Rise and Fall of Amaranth Advisors, FIN. NEWS, 23 July, 
2009, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2009-07-23/the-rise-and-fall-of-amaranth-
advisors?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622; Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves 
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meltdown in 1998, are the very grounds for the regulators to create a new 
regulatory regime, as reflected in the Dodd-Frank Act.259 Under the new regime, 
private funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, advisers become 
fully subject to registration, reporting, and other compliance requirements in the 
Advisers Act like other conventionally regulated advisers.260 
This new hedge fund regime is different from the previous regime (i.e., the 
new hedge fund rule of 2006) in several ways. 
First, back in 2006 when the SEC amended the Advisers Act Rule to make 
private fund advisers under the regulatory purview, the SEC primarily relied on the 
traditional, long-standing rationales to justify the regulation such as investor 
protection and deterrence of fraud. Under the Dodd-Frank regime, systemic risk 
was added as an additional regulatory rationale and it is a primary factor to 
determine whether or not private fund managers are subject to mandatory 
registration and reporting requirements.261 
                                                                                                                                                                
Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21bonds.html?pagewanted=all; Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill is Sold, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all. 
259 As a matter of fact, it has been anticipated that securities regimes would become more stringent 
as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008 in that IOSCO has proclaimed that systemic risk 
would be added as a new rationale for securities regulation in addition to the traditionally accepted 
rationales like protecting investors and/or ensuring market integrity, and securities regimes among 
the member countries should be amended in accordance with this new rationale. See IOSCO 
Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102, at 12-13. 
260 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act § 403. 
261 See Dodd-Frank Act, preliminary note (stating that the legislative intent of the Act is “to 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in 
the financial system, to end ``too big to fail'', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”). 
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Second, the former private adviser exemption based on the number of 
clients (i.e., “fewer than 15 clients” exemption) has been eliminated and replaced 
by a size-based exemption. It may be viewed as a fundamental change in the 
regulatory framework for private fund advisers because the number of clients 
based private adviser exemption is no more available, and instead only small-sized 
or mid-sized advisers can be exempted from federal regulations in the future. All 
these regulatory changes have been justified primarily focusing on the systemic 
risk or macro-prudential regulatory perspective.262  
In short, there is no more “fewer than 15 clients” private fund adviser 
exemption available for the U.S. based private fund advisers, and instead size-
based exemption was newly implemented.263  
                                                          
262See id. The number of clients based exemption is still available even under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
but what is different from the former private adviser exemption is that it is only applicable to 
foreign private advisers. In that regard, it may not be viewed as a fundamental shift in regulatory 
architecture, but there is little doubt that there has been a dramatic change made in designing new 
private adviser exemption, and there has been a distinctive regulatory position shift, from the client 
number-based regulation to the fund size-based regulation. In addition, this regulatory position has 
been unchanged even in making a safe harbor rule for foreign private advisers in that they are 
eligible for the exemption only if they have 25 million dollars or less in assets under management 
and they have fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors. All these changes have been justified in terms 
of the mitigation of systemic risk. It is somewhat puzzling, however, why the US based private 
adviser should be treated differently from the foreign private adviser because their potential impact 
on the U.S. market should be assessed same regardless of their location, and it should be under 
careful reconsideration whether or not this position should be maintained without any modification. 
See supra note 260.  
263 More precisely speaking, former 25 million dollars in assets under management threshold has 
been increased to 150 million dollars in assets under management (this assets under management 
threshold are lowered to 100 million dollars in assets under management by the SEC Rule), and 
consequently any private fund adviser not meeting the minimum threshold assets under 
management condition, in principle, is not eligible for the SEC registration. Instead, under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, they are subject to State regulation subject to certain limited exceptions. What it 
means is that these so-called mid-sized private fund advisers become generally subject to State 
regulation instead of Federal regulation, and no opt-in is allowed for them even though they 
voluntarily would like to choose to register with the SEC in order to be subject to Federal 
regulation rather than state regulation. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1. 
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Third, under the new hedge fund regime of 2006, private equity fund 
managers were placed outside the regulatory purview at the outset because of the 
“two-year lock up” safe harbor provision, while they now become subject to 
various compliance requirements such as registration and periodic reporting under 
the Advisers Act.264 It is unclear why private equity fund managers are treated the 
same as hedge fund advisers, and are treated differently from venture capital fund 
advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. It may be inferred that they have been 
identified as a source of potential systemic risk like hedge funds. Further, it 
becomes blurry to distinguish private equity fund advisers from hedge fund 
managers because hedge funds have become more active in raising their voices in 
corporate governance issues, like private equity funds typically do.265 
Fourth, a private fund adviser exempted from mandatory registration with 
the SEC is nonetheless subject to reporting and recordkeeping requirements under 
                                                          
264 As indicated supra, it has been a controversial issue whether private equity fund advisers should 
be included into the private fund adviser category, and be subject to full scope of the Advisers Act 
under the Dodd-Frank Act. Many opponents strongly argue, among other things, that (i) private 
equity funds are irrelevant to the systemic risk issue in nature, (ii) most of the provisions in the 
Advisers Act are not fit for the private equity fund advisers, and (iii) the compliance burden is too 
onerous to take. See e.g. Joseph A. Tillman, Note, Beyond the Crisis: Dodd-Frank and Private 
Equity, 87 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1602, 1615-20 (Nov. 2012). Because of these concerns raised, new 
legislative consideration is under way to exempt private equity fund advisers from the Advisers Act. 
See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Passes Bill to Exempt Private Equity Funds from Rules, REUTERS, 
Dec. 4, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/04/house-sec-privateequity-
idUSL2N0JJ26W20131204. 
265 See Eilis Ferran, The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in the 
Development of the EU’s Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, ECGI Working Paper Series 
in Law, Working Paper No. 176/2011 (Feb. 2011), at 4-5, available at 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762119. See also David M. Freedman, The 
Difference between Private Equity and Venture Capital, Jan. 30, 2013, available at 
http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/article/the-difference-between-private-equity-venture-
capital (broadly explaining how the private equity funds are different from venture capital funds). 
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the Dodd-Frank Act, while the former hedge fund rule exempted them from any 
reporting or recordkeeping requirements.266  
As indicated earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act has been in place focusing on 
systemic risk regulatory standpoint, and the Act has empowered the SEC to access 
relevant systemic risk information from the “exempt reporting advisers” even if 
they are exempted from the registration and other compliance requirements, due to 
their relatively small size (for exempted private advisers) or limited nature of the 
business (for venture capital fund advisers).267 
Fifth, asset threshold for mandatory registration becomes higher from 30 
million dollars to 150 million dollars in assets under management under the Dodd-
Frank Act. It generally means that any private fund advisers not meeting the asset 
threshold would be exempted from SEC registration, and instead subject to 
relevant State regulation such as registration and/or examination.268 So-called mid-
sized private advisers, with assets under management of between 25 million 
dollars and 100 million dollars, are not allowed to opt in the SEC registration if 
they are eligible for the exempted private advisers and if they are subject to State 
registration and examination requirements.  
By contrast, large-sized private fund advisers with assets under 
management of between 100 million dollars and 110 million dollars are eligible for 
                                                          
266 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4 (b). 
267 Id. 
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3a; 17 C.F.R. 275.203A-1. 
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the SEC registration if they choose to do so although they are eligible for the State 
registration.269 
Sixth, the Dodd-Frank Act also made an attempt to amend the qualified 
client standard under the Advisers Act and accredited investor standard under the 
Regulation D in the Securities Act respectively. Under the Rule 205-3 of the 
Advisers Act, the threshold for the qualified clients, among other things, has been 
increased to 1 million dollars from 750,000 dollars in assets under management, or 
to 2 million dollars from 1.5 million dollars in net-worth.270  
The standard for accredited investors under the Rule 501 of the Regulation 
D becomes more stringent by excluding the natural person’s primary residence 
from the calculation of the individual’s net worth.271These regulatory efforts have 
been made in response to the rising concerns about the substantively unaccredited 
investors’ increased accessibility to the private fund market, and these regulatory 
reforms can be understood as a regulatory measure to protect retail investors by 





                                                          
269 See id.  
270 The qualified client threshold has been in place to ensure that only certain qualified individuals 
with financial sophistication or sufficient net-worth are allowed to enter into an advisory agreement 
with the advisers, based on the performance-based fee. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a). 
271 See Dodd-Frank Act § 413; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A). 
272 Id. 
100 
D. Summary and Comments 
As illustrated supra, hedge funds and their advisers remained unregulated 
or very lightly regulated for a long time by relying on the various safe harbor rules 
under the securities related statutes in the U.S. 
First, the Securities Act provides private offering exemptions for hedge 
funds that offer or sell fund interests to accredited investors or other sophisticated 
investors. These private offering exemptions were justified based on the 
presumption that the sophisticated investors are able to protect themselves without 
the governmental protection. 273 There seems to be no reason to change the current 
regulatory framework because it has provided a clear distinction between the 
private securities market and the public securities market and has helped the hedge 
funds market remain private through the accredited investor standard.274 
 At issue in this private offering safe harbor rule is whether there are some 
more objective factors for setting the accredited investor threshold, and whether 
the deemed sophisticated investors can really make an informed decision without 
the help of mandatory disclosure regime or separate sophistication test.  
It is understandable that having high net-worth or earning high income does 
not necessarily means that the relevant individual is financially sophisticated 
                                                          
273 See e.g., Fletcher, III, supra note 180, at 1122-24.  
274 However, it is still debatable whether accredited investors, who are deemed financially 
sophisticated, are really financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves without paternalistic 
intervention by the government. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 80-83. See also 
Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “the Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT. 
L. REV. 215 (Winter 2010); Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the 
SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009); 
Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (Summer 1994); Choi, supra note 156.  
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enough to protect themselves. But, these objective standards may be necessary to 
create a distinction between the general public and sophisticated investors. Without 
a clear and objective standard, it would be almost impossible to raise capital from 
wealthy individuals because the sophistication test is very subjective and 
accordingly really difficult to make a judgment at time of investment. 275 
Thus, it seems reasonable that current private offering safe harbor regime 
based on the accredited investor standard should be maintained without substantial 
changes, but should be fine-tuned by redefining the accredited investor threshold. 
In that regard, the SEC’s regulatory effort to redefine the accredited investor 
threshold condition by adding minimum invested amount threshold in addition to 
the conventional thresholds based on net-worth or income should be assessed 
positively.276 
In addition, the JOBS Act has recently repealed the ban on general 
solicitation and general advertisement, which used to be one of the essential 
prerequisites for hedge funds to comply with to rely on the private offering safe 
harbor.277  
The new safe harbor rule (i.e., Rule 506(c) of Regulation D) may be 
considered a fundamental policy change in terms of securities public offering 
                                                          
275 That is the reason why we have objective safe harbor rules under the securities laws, rather than 
merely setting general rules in place. These safe harbor rules provide clear guidance to the market, 
which may positively affect market formation and development because participants in the market 
can be confident in the scope of the safe harbor rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500. 
276 Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 17 C.F.R. 230, 239, 270 and 275, Release Nos. 
33-9287; IA-3341; IC-29891 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
277 See 17 C.F.R. 230.506(c). See also Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and 
General Adverting in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 67. 
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regulation because regulatory focus was shifted from offerees to purchasers, and 
because hedge funds are free to promote their securities without mandatory 
registration under the Securities Act, provided that the purchasers are accredited 
investors and the issuer (i.e., hedge funds here in this context) takes reasonable 
step to verify that the purchasers are accredited investors at time of purchase.278  
Under the new safe harbor rule, hedge funds may be incentivized to market the 
funds utilizing various means of mass communication to attract prospective 
investors in the future, which may be a way to encourage hedge funds to disclose 
more information about them to the public.279 
Second, the Investment Company Act provides two safe harbors for hedge 
funds. Accordingly, any hedge fund satisfying the private fund conditions under 
Section 3(c)(1), or the qualified purchaser fund conditions under Section 3(c)(7) 
would be exempted from the onerous regulatory requirements under the Act. These 
private fund related safe harbor rules in the U.S. may provide incentives for the 
private fund advisers to set up the hedge funds in the U.S. because hedge fund 
advisers have full discretion in customizing the fund investment structure to reflect 
market conditions and clients’ needs in a timely manner, and hedge funds would 
retain their unregulated status even under the Dodd-Frank Act.280  
                                                          
278 See supra note 149. 
279 Under the new safe harbor rule of 506(c), unaccredited investors are strictly prohibited from 
investing in the hedge funds. However, there is no doubt that general advertisement or general 
solicitation made by the hedge funds would be beneficial for the general public because they are 
also exposed to the hedge funds indirectly through fund of hedge funds or pension funds, and also 
they may have potential to become accredited investors sometime in the future. 
280 What the new safe harbor rule implicates is that hedge funds just need to be mindful about the 
new accredited investor thresholds under the Regulation D to meet the private offering exemptions, 
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This regulatory position appears reasonable because all the benefits that 
hedge funds provide were possible because they are free from the paternalistic 
regulations originally placed on mutual funds, and they are in the position to easily 
avoid fund regulations by moving offshore if stringent fund regulation is in force 
in the U.S.281  
As illustrated supra, investor protection concerns are not critical if only 
accredited investors have direct access to the hedge fund market, and if appropriate 
fiduciary and disclosure regimes, that govern market intermediaries like fund of 
funds or pension fund managers, are in place.  
Systemic risk concerns are also controllable without difficulty through 
manager regulation because hedge fund managers conduct investment and 
management activities on a daily basis on behalf of the funds. More than anything 
else, direct regulation of hedge funds would end up with losing many benefits they 
have provided to the markets and investors.282 
Third, the Investment Advisers Act provided a private adviser exemption 
based on the number of clients for the hedge fund advisers to rely on (namely, 
“fewer than 15 clients” exemption). Under the traditional private adviser 
exemption, hedge fund, not underlying investors in the funds, was treated as one 
                                                                                                                                                                
because it is one of the threshold conditions for the private fund exemptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3 
(c)(1), (7). 
281 See e.g., Azhar & Ullatil, supra note 13.  
282 See supra Chapter III, Part B.3. See also Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: 
The Investment Company Act as a Regulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 286 (Spring 2008) 
(supporting the idea of having hedge fund managers under the regulatory purview of the Investment 
Company Act by treating them as an investment company).  
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client until the SEC changed the rule governing the method of calculating the 
number of clients.283 The SEC’s first attempt to regulate hedge funds was short-
lived and ended up with failure because the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule on the 
ground that SEC had no legislative authority to change the rule and that doing so 
was in contravention of the SEC’s previous interpretation of the meaning of “client” 
in connection with fund.284  
With the new hedge fund rule, the SEC made an attempt to regulate hedge 
funds (excluding private equity funds), and tried to justify the new rule based on 
the traditional securities regulatory rationales, and not based on systemic risk 
regulation.285 That is, retailization with intransparency and continuous occurrence 
of securities frauds from the hedge fund market were named as primary grounds 
for the justification of the mandatory registration to the managers.286  
However, the rulemaking faced strong oppositions from the inside of the 
regulatory body, and from the hedge fund industry, that it was overly burdensome 
and cost-inefficient, and that retail investor protection issue could be easily 
resolved by redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions.287  
Further, the hedge fund fraud issue is in essence a matter of law 
enforcement because hedge fund advisers have been already subject to very broad 
                                                          
283 See supra note 235. 
284 See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 253. 
285 See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140. 
286 Id. 
287 See supra note 43. See also infra note 289. 
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and powerful anti-fraud rules under the securities statutes, and because mandatory 
registration and examination cannot guarantee that no hedge fund frauds occur.288 
This policy ground is under negative scrutiny from many commentators because 
under the new hedge fund rule, many small private advisers were still exempted 
from regulatory oversight, despite many previous market malpractices occurring at 
those small firms.289 
Overall, the purpose of the new hedge fund rule was understandable, but 
the way of dealing with the hedge fund problems was inappropriate or went too far 
in terms of micro-prudential regulation. 
After the global financial crisis of 2008 and accompanying failures of 
several big investment banks such as Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, the 
systemic risk issue became the primary concern for both the legislators and 
regulators. As a result, drastic changes have been made in hedge fund regulation 
by introducing size-based mandatory hedge fund adviser registration, and large 
sized private fund advisers becomes subject to full scope of regulation under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.290  
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity fund advisers are newly subject 
to mandatory registration regimes in the Advisers Act depending on the size of the 
assets under management, and former private adviser safe harbor rule has been 
                                                          
288 See e.g., Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC’s Repeated Unnecessary Attacks 
on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1509, 1530-33 (Summer 2008). 
289 See e.g., Atkins, supra note 251; Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech by SEC Commissioner, 
 Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Oct. 26, 2004, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102604cag.htm. 
290 See supra note 258. 
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substituted for a foreign private adviser exemption (i.e., a non-US based adviser 
with fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors in the private funds and 25 million 
dollars in assets under management from them).291  
All these regulatory changes are understandable in terms of macro-
prudential regulation because it is difficult to deny that hedge funds could 
adversely affect the market directly through their trading activities in the market 
and/or indirectly through the counterparty financial institutions, particularly during 
times of severe market disruption.292 
However, the problem in this regulatory approach is that the new hedge 
fund regime under the Dodd-Frank Act put too much emphasis on systemic risk 
and tries to regulate them in exactly the same way as other regulated advisers, and 
to subject them to full scope of regulations under the Advisers Act - despite the 
fact that there has been no clear evidence that they contribute to the global 
financial crisis.293  
Further, it is also problematic that there are no special direct regulatory 
requirements, such as liquidity and leverage requirements, added to the Advisers 
Act to mitigate systemic risks from hedge funds. Rather, this mandate seems to be 
                                                          
291 See id. 
292 See e.g., Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies with and Alternatives to SEC 
Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 332-35 (Spring 2009). 
293 See supra Chapter III, Part B.3, Part C. 
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handed over to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter as 
“FSOC”).294 
In terms of systemic risk-based regulation, size or assets under 
management should not be viewed as the only one relevant factor to decide the 
threshold for the exempted private advisers; leverage should be also taken into 
account for that purpose.295  
The FSOC was newly established to oversee and supervise systematically 
important financial institutions including hedge funds and their advisers, and any 
hedge funds and their advisers designated as systematically important financial 
institutions become subject to very stringent macro-prudential regulation like other 
regulated and FDIC insured financial institutions. In that regard, it would be 
prudent that the securities regulator’s role be limited to gathering the relevant 
information from the hedge fund industry, getting ready to take any corrective 
regulatory measures if necessary, and strictly enforce the law against any 
malpractices from the hedge fund market relying on the anti-fraud rules.296  
                                                          
294 It is not yet determined whether or not some of the big-sized hedge funds or their advisers are 
designated as systematically important nonbank financial companies by the FSOC, but they become 
subject to some stringent prudential regulation in accordance with Title 1 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
once they are designated as such. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain 
Nonbank Financial Companies, supra note 104. 
295 See id. at 21640 (indicating that the designation of the systematically important nonbank 
financial companies including hedge fund and/or its advisers should be determined considering 
various factors like the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the 
activities of the nonbank financial company). 
296 See e.g., Kathleen L. Casey, SEC Commissioner, Statement at SEC Open Meeting – Rules 
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Exemptions for Advisers to 
Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under 
Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, June 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm (arguing that “these rules will 
needlessly harm innovation and capital formation without a demonstrated, articulable, or 
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The Dodd-Frank Act permits hedge funds to remain exempted from fund 
related regulations under the Investment Company Act. What it implicates is that 
the prevention of systemic risk is practically impossible and infeasible because 
hedge fund advisers are free to exercise highly risky or highly leveraged 
transactions. Unquestionably, the best way to prevent or mitigate systemic risk 
from potential hedge fund failures would be directly regulating them, but it is 
undesirable because the regulatory cost outweighs the benefits from the 
regulation.297 
Thus, the more advisable regulatory approach would be to impose 
registration and reporting obligations on big-sized and highly leveraged hedge 
fund advisers, and to empower the SEC to intervene in the market to regulate them 
during times of emerging systemic risk.298 
However, current hedge fund regime under the Dodd-Frank Act provides 
that large sized private advisers are fully subject to the Advisers Act based on the 
systemic risk regulation, while most of the rules in the Advisers Act are in place 
based on micro-prudential regulation. There seems to be insufficient grounds to 
apply all the paternalistic rules and regulations under the Advisers Act to the 
                                                                                                                                                                
measurable benefit to investors or financial stability”). See also Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of 
Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a 
Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (2012) (generally discussing about the 
potential problems inherent in the Dodd-Frank Act). 
297 See id. 
298 It is something similar to the regulatory approach applicable to the so-called exempted reporting 
advisers, but the difference is that large private advisers are fully subject to the Advisers Act, 
including registration and business conduct regulations, while the small or mid-sized advisers are 
merely subject to reporting requirements, despite being exempted from the registration and other 
requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4. 
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private fund advisers because the Advisers Act was originally enacted to protect 
investing public, not accredited investors, and because hedge funds’ target 
investors are all accredited investors or qualified purchasers that have been legally 
deemed sophisticated enough to protect themselves.299 
On the other hand, it is also doubtful that it is necessary to regulate private 
equity fund advisers exactly the same as hedge fund advisers by having them fully 
subject to the Advisers Act. Private equity funds are less likely to pose systemic 
risk than hedge funds, because their business is primarily centered on private 
equity investments, not on short-term trading purpose.300 As pointed out above, 
there are no substantial investor protection and market fraud issues in the private 
equity fund market in that the investors (i.e., limited partners or LPs) are strictly 
limited to accredited investors, and they are subject to anti-fraud rules against any 
fraudulent or deceptive market practices. Thus, it is prudent to treat them more like 
venture capital funds, and to exempt them from the direct and full regulations, and 
instead to make them subject to reporting requirements like “exempted reporting 
advisers” (i.e., small sized private advisers or venture capital fund advisers). 
In addition, the different treatment of U.S. based private advisers from 
foreign private advisers is problematic in that, from a systemic risk standpoint, it 
                                                          
299 See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 56, at 72,067 (indicating that the legislative intent of enacting 
the former private adviser exemption was to exempt certain advisers whose activities were “not 
sufficiently large or national in scope”).  
300 For the legislative background on why the U.S. Congress targeted private equity funds, see 
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. Rep. No. 111-686, pt. 1 (2010), at 
6, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt686/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt686-pt1.pdf. 
See also Tillman, supra note 264, 1615-20 (arguing that no careful considerations or discussions 
have been made focusing on private equity funds). 
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seems more reasonable and consistent to apply the same threshold requirements to 
both domestic and offshore private advisers. It is confusing to understand why the 
U.S. Congress maintained the former “fewer than 15 clients” exemption for 
foreign private advisers because the number of clients in the funds seems remote 
from the systemic risk regulatory concern.301  
In terms of investor protection, there is no strong need to directly regulate 
foreign private advisers because, like US based private advisers, they must offer or 
sell fund shares only to sophisticated investors and they are subject to anti-fraud 
provisions under the US securities statutes. Therefore, it seems more prudent to 
have the same threshold conditions applied to both domestic private advisers and 
foreign private advisers.302 
  
                                                          
301 See e.g., Michael I. Overmyer, Note, The “Foreign Private Adviser” Exemption: A Potential 
Gap in the New Systemic Risk Regulatory Architecture, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2211-19 (Dec. 
2010) (arguing that the same registration obligation should be imposed on foreign private advisers 
as is applicable to US based private advisers in terms of systemic risk based regulation). 
302 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)(b). It should be noted that non US-based private advisers are also 
able to rely on the general private adviser exemption based on the assets under management 
(namely, less than 150 million dollars in assets under management), but due to the foreign private 
adviser exemption and because of the difference in threshold conditions between the two, it is more 
likely that regulatory arbitrage problem arises, providing disadvantages to the US based private 
advisers (especially to start-up companies) and force them to choose a more regulatory favorable 
overseas jurisdictions. See id.  
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V. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K. 
 
A. Overview 
Traditionally, the U.K., and especially London, has been well-known as the 
center for hedge fund business in Europe. This is supported by the fact that London 
has been ranked as the first place venue for hedge fund managers in Europe, and as 
the second place venue worldwide (following the U.S.).303 Various factors explain 
why most hedge fund managers in Europe and worldwide have been willing to be 
based in London. “Local expertise, the proximity of institutional clients and global 
markets, a long established financial services industry, and a generally favorable 
regulatory environment” are some of the factors generally discussed.304 
Interestingly, however, most hedge funds managed by London-based 
managers are not domiciled in the U.K. This can be explained from both a 
regulatory and a tax perspective. From a regulatory perspective, there are no 
special rules and regulations in place for U.K. based hedge funds, while offshore 
domiciled funds have remained unregulated if they are offered or sold only to 
certain U.K. professional investors. 305  As a result, by setting up their funds 
                                                          
303 As of the year-end of 2012, almost 80% of hedge fund assets in Europe are under management 
by U.K. based managers. See 2013 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, at 7, Fig. 2.3, available at 
https://www.preqin.com/docs/samples/The_2013_Preqin_Global_Hedge_Fund_Report_Sample_Pa
ges.pdf. 
304 CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 483. 
305 Onshore funds can also be exempted from regulation unless they are marketed to the general 
public. In that regard, it may not be a critical factor in explaining why most hedge funds managed 
by U.K. based managers are domiciled offshore, rather than onshore. Rather, the tax consideration 
may be more important in choosing the jurisdiction for the fund to be set up. See infra Chapter V, 
Part B. 
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offshore, it is more convenient and provides more flexibility to U.K. based 
managers to be able to structure a fund investment strategy reflecting investors’ 
needs both locally and globally. From a tax perspective, unfavorable tax treatment 
may be applicable if a fund is established as an unregulated fund in the U.K. 
compared to if the fund was established in an offshore tax haven, such as the 
Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.306  
Overall, the U.K. has maintained its leading role in the hedge fund 
management business in Europe and worldwide, partly because of a flexible 
regulatory environment that allows offshore funds to remain unregulated307 if they 
are only marketed privately to professional investors.  
 
B. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K.: Before the AIFMD  
 
1. Hedge Fund Manager Regulation 
In principle, any person, including a hedge fund manager, who intends to 
conduct “regulated activities” in the U.K., must first be authorized by the Financial 
Conduct Authority (hereinafter as “FCA”).308 Even a manager domiciled outside 
                                                          
306 The tax issue is very important, especially for foreign investors, because they are concerned 
about the potential double taxation issue. As a result they may be more comfortable with the fund 
regimes located in tax haven countries. See supra note 304. 
307 The U.K. financial regulatory body was referred to as the Financial Services Authority until it 
was separated into and reorganized as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (a part of the Bank of England) on April 1, 2013. The roles of the two 
separate regulatory bodies may be seen at their websites: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/PRA/Pages/default.aspx, and http://fca.org.uk/about/what. 
308 See FSMA, art. 19, Sch. 6. 
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the jurisdiction of the U.K. may be subject to U.K. regulations depending on 
factual circumstances. 309  For instance, an offshore manager is more likely to 
become subject to U.K. regulations if the offshore manager contemplates 
conducting “regulated activities” in the U.K. market, such as marketing the 
offshore funds they manage to U.K. investors or trading the fund assets.310  
Contrary to the U.S. regime, there is no license exemption available for 
hedge fund managers in the U.K., and they are subject to authorization and other 
business conduct rules like other regulated financial companies. However, the 
authorization requirements are relatively flexible because they are in place based 
on broad principles.  
As a result, the U.K. regulatory authority (i.e., the FCA) has discretion to 
apply the requirements to hedge fund managers as leniently as possible provided 
that they intend to conduct the business on a limited basis focusing on professional 
investors. 311  Schedule 6 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
(hereinafter as “FSMA”) provides threshold requirements for authorization, 
including the applicant’s legal status and location of the offices, close links (i.e., 
                                                          
309 See id. art. 21(3). (“In the case of a communication originating outside the United Kingdom, 
subsection (1) applies only if the communication is capable of having an effect in the United 
Kingdom.”). 
310 See Cornish & Mason, supra note 47, at 487. 
311 See Hector Sants, FSA Chief Executive, Hedge Funds – Lessons from the Recent Market 
Turmoil: A Supervisor’s Perspective, Nov. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/112 0_hs.shtml.  
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control person(s) of the applicant firm), fitness and propriety of the persons 
involved of the firm, and the adequacy of the financial or other resources.312 
As authorized and regulated entities, hedge fund managers are required to 
have internal policies and procedures in place to monitor that their regulatory 
capital is adequate. It is an ongoing obligation while carrying on the authorized 
business to remain in compliance with the initial authorization requirements.313 
Wholesale firms like hedge fund managers are not strictly subject to examination 
requirements under the Senior Managements Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(hereinafter as “SYSC”) 5 of the FCA Handbook regarding “approved person”.314 
That is, a person in the hedge fund managers may be deemed competent without a 
thorough examination provided that the applicants can demonstrate why they 
believe they are competent.315 
Hedge fund sales agents are also subject to authorization by the FCA 
because fund marketing and promotion activities are also considered “regulated 
activities” under the FSMA.316 In terms of ongoing examination, the U.K. financial 
regulator has taken an “outcome-based” approach, along with a broad “principle-
based” regime.317 What this means is that the FSA will take regulatory action 
                                                          
312 See FSMA, art. 41, Sch. 6 (providing broad line-by-line requirements on the threshold 
conditions for authorization). 
313 CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 492. 
314 Id. at 493-94. 
315 Id. 
316 See FSMA, art. 19, 21-22. 
317 See Sants, supra note 311.  
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against regulated entities, like hedge fund managers, if they find something wrong 
in the actions or decisions made by the regulated firms. That evaluation is done 
based on the outcomes and consequences of the actions or decisions made, with 
reference to the general regulatory principles, and not based on the mere fact of 
being in compliance of any given rules.318 For example, Principles for Businesses 
3 requires regulated firms to “take reasonable care to establish and maintain such 
systems and controls as are appropriate to its business.” 319  This high level 
regulatory principle is applied with broad flexibility depending on the size, nature, 
scope, and complexity of the business.320 
Like other regulated entities, hedge fund managers are subject to the FCA’s 
“risk-based” supervision. Hedge fund managers are required to have enough 
capital to cover any potential risks they may face while carrying on their business 
and to put adequate internal control and risk management systems in place to deal 
with the risks inherent in the business.321 Through their “risk-based” supervision 
approach and their “principle and outcome-based” regulations, the U.K. seeks to 
ensure that any regulated firm carries on their business in compliance with the 
rules and regulations in place under the FSMA.322  
                                                          
318 See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 501. 
319 See Senior Managements Arrangements, Systems and Controls, art. 3.1.1R, available at 
http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/SYSC/3/1. 
320 Id. art. 3.1.2G. 
321See General Prudential Sourcebook, art. 2.1, available at 
http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/GENPRU/2/1. 
322 For the regulatory objectives of the FSMA, see FSMA, art. 3-6. 
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Some may doubt why hedge fund managers, despite conducting business 
on a limited basis and only targeting certain professional investors, should be 
under prudential regulations. A micro-prudential regulatory perspective is 
insufficient to justify such prudential regulation, because unlike other regulated 
entities conducting business with the general public, hedge fund business is strictly 
limited to certain professional investors. However, there seem to be grounds to 
justify the application of prudential regulations to hedge fund managers in terms of 
a macro-prudential perspective, because the overall size and risky nature of hedge 
funds may pose systemic risk.323  
Thus, there is little doubt that the current risk-based regime in the U.K. 
should be maintained in general. However, the current regimes should also be 
reconsidered in the sense that they do not take into account the size and risk level 
of particular hedge fund businesses in subjecting them to full regulatory 
supervision. That is, small-sized hedge fund managers have less of a potential to 
pose systemic risk to the market, so there is little necessity to subject them to the 
full scope of direct regulatory oversight.324   
                                                          
323 See Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, FSA Discussion 
Paper, DP 12/1, Jan. 2012, at 14, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/FsaWeb/Shared/Documents/pubs/discussion/dp12-01.pdf. See also 
FSMA, art. 3A (adding financial stability as one of the regulatory objectives of the FSMA after the 
global financial crisis of 2008). 
324 Some may argue that small hedge fund managers may also pose systemic risk on a collective 
basis because of their herd behavior, particularly if they have similar investment strategies and 
behave in the same direction during extreme market situations. But generally speaking, it is more 
reasonable to say that they are less likely to cause systemic risk even in extreme market situations 
because they are small in size and have limited market impact (even when they go bankrupt). See 
Sants, supra note 311. (“We believe that these firms, with lower volumes of assets under 
management, are generally not large enough to have a significant systemic impact, although there 
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   2.   Hedge Fund Marketing Regulation 
The FSMA forbids anyone from acting “in the course of business to 
communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity” unless 
certain conditions or exemptions are met.325 This default rule is that only an FCA 
authorized or approved person is allowed to market their fund interests, but they 
are subject to limited exemptions. One exemption allows someone other than the 
authorized person to promote the funds provided that the content of the 
communication is approved first by the authorized or approved person.326 Under 
the FSMA, “financial promotion” is defined very broadly to include any 
communication noted above, and the promotion rules may include 
communications made from outside the U.K.327 
Thus, an unauthorized person (including an unauthorized hedge fund) is not 
allowed to communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in the marketing or 
promotional activity in the U.K. unless they rely on exemptions, because offering 
circulars (e.g., private placement memorandum) and other marketing materials for 
activities of the fund may constitute financial promotion under the FSMA.328 In 
particular, Article 238 of the FSMA applies in cases where the promotion of an 
unregulated collective investment scheme (like a hedge fund) has been made in the 
                                                                                                                                                                
may be issues to manage where they hold concentrated positions in specific thinly traded 
securities.”). 
325 See FSMA, art. 21, 238. 
326 Id. 
327 See FSMA, art. 21(3), 238(3). 
328 See supra note 325. 
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U.K., and it specifies the categories of investors that can be marketed or promoted 
to by hedge fund managers without being subject to regulatory supervision.329  
The Conduct of Business Sourcebook (hereinafter as “COBS”) 4.12R also 
provides some exemptions for the general prohibition of fund promotion under 
Article 238 of the FSMA. It provides a safe harbor rule that it is not a breach of 
Article 238 of the FSMA for hedge fund managers to market the fund shares, 
provided that the managers take reasonable steps to ensure that they market fund 
interests to only the specified categories of persons, or to any other persons 
reasonably regarded as being comparable to those in the specified categories.330  
Therefore, if they wish to make use of this exemption it is critically 
important for hedge fund managers to only market hedge funds to certain 
categories of professional investors. However, because hedge funds are typically 
domiciled offshore they are not allowed to market to the general public; only U.K. 
based funds or offshore-based funds that are authorized or recognized by the FCA 
                                                          
329 See FSMA, art. 238(5). See also Conduct of Business Sourcebook, art. 4.12.1R [hereinafter 
COBS], available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COBS/4/12 (providing some 
exemptions for an authorized person to market or promote unregulated funds like hedge funds). 
330 See COBS, supra note 329. COBS 4.12.1: 
(1) A firm may communicate an invitation or inducement to participate in an unregulated collective 
investment scheme without breaching the restriction on promotion in section 238 of the Act if the 
promotion falls within an exemption in the table in (4), as explained further in the Notes. 
(2) Where the left-hand column in the table in (4) refers to promotion to a category of person, this 
means that the invitation or inducement: 
(a) is made only to recipients who the firm has taken reasonable steps to establish are persons in 
that category; or 
(b) is directed at recipients in a way that may reasonably be regarded as designed to reduce, so far 
as possible, the risk of participation in the collective investment scheme by persons who are not in 
that category. 
(3) A firm may rely on more than one exemption in relation to the same invitation or inducement. 
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are eligible for the exemption that allows them to market to the general public 
under the FSMA.331 
The Qualified Investor Schemes established in the U.K. are not accessible 
to the public, even if the FCA has authorized them, because it was specially 
designed as a non-retail scheme authorized to market only to “qualified investors.” 
The qualified investor schemes are also subject to financial promotion regulations 
and only authorized persons are permitted to market the funds.332 
However, some exemptions are available for hedge funds to rely on in 
terms of marketing. One of them is called the “Professional Clients” or “Eligible 
Counterparties” exemption. Under this exemption hedge funds are free to market 
the fund shares to professional clients and eligible counterparties without engaging 
an authorized person in the U.K.333  
An additional exemption is available for hedge funds where the promotion 
is made to a person who is (or who has been in the past 30 months) a participant in 
an unregulated scheme (Category 1); where a firm has made a suitability 
determination for an existing (or newly accepted) client (Category 2); or where the 
firm has made a suitability assessment of the prospective investor and has warned 
the investor in writing that the firm will promote an unregulated scheme to them 
(Category 8).334 
                                                          
331 See FSMA, art. 238, 264, 270, 272. 
332 See supra note 326. 
333 See COBS, art. 4.12, Category 7. 
334 See COBS, art. 4.12, Category 1, 2, 8. 
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3. Hedge Fund Regulation 
There has been no special regime in place under the U.K. fund regime for 
hedge funds to rely on. However, the U.K. government introduced a Qualified 
Investor Scheme (hereinafter as “QIS”) in 2004, and U.K. domiciled hedge funds 
may utilize this regime.335 Under this regime, QIS provides more flexibility for 
hedge fund managers to exercise their investment strategies because, compared to 
other regulated funds available to the general public, relatively less stringent 
investment restrictions are imposed on them.  
With this, hedge fund-like investment strategies can be utilized through the 
QIS regime provided that the hedge fund is marketed to qualified investors.336 In 
contrast, the Fund of Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter as “FAIFs”)337 
scheme may be available if hedge fund managers intend to offer or sell fund 
interests to the general public.  
In this scheme, the general public can invest in offshore hedge funds 
indirectly, while onshore managers are subject to tight due diligence obligations 
                                                          
335 CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 484. See also Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook, 
art. 8.1 (hereinafter “COLL”), available at 
https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COLL/8/1#D2. 
336 For details about who is eligible to be Qualified Investors, see id. art. 8, Annex 1. Some other 
types of fund schemes like “Futures and Options Schemes” or “Geared Futures and Options 
Schemes” are also available for onshore hedge funds, but it may not work completely as applied to 
hedge funds because those rules were not put in place with hedge funds in mind. See CORNISH & 
MASON, supra note 55, at 484. 
337 FAIFs mean “a non-UCITS retail scheme, or a sub-fund of a non-UCITS retail scheme which is 
an umbrella whose authorised fund manager operates, or proposes to operate, it in accordance with 
the investment and borrowing powers in COLL 5.7 (Investment powers and borrowing limits for 
NURS operating as FAIFs)”. See FCA Handbook Glossary Definition, available at 
https://fshandbook.info/FS/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/F?definition=G2752.  
121 
under the scheme because onshore managers are allowed to invest up to 100% of 
the fund assets in unregulated offshore hedge funds.338 
However, QIS and FAIFs are different from the “qualified purchaser fund” 
under the U.S. regime, because the former are regulated funds (despite relatively 
loose investment restrictions being imposed on them), while the latter is an 
unregulated fund.339 The QIS and FAIFs are more comparable to Korean qualified 
purchaser funds and may be referred to as “quasi-regulated” or “half-regulated” 
funds.340  
Unlike the authorized hedge fund-like schemes that are subject to FCA 
supervisory oversight, such as QIS or FAIFs, unauthorized hedge funds are 
generally free from onerous regulatory requirements by relying on private 
placement safe harbors. As a result, they can be established in whatever legal form 
they prefer, such as limited partnerships or closed-ended corporations. Tax 
treatment is also one of the primary factors in determining the legal form of the 
fund (as well as the favorable treatment of the offshore hedge funds over the U.K. 
domiciled hedge funds), and is the primary reason why there have been so few 
hedge funds established in the U.K.341 
                                                          
338 See COLL, art. 5.1.4, 5.7. For further details on FAIFs, see Fin. Serv. Auth., Fund of Alternative 
Investment Funds (FAIFs), Consultation Paper (CP 07/6), March 2007, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp07_06.pdf.  
339 Id. For more detailed investment and borrowing restrictions applicable to Qualified Investor 
Schemes, see COLL, art. 8.4. 
340 See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1). 
341 See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 486. For a broad overview of the U.K. tax regime 
applicable to hedge funds, see also CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 516-23. 
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As illustrated above, non-U.K. based hedge funds are not subject to the 
FCA’s regulatory requirements unless they are offered or sold to the general 
public.342 Therefore, it is not uncommon to observe managers who are domiciled 
in the U.K. and are under the U.K. regulatory purview, while their funds are 
seldom established in the U.K. but rather are set up in offshore tax havens.343 
 
C. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K.: After the AIFMD  
 
             1.  The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
In an effort to regulate the hedge fund industry in a harmonious way within 
the E.U. and worldwide in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the 
European Commission (hereinafter as “EC”) adopted the E.U. Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter as “AIFMD” or “the Directive”) 
in June 2011 (after long discussions and negotiations among the member states).344 
The AIFMD was partially implemented in all E.U. member states starting on July 
22, 2013.  
                                                          
342 See supra note 331. 
343 The reasons why many hedge fund managers are based in the U.K., despite the fact that they are 
subject to regulatory supervision, are that there are many potential clients available in the U.K., and 
that the U.K. provides a more reliable and more convenient infra-structure for hedge fund managers 
to conduct hedge fund business, along with a relatively flexible regulatory regime. See Eva Pakla, 
An Analysis of Regulation Governing Hedge Funds in the US and the EU from 2002 to July 2010: 
A Preliminary Assessment, 2 W. MIN. L. REV. 1, 34-39 (Sept. 2012); ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, 
at 165-81. 
344 For details about the legislative history before the AIFMD was adopted, see ATHANASSIOU, 
supra note 79, at 165-81. 
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Undoubtedly, the AIFMD will have a substantial impact on the alternative 
investment fund markets within the E.U. and worldwide, because it includes many 
aspects of the alternative investment fund industry.345 That is, the E.U. member 
states are required to transpose the AIFMD into their national regimes respectively 
by the implementation date (July 22, 2013). There are some transitional periods 
available, but the AIFMD will be in force and reflected into the local regime of 
each E.U. member state in due course.346  
The AIFMD provides a uniform and comprehensive regime for the first 
time among the E.U. member states; it includes alternative investment funds (E.U. 
based or not), their managers (domiciled in the EU region or not), their affiliated 
service providers (such as depositories), and the marketing of the funds.347 E.U. 
based Alternative Investment Fund Managers (hereinafter as “AIFMs”) are fully 
subject to the Directive, while non-E.U. based AIFMs, who intend to market the 
funds (E.U. based or not) to E.U. investors.  
The AIFMs are partially subject to disclosure and other reporting 
requirements unless they apply for authorization in accordance with the Directive 
(which is transposed to the local member state regimes) to manage E.U. based 
                                                          
345 The EC adopted something called “Level 2” regulation on December 2012 as a Supplementing 
Directive to the AIFMD, and it will also become a part of the AIFMD when it is in force. For 
further details on the Level 2 regulation, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), O.J. L 132, 
15.5.2013, Implementing Regulation 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency and 
supervision, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/2013/regulation-2013-
447_en.pdf.   
346 See AIFMD, art. 66. 
347 See id. explanatory note 4. 
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alternative investment funds or to market the funds under the so-called “passport 
regime.”348 
Several noteworthy aspects of the Directive are as follows: 
First, the AIFMD defines alternative investment funds (hereinafter as 
“AIFs”) very broadly to include any “collective investment undertakings … which 
raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance 
with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors, and do not 
require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC.”349 Due to the 
broad definition of AIFs any pooled investment vehicles, including commodity 
funds, real estate funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds, become subject to 
the Directive. 
Second, the threshold requirements for AIFMs, who are fully subject to the 
Directive, are somewhat different from those of the U.S. These requirements are 
two-tiered depending on whether leverage is utilized and on the length of the lock-
up period for the funds. The default rule is that any AIFMs having 100 million 
euros or more in assets under management, are required to be authorized and are 
wholly subject to the Directive.  
However, this asset under management threshold increases to 500 million 
euros if the AIFMs do not make use of the leveraged investment strategies for the 
funds and if they put a lock-up period in place of 5 years or longer.350 This two-
                                                          
348 See id. explanatory note 65, 66. 
349 See id. art. 4(1)(a). 
350 Those small firms having assets under management in their alternative investment funds lower 
than the threshold are required to register with the relevant local regulator and are subject to lighter 
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phased approach seems more reasonable for manager authorization than the 
approach utilized in the U.S. The AIFMD sets the threshold conditions based on 
various systemic risk relevant factors like the size of the funds they manage, the 
use of leverage, and the length of the lock-up period, and it tries to strike a balance 
to avoid an overregulation problem. 351  
Third, the Directive provides that the AIFMs must be exclusive to the fund 
they manage. As a result it becomes a fundamental issue of who the AIFM is, and 
thus who is fully subject to the Directive, especially in cases where multiple 
managers are involved in the management of the AIF. For instance, some 
controversies exist about who is the AIFM under the Directive where all or 
substantial parts of the core functions are delegated to third party manager(s).  
The E.U. Level 2 regulation provides useful guidance about this issue by 
expressly stating that an original AIFM becomes the “letter-box entity” if all or 
substantial parts of the core functions are delegated to third party managers; 
                                                                                                                                                                
reporting requirements instead of the authorization requirement. This is comparable to the former 
U.S. private fund safe harbor regime that exempted private funds from the definition of investment 
company on the condition that they have a 2 years or longer lock-up period in place. This 
exemption is primarily applicable to the private equity funds, but hedge funds are also able to rely 
on the safe harbor if they satisfy the threshold requirements. See id. explanatory note 17. 
351 Still this approach may face criticism in that, for example, private equity funds with no or low 
leverage strategy and a long lock-up clause in place are inappropriate targets for direct regulation, 
even from macro-prudential regulatory perspective, because the likelihood of their posing systemic 
risk is substantially lower than hedge funds (considering their private equity investment nature and 
their relatively small size). Because of these controversies, the U.S. Congress is considering 
exempting private equity fund managers from mandatory registration and ongoing reporting 
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act by eliminating the distinction between private equity funds 
and venture capital funds, provided that outstanding debt or leverage ratios are lower than 2 times 
the invested capital commitments. See Scott E. Gluck, United States: Legislation Would Exempt 
Private Equity Fund Advisers from Registration, June 17, 2013, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=245222&signup=true. See also Lynch, supra note 
264. 
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instead, the third party manager is deemed the AIFM and is subject to the full 
application of the Directive – despite the third party manager not being authorized 
under the Directive.352 
Fourth, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to have minimum capital and to put 
adequate internal control policies and procedures in place based on the principle of 
proportionality.353 Therefore, there is some flexibility for AIFMs about how to 
implement the internal control system, depending on the nature, scale, and 
complexity of the business they intend to carry on. The AIFMD also broadly 
provides moderate level of investment, valuation, and risk management 
requirements for AIFMs, and requires them to have proper internal investment and 
risk management systems in place.354 
This proportionality-based approach, together with principle-based 
regulation, is more appropriate and preferable to a rule-based or one-size-fits-all 
regulatory approach; the AIF market is too complex and too diverse to regulate 
through a positive regulatory system. For example, many potential issues, 
including conflicts of interest between the manager and the investors and fair 
treatment among investors, can be resolved by providing broad rules about the 
manager’s fiduciary duty and by strictly enforcing the rule against any violators.355  
                                                          
352 See AIFMD, art. 20(3). 
353 See id. art. 9. 
354 See id. art. 15-17, 19. 
355 The fiduciary duty itself may require the managers to disclose any preferential terms, like side 
letters or side agreements applicable only to certain investors in the funds.  
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Fifth, AIFMs must appoint a regulated credit institution as a depositary for 
the custody of fund assets.356 This ensures the safe custody of fund assets and 
protects fund assets through the segregation of fund assets from the manager’s 
assets. A depositary should in principle be separately appointed from the prime 
broker, but under the AIFMD it is not impossible for a prime broker to be 
designated as a depositary for the fund.  
However, it is only permissible if the prime brokerage function and the 
depositary function of the relevant entity are functionally and hierarchically 
separated. 357  This requirement can be understood as a regulatory measure to 
minimize potential conflicts of interest between the two functions; they are in 
conflict with each other because the prime broker is in the position to make use of 
the fund assets for rehypothecation purposes.358 
Sixth, the AIFMD defines marketing as “a direct or indirect offering or 
placement at the initiative of the AIFM or on behalf of the AIFM of units or shares 
                                                          
356 See AIFMD, art. 21. 
357 This regime is more appropriate for hedge funds, and it may not work properly for private equity 
funds. Basically, there is no prime brokerage concept for private equity funds, and there is no 
practical need to have a separate custodian appointed for asset custody of the private equity funds, 
in that the investment in private equity funds should be made on a capital call basis, and there are 
no particular assets to be under custody by a separate custodian because most of the fund assets 
would exist in the form of equities or some other mezzanine securities for buy-out investment 
purposes. However, the Directive provides that a depositary be separately appointed for the custody 
of private equity fund assets although it offers some flexibilities for the funds. See id. explanatory 
note 43, art. 21(3). 
358 Rehypothecation occurs when a broker, who has been hypothecated -- or pledged -- securities as 
collateral for a margin loan, pledges those same securities to a bank or other lender to secure a loan 
to cover the firm's exposure to potential margin account losses. It is a very common practice 
between the hedge fund and the prime broker, and because of this practice fund’s assets may be at 
risk when the prime broker goes bankrupt. See e.g., Harriet Agnew, Rehypothecation is being 
redefined, Sep. 13, 2010, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-09-
13/rehypothecation-is-being-redefined (demonstrating that rehypothecation became an important 
issue in the hedge fund industry especially after the Lehman Brother’s collapse in 2009).  
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of an AIF it managers to or with investors domiciled or with a registered office in 
the Union.”359 An AIFM is subject to the Directive whether or not they market the 
funds directly or through third party intermediaries.  
What can be inferred from the statutory definition is that so-called “passive” 
marketing or “reverse solicitation” done at investors’ initiative will not be deemed 
to be active marketing under the AIFMD.360 Therefore, for the AIFM to rely on the 
passive marketing and reverse solicitation safe harbors they should take reasonable 
steps not to conduct active marketing during their follow-up communications 
and/or meetings, which are subject to the AIFMD. The passive marketing safe 
harbor is narrowly construed and is very hard to comply with accordingly. 
Compliance should eventually be determined by the totality of the facts and 
circumstances.  
The AIFM may have two different options available under the Directive in 
terms of fund marketing. First, an AIFM may market funds in the E.U. by relying 
on the “passport” regime. Under the passport regime, the AIFM is free to market 
the funds throughout the E.U. countries without separate approval from each 
individual member State’s regulator (once they get approval or get authorized from 
a home regulator).361  
                                                          
359 See AIFMD, art. 4(1)(x). 
360 See id. For further guidance about passive marketing, see Financial Conduct Authority, PS 13/5, 
Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, June 2013, available at 
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-statements/ps13-05. 
361 This passport regime may not be a viable option for the non-E.U. AIFM to rely on because it 
may not be available until late 2015 at the earliest for non-E.U. AIFMs. See AIFMD, art. 37, 39, 40. 
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Second, the AIFM may market non-E.U. funds subject to each individual 
member state’s private placement regimes. Under this route, each individual 
member state has the ultimate authority on whether or not to allow the AIFM to 
market the funds on a private placement basis.362   
For an offshore AIFM to market funds to E.U. investors, several conditions 
must be met: (i) the relevant E.U. member state must have a private placement 
regime in place to accommodate offshore fund marketing, (ii) an offshore AIFM 
must comply with disclosure and transparency requirements under the AIFMD, in 
addition to any other local rules and regulations of the relevant member state, (iii) 
a cooperation or information sharing arrangement must be made between the 
regulators of the E.U. member state regulator, the home country regulator, and the 
regulator where the funds are domiciled (where the jurisdictions of the offshore 
AIFM and offshore fund are different), and (iv) the home country of the offshore 
AIFM (including the home country of the offshore funds, if applicable) must not 
be listed as a “Non-Cooperative Country or Territory” by the Financial Action 
Task Force.363  
Thus, Non-E.U. AIFMs need not comply with AIFMD, other than the 
disclosure and transparency provisions, if they satisfy the member State’s national 
private placement regimes for fund marketing (whether or not the funds are based 
in the EU).364 
                                                          
362 This national private placement regime route was only available until the end of 2008. After that, 
only the passport regime is available. See id. explanatory note 4, 69, art. 42, 67. 
363 Id. art. 42. 
364 Id. explanatory note 69. 
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Seventh, some disclosure and reporting obligations are imposed on both the 
E.U. AIFM and the non-E.U. AIFM (when the funds are marketed to E.U. 
investors).365  The AIFMD requires an AIFM to disclose material terms to the 
investors before they make investment decisions, including side-letter or side-
pocket arrangements, and any material changes to the investment after they 
invest.366  The AIFMs are also subject to continuous reporting requirements to 
existing investors after the investment. This includes the illiquid assets’ ratio in the 
fund portfolio, special arrangements like side pockets, the risk profile of the fund, 
and the amount of leverage employed.367 
An AIFM is also subject to ongoing reporting requirements to the relevant 
member State regulator.368 The frequency of the reporting may vary depending on 
the size of funds the AIFM manages. For example, small firms with assets under 
management of between 100 million euros and 1 billion euros are required to 
report to the relevant regulator on a half-yearly basis, while big firms with assets 
                                                          
365 Id. 
366 Id. art. 23. This mandated disclosure requirement is incompatible with the hedge fund regime in 
essence because it is a private market that only certain presumably sophisticated investors (who are 
presumably able to protect themselves) are allowed access to. That was the previous U.S. and U.K. 
regulatory position and there seems to be no substantial change made in market circumstances, 
particularly in the context of the mandatory disclosure (in that the transparency issue may be 
tackled easily by ensuring that only sophisticated investors are permitted into the market). Further, 
this mandatory disclosure requirement blurs the distinction between the private market and the 
public market, despite there being no clear rationale for why both markets should be treated the 
same. See supra Chapter IV, Part B; Chapter V, Part B 
367 An annual report must also be prepared and provided upon an investors’ request. Id. art. 24. 
368 For the detailed items to be included in the report, see Council Directive 2013/238, 2013 O.J. (L 
83) 1 (EC), Annex IV (hereinafter Level 2 Regulation), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/20121219-directive/delegated-act_en.pdf. 
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under management of 1 billion euros or more are required to report on a quarterly 
basis.369  
However, the reporting requirements are mitigated for AIFMs of private 
equity funds. They are required to report on a yearly basis regardless of the size of 
funds they manage, and when they acquire 50 percent or more of the voting rights 
of an E.U. non-listed company they are also subject to notice requirements to the 
companies, to their shareholders, and to the home member State regulator.370 
Eighth, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to set leverage limits internally that 
they believe are reasonable for the funds concerned, and the home member state 
regulator has the authority to impose leverage limits on an ad-hoc basis “when it is 
deemed necessary in order to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial 
system.”371 As such, there is no clear and specific rule in place for leverage limits; 
rather, the Directive encourages AIFMs to set the limit voluntarily by considering 
various factors (such as the nature of the fund and the investment strategy) and the 
regulator is ready to intervene to set the leverage limits during market disruptions 
or other emergent situations.  
This principle-based approach is highly advisable, particularly in terms of 
hedge fund regulation, in that (i) it is very difficult to measure the risk they may 
                                                          
369 See id. art. 110(3); AIFMD, supra note 14. 
370 Private equity fund managers under the AIFMD means “AIFMs in respect of each unleveraged 
AIF under their management which, in accordance with its core investment policy, invests in non-
listed companies and issuers in order to acquire control.” Thus, AIFMs who manage leveraged 
private equity funds may not be able to take advantage of these lighter reporting regimes, but 
instead are subject to the same reporting requirements as other AIFs like hedge funds. See Level 2 
Regulation, art. 110(3)(d). 
371 See AIFMD, art. 15(4). 
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pose through the leveraged transactions; (ii) it is practically impossible to prevent 
risk completely even where a statutory leverage limit is in place; (iii) unitarily 
setting the leverage limit may adversely affect the market and make the fund 
structure inflexible, making it hard to achieve the fund’s investment goal (i.e., 
market neutral absolute return or alpha); and (iv) there is no or little practical need 
to regulate that way considering the fact that it is a private market specially 
designed for certain professional investors only.372 
 
2. The Impacts of AIFMD on U.K. Hedge Fund Regulation 
In principle, the U.K. government should take measures to implement the 
Directive by the implementation date (i.e., July 22, 2013) by amending the relevant 
U.K. rules and regulations. However, U.K. domiciled managers are not required to 
comply with the Directive during the transition period until they are authorized by 
the U.K. regulator (i.e., FCA), due to the one-year transition clause. 373  This 
transition period is applicable to U.K. based AIFMs seeking authorization under 
the new regime and to non-E.U. domiciled AIFMs marketing funds in the U.K.374 
                                                          
372 For how to apply the broad principle to hedge funds, see generally Fin. Serv. Auth., Hedge 
funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement, Feedback on DP05/4, March 2006, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf. 
373 Under the AIFMD, AIFMs have one year to comply with the new regulatory requirements under 
the Directive, even after the implementation date of the AIFMD. Therefore, the actual 




Some of the likely effects on the U.K. hedge fund regime from the implementation 
of the Directive include:375 
First, U.K. based AIFMs are required to be newly authorized or registered 
during the transition period (i.e., by July 21, 2014) in compliance with the 
requirements under the Directive and depending on the size of their firms.376  
However, the level of regulatory compliance burden varies depending on 
the size of the funds and on the nature, structure, and complexity of the business 
the managers intend to conduct.377 This new authorization regime seems somewhat 
similar to the existing regime in that U.K. based hedge fund managers were 
already required to be authorized by the U.K. regulator. However, it is different 
from the old regime in that it is much broader and more comprehensive regarding 
the scope of the regulated funds, their managers/ related entities, and the regulated 
activities.378 
Second, AIFs are not subject to direct regulation under the Directive, which 
is similar to the existing U.K. fund regime.379 Under the new regime, however, 
                                                          
375 For the details of the possible impacts of the AIFMD across Europe (including the U.K.), see 
Charles River Associates, Impact of the Proposed AIFM Directive across Europe, October 2009, 
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Impact_of_AIFM_Directive.pdf. 
376 For instance, an AIFM whose total size of AIF is less than 100 million euros is required to 
register with the regulator instead of getting authorization. Also, the assets under management 
threshold requirement is further lifted to 500 million euro for an AIFM who manages unleveraged 
AIFs only and who provides no redemption right for 5 years or longer. See id. explanatory note 17. 
See also The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations, 2013, S.I. 2013/1773, art. 9, 10 
(U.K.) (hereinafter “AIFMR”), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1773/pdfs/uksi_20131773_en.pdf . 
377 See AIFMD, explanatory note 17. 
378 See id. explanatory note 4, 5. 
379 See id. explanatory note 10. 
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AIFs may be indirectly subject to regulation because certain rules applicable to 
AIFMs (like liquidity management and leverage requirements) may function as de-
facto regulations of the fund investment and management activities. The Directive 
also covers various types of AIFs including hedge funds and private equity funds, 
so formerly unregulated funds under the existing U.K. fund regime (e.g., listed 
company type funds like investment trusts) also become subject to regulation 
indirectly through the manager regulation.380 
Third, AIF related entities like depositaries, prime brokers, fund pricing 
agencies, and delegates (e.g., sub-adviser or sub-custodian) are also subject to the 
new regime, although somewhat lighter regulations may be available depending on 
the types of AIFs. For example, the requirement of appointing an eligible credit 
institution as a depositary for the custody of fund assets is mitigated for private 
equity funds, venture capital funds, and real estate investment trusts considering 
their unique investment nature and their type of invested assets.381 
Fourth, systemic risk-related regulations focusing on the AIF industry were 
introduced for the first time in the Directive.382 Both liquidity management and 
leverage requirements are imposed on AIFMs, and they are subject to continuous 
                                                          
380For the meaning of AIF, see AIFMR, art. 3. See also Fin. Serv. Auth., DP 12/1, Implementation 
of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Jan. 2012, at 10 (hereinafter AIFMD 
Implementation), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/FsaWeb/Shared/Documents/pubs/discussion/dp12-01.pdf (illustrating 
how diverse types of funds are subject to the Directive as AIFs).  
381 See AIFMD, explanatory note 34. 
382 See AIFMD, explanatory note 2, 3; AIFMD Implementation, at 17. 
135 
reporting requirements for systemic risk-related information (like assets under 
management and leverage employed).383  
In addition, the new regime makes it clear that the regulator has an 
obligation to monitor the AIF industry to mitigate systemic risk and that it has the 
authority to limit the use of leverage if necessary to ensure market stability.384  
Fifth, U.K. domiciled AIFMs may benefit from the passport regime. Once 
they are authorized by the FCA, they are free to market the funds in other E.U. 
countries.385 By contrast, until new authorization or passport regime is available to 
them, offshore managers are only allowed to market the funds by relying on the 
U.K. private placement regime.386 That is, non-E.U. domiciled managers will be 
allowed to market the funds they manage to U.K. professional investors and 
eligible counterparties without authorization until the authorization or passport 






                                                          
383 See AIFMR, art. 68. 
384 Id. art. 65-69. 
385 See AIFMD, explanatory note 15; AIFMD Implementation, at 73-78 (illustrating various 
dimensions of AIF marketing issues in the E.U.). 
386 See AIFMD, explanatory note 19; AIFMD Implementation, at 76-78. 
387 Id. 
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D. Summary and Comments 
As illustrated above, the U.K. hedge fund regimes can be summarized as 
follows: 
First, the U.K. hedge fund regime was implemented based on broad 
principles, including the principle of proportionality. What this means is that U.K. 
based hedge fund managers are subject to the same authorization and business 
conduct regulations as other regulated entities, but that the rules and regulations 
applicable to hedge funds are general and flexible enough to apply proportionately 
to the hedge fund managers based on the size, type, and scope of their business.388  
This principle-based approach is advisable in regulating the AIF market 
because it is very difficult to regulate it in a uniform way. The rule-based or “one-
size-fits-all” approach is not appropriate for regulating the hedge fund industry due 
to the heterogeneous nature of the business and the complexity of their investment 
activities.389 
 The principle-based regime in the U.K. provides some flexibility in 
applying the rules to the hedge fund managers considering the fact that their target 
investors are strictly limited to professional investors, but also considering that 
they conduct relatively high-risk business compared to other general regulated 
entities. The U.K. regime is based on the belief that hedge fund managers should 
be regulated in certain ways due to the risky nature of their activities and their 
potential negative impacts on the market.  
                                                          
388 See supra Chapter V, Part B.1. 
389 Id. 
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However, there are insufficient investor protection grounds to make them 
fully subject to the existing regimes in that their investor base is strictly limited to 
professional investors. Many of the existing rules and regulations are overly 
burdensome for and inappropriately applied to hedge fund managers (because 
those rules and regulations are in place to protect the general public).390 
This principle-based regime is likely to work more efficiently and properly 
if supplemented by the principle of proportionality. Based on these broad 
principles, the U.K. regulators would have the discretion to apply the regulatory 
principles to the hedge fund managers more lightly than other regulated entities, 
and to enforce the rules based on outcomes instead of simply relying on 
compliance with a specific individual rule.391  
Thus, the principle-based hedge fund regulation in the U.K. can be 
positively assessed in that it is hard to deny that hedge funds should be regulated. 
However, it is also true that hedge funds should be more lightly regulated than 
other more typical regulated entities whose business is widely open to the public, 
because hedge fund managers conduct their business on a private placement basis 
focusing on professional investors.392 
Second, hedge funds are not subject to direct regulatory oversight under 
both the old regime and the new regime, although hedge funds become subject to 
directly regulations under the new regime because hedge fund managers are 
                                                          
390 See FSMA, art. 5. 
391 See supra note 388. 
392  See AIFMD Implementation, at 65. It is important to recall that hedge funds used to be 
unregulated or lightly regulated in various jurisdictions for a long time; that is how hedge funds 
have emerged and evolved as an alternative private market. 
138 
subject to additional regulations on leverage, disclosure, and reporting.393 There 
was formerly no hedge fund regime was in place in the U.K., so hedge funds were 
able to avoid regulations unless they offered or sold the fund interests to the 
public.394  
The U.K. private placement or private fund regime remains unchanged 
under the AIFMD because it has no specific hedge fund-focused rules and 
regulations and does not mandate that member states make new hedge fund-
focused regimes. As a result, even after the AIFMD was transposed to the various 
U.K. regimes, there will still be no special hedge fund-focused regime in place. 
Domestic and offshore hedge funds can still avoid direct regulation regarding how 
they structure the funds, provided that the funds are only marketed and sold to 
professional investors.395 
This regulatory approach seems to be the result of efforts to strike a balance 
between direct regulation and indirect regulation, considering the fact that (i) there 
is no practical need to regulate funds directly because the general public is not 
permitted to access the hedge fund market directly, (ii) the benefits that hedge 
funds provide to the markets were possible because they are outside direct 
regulatory purview, (iii) it is very difficult to directly regulate hedge funds because 
each E.U. member state has different hedge fund regimes (and local regulation is 
not sufficient to reach the funds domiciled offshore), and (iv) it is more appropriate 
                                                          
393 See supra Chapter V, Part B.2. 
394 See supra Chpater V, Part B.3. 
395 See supra Chapter V, Part B.3, Part C.1. 
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to regulate hedge fund managers because they are responsible for the daily 
operation of the funds.396  
Third, an all-encompassing AIF definition under the new regime is 
agreeable in that it could minimize the regulatory gap and regulatory arbitrage 
problems between the AIFs in terms of functional based regulation. However, from 
a manager regulatory perspective, it is somewhat doubtful if all the AIFMs should 
be treated equally regardless of the nature of their business. For instance, private 
equity fund managers are different from hedge fund managers in many ways, and 
both managers should be treated differently.  
It is less likely for private equity funds to pose systemic risk (and there was 
no private equity fund generated high-profile financial market collapse so far) in 
that they generally have a long lock-up period in place, they utilize minimal 
leverage at the fund level, and they invest in target companies (typically private 
companies) for controlling purposes, not for short-term trading purposes. Thus, it 
is more reasonable to conclude that they carry on business irrelevant to systemic 
risk. Further, investor protection concerns are negligible because private equity 
fund investors are all professional investors, presumably sophisticated enough to 
protect themselves without governmental protection.397 
Thus, it is unreasonable to make private equity fund managers subject to 
the same level of authorization requirements as other AIFMs, such as hedge fund 
managers. It is more prudent to exempt private equity fund managers from 
                                                          
396 See supra Chapter III, Part B.2-4. 
397 See supra Chapter II, Part C.2. 
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authorization requirements and to impose lighter obligations like registration and 
reporting requirements for instances when they have the potential to pose systemic 
risk.398 
Fourth, under the AIFMD, both the local private placement regime and the 
passport regime are available for a couple more years for onshore AIFMs who 
manage E.U. domiciled funds, while only the local private placement regime is 
available for offshore AIFMs who market offshore funds or manage E.U. 
domiciled funds until 2015 at the earliest (which will be eventually replaced by the 
passport regime).399 The new passport regime is devised to deal with the regulatory 
arbitrage and regulatory competition problems among the jurisdictions by setting a 
uniform regime applicable not only to all the E.U. member states, but also between 
E.U. member states and Non-E.U. member states.  
This passport regime is more likely to lower the entry barrier among the 
E.U. member states and for offshore managers, to help the managers raise capital 
more conveniently from E.U. investors or in the E.U. market, and to apply the AIF 
market regime in a consistently to level the playing field among market 
participants.  
                                                          
398 As observed in the U.S. regime, small-sized managers should be free from onerous advance 
authorization and registration requirements because the regulatory cost outweighs its benefits. 
Otherwise, small firms will disappear and new firms will be unable to emerge due to high 
regulatory compliance costs. Further, private equity fund managers that create only remote system 
risk should be exempted from the onerous authorization and registration requirements, regardless of 
the size of the firms, provided that they meet certain threshold requirements (like no leverage and a 
certain period of lock up). Instead, minimum reporting and disclosure requirements would be 
sufficient for ensuring market stability. See id. 
399 See supra Chapter V, Part III. 
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However, some doubts still remain about whether it is really necessary to 
subject all the AIFMs to advance authorization to rely on the passport regime. 
There may not be strong policy grounds to justify the regulation from a micro-
prudential regulatory standpoint, assuming that it is a specially designed market for 
certain qualified professional investors, and that many rules and regulations are 
already in existence to regulate market frauds like inside trading.  
It is somewhat understandable, though, that AIFMs need to be subject to 
regulation in terms of a systemic risk based perspective, in that they are big enough 
to potentially influence the market in a negative way in times of distressed market 
situations. Regulators are in the best position to cope with the overall systemic risk 
issues and should be able to access the AIF market information on a continuous 
basis to take timely corrective actions.  
It seems acceptable that the AIFMD requires AIFMs to provide system risk 
related information to relevant local regulators on a regular basis, and that the 
AIFMD empowers the regulators to exercise discretion to limit the AIFM’s high 
risk activities, like leveraged transactions, on an as needed basis. However, ex-ante 
regulation is inappropriate and is overly burdensome on small AIFMs (E.U. based 
or not); it is also incompatible with private offering or private fund exemptions.400 
There are two separate regimes in place under the AIFMD in terms of fund 
marketing regulation; active marketing is regulated and passive marketing is not. 
So, in regards to fund marketing, reverse solicitation, and passive marketing 
                                                          
400 In this regard, the U.S. size-based private adviser exemptions, including the foreign private 
adviser exemption, seem more reasonable in principle because the U.S. regime takes a cautious 
approach to avoiding the overregulation problem - especially in terms of systemic risk based 
regulation. See supra Chapter IV, Part III. 
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initiated by E.U. investors, if the activity is not deemed to be “active marketing” 
initiated by the managers or their placement agents then it falls outside of the fund 
marketing regimes.401  
However, the problem with this fund-marketing regime is that those two 
distinctions are not entirely clear, making it more likely to cause a regulatory 
arbitrage problem with AIFMs trying to utilize the passive marketing exemption. 
This problem may happen more frequently if regulatory compliance costs are too 
high, especially while the prospective business in the E.U. market is limited. Thus, 
a small adviser exemption or other private adviser exemption as observed in the 
U.S. regime should be taken into consideration.402  
Fifth, the AIFMD provides extraterritorial application rules, applicable to 
when onshore AIFMs market the offshore funds they manage, when offshore 
AIFMs manage and/or market E.U. based funds, or when offshore AIFMs market 
offshore based fund to E.U. investors.403 In those situations, the AIFMs are subject 
to a local private placement or passport regime.  
Under the AIFMD, there should be minimal concerns for regulatory 
evasion, regulatory arbitrage, and jurisdictional shopping, in that the AIFMD 
provides no fund specific rules and regulations, and because the AIFMD 
accommodates all the possible scenarios relating to transnational fund related 
transactions. As a result, it makes little difference for AIFMs to choose the E.U. or 
                                                          
401 See supra note 361. 
402 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
403 See supra text accompanying note 360, 361. 
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other jurisdictions in terms of fund regulation. They are basically free to choose a 
jurisdiction for their funds.404 
This is an interesting regulatory approach because offshore managers are 
not required to be based in or authorized by the relevant local E.U. regulator to 
manage and market the E.U. domiciled funds to E.U. investors. It is likely to help 
minimize the jurisdictional shopping problem and to give some incentives for 
offshore AIFMs to set up the funds in E.U. member states.405 
The AIFMD does still have inherent problems worth revisiting. As stated 
earlier, only national private placement regimes are available until the new 
passport regime has replaced it. Under the current private placement regimes, both 
onshore managers and offshore managers are not required to get authorized by the 
E.U. member state regulators, provided that they only market the funds to 
professional investors.406  
When the new passport regime is fully implemented, AIFMs who obtain 
authorization from one E.U. member state regulator will still be subject to 
                                                          
404 Still it is not entirely clear and should be determined based on factual circumstances whether or 
not an offshore AIFM is allowed to manage E.U. based funds and to market the funds to EU 
investors, supposing that the offshore AIFM chooses offshore solely for the purpose of evading the 
U.K. regimes applicable to U.K. based AIFMs. See id. 
405 As stressed supra, this is possible because there is no fund focused regime in place under the 
AIFMD; the AIFMD basically permits AIFMs to choose any jurisdiction for fund establishment 
purposes to help the AIFM accommodate various needs from the clients as much as possible. Also, 
the regulatory arbitrage or regulatory evasion issues should be handled without difficulty based on 
the general extraterritorial application provision. For instance, suppose that an AIFM chooses to set 
up a U.K. domiciled fund to raise capital from U.K. investors, and chooses to have its office 
offshore to avoid any U.K. manager regulation, despite most of the investment and management 
activities being done in the U.K. It is highly likely to be deemed illegal even under the AIFMD. See 
supra Chapter V, Part C. 
406 See id. 
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authorization requirements even though they are free to market the funds around 
the E.U. countries without worrying about local private placement regimes.407  
The passport regime is also somewhat problematic in that there are 
insufficient grounds to justify it, in terms of investor protection and even in terms 
of systemic risk. It is necessary that both onshore and offshore AIFMs be subject 
to regulatory supervision, however, the manner of regulating the AIFMs based on 
their transnational deals should be done more delicately by only imposing simple 
registration and/or reporting requirements, together with certain minimum 













                                                          
407 Id. 
408 See supra note 363. 
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VI.     Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea  
A. Overview 
Hedge funds had not existed409 in Korea because they were expressly and 
legally prohibited before the new hedge fund regime was introduced in September 
2011 by amending the Enforcement Decree to the FSCMA.410 Unlike the U.S., the 
Korean hedge fund market was not naturally formed by the demand and supply of 
the market participants, but rather it came into emergence by a government 
initiative to build up the market in Korea.411 Before the new hedge fund regime 
was introduced, the then-existing Korean fund regime had not provided any safe 
harbor provisions to make hedge fund unique activities or strategies possible.412  
                                                          
409 As further explained infra Chapter VI, there used to be a private fund or qualified purchaser 
fund scheme available under the old Korean fund regime (i.e., FSCMA), but it provided detailed 
paternalistic rules and regulations limiting the leverage and short sale, and as a consequence 
generally accepted hedge funds’ unique investment strategies had not been available before the new 
hedge fund regime was implemented in 2011.  
410 When Korean hedge funds were initially launched in December 2011, total assets under 
management were roughly 150 billion won with 12 funds managed by 9 management companies. 
Over time, there were increases in both assets under management and the number of the funds. That 
is, as of November 2012, the total assets under management were roughly 1 trillion won with 19 
funds managed by 12 management companies. Because of the relatively short track record and 
resulting reputational problem, there were little capital inflows from institutional investors at an 
initial stage, and so-called high net-worth individuals as well as prime brokers and/or affiliated 
companies were the primary funding sources. See Financial Services Commission Press Release, 
First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, Dec. 6, 2012, available at 
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/wn/list_qu.jsp?menu=01&bbsid=BBS0048&selQuarter=&selYear=2012
&nxPage=1.  
411 See Financial Services Commission Legislative Release No. 2011-92 (June 20, 2011), at 1, 
available at 
http://fsc.go.kr/know/law_prev_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0120&page=3&sch1=subject&sch2=&sch3=
&sword=&r_url=&menu=7410100&no=25255. See also Interview with Seokdong KIM, former 
FSC Chairman, at Hedge Fund Workshop, May 23, 2011, available at 
http://www.asiatoday.co.kr/news/view.asp?seq=483850. 
412 As indicated earlier, although there were some special rules for private funds under the old fund 
regime, a hedge fund scheme was be practically impossible because leveraged transactions like 
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What that means, however, is not that hedge funds are completely 
unavailable in Korea: Offshore hedge funds are limitedly accessible to certain 
professional investors,413 and retail investors are also accessible to offshore hedge 
funds indirectly via fund of funds scheme.414 That is, under the previous Korean 
regime (i.e., the FSCMA before the new hedge fund rules were introduced), 
offshore hedge funds, established and managed offshore by foreign managers, 
were directly available to certain professional Korean investors, and indirectly 
available to all types of investors including non-professional investors via Korean 
fund of funds scheme.415 
                                                                                                                                                                
money borrowings, speculative derivative transactions, and short sales were legally barred. More 
precisely, those private funds used to be treated as one of the regulated funds managed by the 
regulated management companies although some of the rules and regulations were not applicable to 
the private funds on the condition that they offered or sold their securities on a private placement 
basis and that they were subject to certain threshold requirements such as the maximum number of 
the investors or eligible investor threshold (i.e., qualified purchasers). See supra note 408. 
413 For example, National Pension Service, Korea Investment Corporation and Korea Post are some 
of the eligible investors to invest in the offshore hedge funds. For more details about the eligible 
professional investors in terms of offshore fund sale, see FSCMA, art. 279; PD, art. 301. 
414 For instance, diversification and no double fee rules, as well as mandated disclosure 
requirements (i.e., securities registration statements) should be applicable to fund of funds because 
they were deemed to be a typical regulated funds (i.e., mutual funds), and even fund of hedge funds, 
which were treated as private funds, would be subject to the same requirements to a large extent. 
See FSCMA, art. 249; PD, art. 271. 
415 Under the Korean regime, offshore hedge funds had also been available to Korean investors 
through discretionary investment management accounts or specified money trusts. Thus, four 
different alternatives (i.e., fund of funds, fund of hedge Funds, discretionary investment 
management accounts, and specified money trusts), in addition to the direct sale of offshore funds 
to certain professional investors, have been available to Korean investors to access offshore hedge 
funds during the time when Korean domiciled hedge funds had been strictly prohibited. What is in 
common among the four alternatives is that there is a market intermediary or third party fiduciary 
like an investment adviser or a trustee between offshore hedge funds and Korean investors, and no 
direct contact between them is permitted under the FSCMA. See supra note 22. 
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Some may wonder why the Korean government (i.e., Korean FSC) has 
determined to begin allowing Korean domiciled hedge funds and managers while 
many other countries around the world have tried to regulate the hedge fund 
industry more tightly than ever. We may find the clues or answers for this question 
by highlighting the unique market circumstances surrounding the Korean hedge 
fund market as follows:416 
First and foremost, the push to expand the Korean hedge fund market was 
introduced by the government, not by market participants.417 Meanwhile, Korean 
local firms have demonstrated insufficient progress and advancement in their 
business practices and have gained little experience or expertise in cutting-edge 
areas like hedge fund and prime brokerage services, because they do not have 
sufficiently well-experienced human resources and capital to engage in this 
innovative, but risky business.  
With this problem in mind, the Korean government has made an effort to 
introduce a brand-new, high value-added market in Korea, encouraging Korean 
domiciled companies to try to do something more innovative businesses, and to 
play a more active role in investing in emerging companies with growth 
potential.418 What that means is that the Korean government took the initiative to 
                                                          
416 See supra note 410. 
417 As illustrated infra, Korean domiciled hedge funds used to be unavailable because no special 
safe harbor rules were provided under Korean laws. That is, private funds and their managers are 
subject to the same rules and regulations like licensing, business conduct, and investment activities 
as mutual fund managers, although some provisions are exempted to apply for private fund. Thus, 
hedge fund-only markets were legally and practically impossible. See infra Chapter VI, Part B. 
418 Prime brokerage businesses, which play a very critical role with hedge funds, have not also 
developed yet because there have been no local hedge funds available in Korea until the new hedge 
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make the hedge fund market as they contemplated, and provided the management 
companies and securities companies with incentives to do more risky, but at the 
same time highly lucrative, business like hedge funds or prime brokerage 
businesses as a way to diversify their business portfolios.  
However, especially from the demand side, there has been a great potential 
for institutional investors like pension funds and highly wealthy individuals to 
pursue innovative investment opportunities for greater, but also stable returns on 
an ongoing basis.419 As with the emergence of the Korean domiciled hedge fund 
the Korean government has anticipated that Korean institutional investors, such as 
public pension funds and the high net-worth individuals, would be willing to 
commit their money to Korean hedge funds. In other words, Korean institutional 
investors and ultra-rich individuals would be given the opportunity to pursue this 
alternative investment opportunity in addition to the already available ones, like 
direct investment to offshore hedge fund or indirect investment through Korean 
domiciled fund of hedge funds.420  
Second, by introducing a local hedge fund market, the Korean government 
also expected an incidental effect that highly value-added investment banking 
businesses like prime brokerage services may be able to emerge. As previously 
indicated, the Korean investment banking industry has fallen by far behind as 
                                                                                                                                                                
fund regime was in place. Thus, from the Korean government perspective, by introducing the hedge 
fund market in Korea they anticipate incidentally that more investment bank-like business, such as 
prime brokerage services could emerge as the hedge fund market grows. See supra note 410. 
419 See supra note 140. 
420 See FSCMA, art. 81, 249, 279. 
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compared with the global practices in terms of business scope, and as a matter of 
fact, their business has been primarily oriented towards conventional brokerage 
businesses. In that respect, prime brokerage services are essential for the 
investment banking firms to diversify their business portfolio and it is critically 
important for hedge funds to grow sustainably. Thus, without a doubt, they are 
closely interdependent. It would be mutually beneficial for hedge funds and prime 
brokers if the hedge fund market were to grow because prime brokers provide very 
extensive roles related to hedge funds and they could gain a lot of profit from the 
services.421 In short, the Korean government took the lead to create the hedge fund 
market in a way that accommodates the various needs of different market 
participants. 
Third, the Korean government tried to attract foreign hedge fund managers 
to Korea to build up the local hedge fund market. To do so, the Korean 
government has provided incentives for foreign hedge fund managers by imposing 
less stringent licensing requirements as compared to local securities firms or asset 
management companies.422  
                                                          
421 Prime brokers are the very entity to supply various services for the hedge fund including the 
credit extention (e.g., money or securities lending), asset custody, capital raising, and proprietary 
investment, and they are indispensable for hedge funds to operate on a daily and stable basis. See 
FSCMA, art. 8(8), 77-2, 77-3. 
422 For instance, the assets under management requirement was reduced to 1 trillion won while local 
Korean licensed management companies need to have 10 trillion won in assets under management 
to obtain the hedge fund license. Also personnel requirements are less onerous than Korean 
licensed advisers to accommodate foreign managers having fund management experience in foreign 
jurisdictions. Despite this preferential treatment of foreign advisers, so far there has been no foreign 
hedge fund adviser licensed in Korea. It may be partly because the Korean hedge fund market entry 
regulation is still quite onerous or cost inefficient compared to those of other countries (especially 
nearby countries like Hong Kong or Singapore) and some alternatives are available for them to do 
hedge fund business on a cross border basis, as indicated earlier. See Financial Services 
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It may be understood as a policy decision by the Korean government in that 
offshore funds have been marketed already via Korean institutional investors and 
have been managed by managers outside of Korea, and as a result they have little 
incentive to obtain the Korean adviser license and to have a commercial presence 
in Korea. Further, local Korean entities have little experiences, expertise, and track 
records to attract Korean investors at an initial stage. 
 
B. Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea: Before the New Hedge 
Fund Regime 
 
1. Hedge Fund Manager regulation   
Under the FSCMA, any person is required to obtain a license in advance if 
he/she intends to conduct fund (including private fund) management and 
marketing business in Korea.423  Unlike in the U.S., there has been no private 
adviser exemption for licensing purposes available in Korea even in cases where 
someone intends to only target professional investors for their private fund 
business. As a result, exactly the same licensing requirements as applicable to 
mutual fund advisers are applied to private fund advisers, such as major 
                                                                                                                                                                
Commission Press Release, First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, December 6, 
2012, available at 
http://fsc.go.kr/eng/wn/list_qu.jsp?menu=01&bbsid=BBS0048&selQuarter=&selYear=2012&nxPa
ge=1. 
423 See FSCMA, art. 12. 
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shareholder, equity capital, and personnel requirements, although some 
requirements may be alleviated to some extent.424  
In addition, private fund management companies also need to obtain a fund 
distribution license to market the fund units (also known as “collective investment 
securities”) themselves, because fund units are classified as securities under the 
FSCMA, and are subject to securities dealing license requirements in connection 
with fund sales activities.425Interestingly, there is a clear definition of private fund 
(i.e., private collective investment scheme) under the FSCMA, but there is no 
special licensing unit available for those who intend to engage in private fund 
business only. Thus, as a matter of practice, there is no private fund adviser license 
available under the old regime.426 
                                                          
424 More precisely and legally speaking, only equity capital and investment management expert 
requirements will be reduced to half of the requirements applicable to the manager for the mutual 
fund if target investors are limited to professional investors, and other licensing requirements like 
major shareholder or business plan requirements are equally applicable to private fund advisers as 
well. See FSCMA, art. 12. 
425 Under the FSCMA, fund sales activities are deemed as “regulated business” (i.e., securities 
dealing or brokerage business), and as a consequence the private fund manager is also required to 
obtain a fund distribution license (namely, securities dealing license) if they intend to engage in the 
fund distribution activities themselves. See FSCMA, art. 12; PD, Annex 1. 
426 This problem happens because the licensing unit for fund business is different from the fund 
classification. That is, fund manager licenses are broken down simply based on the investor 
classification of professional investors, not by whether the fund is classified as a mutual funds or 
private funds. As a result, it is de facto impossible to do private fund business if targeting high net-
worth individuals who are not deemed professional investors under the FSCMA, but who are 
eligible for the investment of private funds. More than anything else, it makes little difference and 
provides little incentive for the applicant to pursue private fund business only because largely the 
same regulatory burden is imposed on them despite the fact that they intend to do fund business 
focusing on professional investors or quasi-professional investors only. 
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However, there is an exception for private equity fund (hereinafter as 
“PEF”) managers. Unlike hedge fund 427  managers, the PEF managers are not 
required to have a license provided that they engage in PEF business only. 428 
Basically, PEF advisers are exempted from fund management license requirements 
and fund distribution license requirements.429 In short, under the old regime private 
fund (including qualified purchaser fund, but excluding private equity fund) 
advisers need to obtain both a fund management license and a fund distribution 
license, while no license is required to PEF managers.  
It is uncertain why the old Korean regime provided license exemptions for 
PEF advisers as opposed to other private fund advisers. However, it may be 
inferred from the fact that private funds in Korea have traditionally been regarded 
as a part of general fund business similar to mutual fund business, because only 
fully licensed companies covering mutual fund businesses have been allowed to 
manage private funds; also, because the PEF rule was introduced at a later stage in 
                                                          
427  For clarity, in this chapter, private funds mean both private funds and qualified purchaser funds 
only, to the exclusion of private equity funds, although in principle private funds may include PEF. 
Unlike in the U.S., the Korean regime has a separate provision for defining PEF, in addition to the 
private fund definition. For the definition of PEF, see FSCMA, art. 9(18)(vii). 
428 Private equity fund is a kind of private fund in a broad sense of meaning under the FSCMA, but 
are distinct from typical private fund because private equity funds are strictly limited to private 
equity investment only, while other private funds are flexible in investment architecture. Because of 
the limited nature of PEFs most of the fund rules and regulations applicable to private funds are 
exempted to PEFs and their managers, and instead separate set of rules are in place for them. See 
FSCMA, art. 268 et seq. 
429 It should be noted, however, that the PEF itself is subject to regulation to some extent despite the 
manager or GP being exempted from licensing requirements, and the GP is also regulated to some 
extent indirectly, although they are not subject to licensing requirements. For instance, the PEF is 
subject to registration requirements and some restrictions are also imposed on them in regard to 
their investment activities. See FSCMA, art. 270. 
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2004 as a special and separate form of fund business focusing only on buy-out 
investment business.430  
On the other hand, venture capital fund 431  managers are expressly 
exempted from licensing requirements under the FSCMA provided that they offer 
or sell the fund units on a private offering basis.432 It may be explained as a policy 
decision to avoid a regulatory overlap problem, considering the fact that they have 
been subject to other comparable regulatory regimes and separate regulatory 
bodies are in place to supervise them; thus, there is no practical need for financial 
regulators to regulate them directly.433 As a consequence, PEFs are subject to the 
FSCMA while venture capital funds are subject to a completely separate statute – 
despite being functionally similar in many ways.434 
                                                          
430 When the PEF regime was newly introduced in 2004, the then-existing U.S. regime provided 
license and registration exemptions for PEF advisers. That may also have affected the Korean 
government’s decision not to regulate the PEF advisers directly at that time. 
431 Venture capital fund is defined under a separate law, and is subject to separate rules and 
regulations that are quite different from the fund regime under the FSCMA. Assuming that they are 
subject to comparable regulation under separate regimes, venture capital funds were deemed to 
qualify for an exemption from fund regulation under the FSCMA, despite falling under the fund 
definition under the FSCMA that would make them subject to fund regulation under the FSCMA. 
See FSCMA, art. 6(5) (S. Kor.); PD, art. 6(1). 
432 Id. 
433 Unlike the U.S., there has been no debate whether or not to regulate venture capital funds under 
the FSCMA from a systemic risk perspective, both before and after the sub-prime mortgage crisis, 
although there was a debate about that in terms of functional regulation. Namely, in Korea venture 
capital funds used to be explicitly excluded from fund regulation under the FSCMA or its preceding 
statutes despite falling within the definition of fund. Instead, they used to be regulated by a separate 
governmental body and financial regulator, and separate rules and regulations were applied to them 
by separate statutes.  
434 For the details of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two, see supra Chapter II, Part 
C.2.  
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In sum, private fund (excluding PEF) managers have been subject to the 
same license requirements as mutual fund managers,435 and only licensed entities 
are entitled to engage in private fund business in compliance with detailed rules 
and regulations applicable to mutual fund advisers. PEF managers, distinct from 
other private fund managers, are subject to no direct licensing requirements; 
however, they may be under regulatory supervision to some extent indirectly 
through the general partner regulation in the fund.436 Also venture capital fund 
managers are expressly excluded from fund regulation under the FSCMA unless 








                                                          
435 Private fund manager licenses may be theoretically possible under the FSCMA, but it is 
practically infeasible because the only difference or benefit to private fund advisers is that less 
stringent capital and investment management experts requirements are applied, and other than that, 
every other rule and regulation for mutual fund managers is equally applied to private fund 
managers. More precisely speaking, there is no private fund only license is available under the 
former FSCMA because there is no clear license unit available to accommodate private fund only 
managers. Furthermore, newly licensed entities targeting professional investors may have a hard 
time accessing high net worth individuals who may be the primary target investors, because they 
are not covered by the professional investors and because they are deemed to be non-professional 
investors. For the new adviser, raising capital from institutional investors is practically impossible 
because new advisers have no track record available to attract institutional investors.  
436 See supra note 427. 
437 See supra note 430. 
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2. Hedge Fund Regulation 
As described above, Korean private funds have been defined broadly to 
accommodate both general private funds and qualified purchaser funds.438 Both are 
similar in nature because both funds are limited to offer or sell the units on a 
private placement basis only.  
On the other hand, they are different in that private funds are limited to 
offer or sell the units to up to 99 purchasers, and up to 49 unsophisticated retail 
investors (i.e., non-professional investors) may have access to the fund, while the 
latter is limited only to qualified purchasers, 439  and an unlimited number of 
investors can be accessible if they meet the qualified purchaser eligibility threshold 
requirements.440 
Both private funds are somewhat similar to those under the U.S. regime in 
terms of the threshold requirements because the Korean regime benchmarked the 
U.S. regime in making their private fund rules. Korean private funds are a lot 
different from those under the U.S. regime because the Korean regime borrowed 
the private fund concepts to treat them a bit more favorably than mutual funds by 
imposing less onerous investment requirements on the assumption that they are 
marketed on a limited basis relying on a private placement exemption, and that 
                                                          
438 See FSCMA, art. 9(19). 
439 Qualified purchasers may be regarded as super accredited investors because the threshold 
requirements for them are much higher than that for general professional or accredited investors. It 
may be presumed on the belief that qualified purchaser funds are a more risky product than general 
securities, and should be limited to highly accredited investors. For the details about who may be 
eligible to become qualified purchasers, See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1), 271-2(1). 
440 See FSCMA, art. 249, 249-2. 
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purchasers should be limited to certain professional investors. 441  That is, the 
private fund concept is in place to mitigate the regulatory burden on investment 
activities, not to exempt them entirely from regulatory supervision in Korea. Thus, 
Korean private funds under the old regime are more likely classified as a sort of 
regulated fund like mutual funds, although they are exempted from some of the 
fund rules and regulations.  
They are subject to various fund rules and regulations including registration 
requirements 442  and reporting requirements, but they are exempted from some 
investment and management related provisions. Because of this unique regulatory 
framework, under the old private fund regime, it was practically impossible for a 







                                                          
441 As previously indicated, theoretical non-professional investors are also accessible to private 
funds up to 49 persons, but they must go through a suitability test, while professional investors 
need not to do so. Thus in reality, non-professional investors are hard to access by private funds 
because the fund distributor carries the suitability obligation. It is extremely difficult to prove that 
fund distributors checked the suitability test and confirmed that the non-professional investors are 
eligible for the investment, especially from the fund distributor’s standpoint. See FSCMA, art. 46. 
442 Unlike general private fund, qualified purchaser fund is subject to ex-post notice requirement, 
instead of ex-ante registration requirement. It may be because there is less investor protection 
concern for the latter in that the offerees and purchasers are limited to qualified purchasers only, 
while general private fund are accessible by non-professional investors on a limited basis. See 
FSCMA, art. 249-2(6). 
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3. Hedge Fund Marketing regulation 
Contrary to fund regulation, private funds are exempted from securities 
registration requirements if they satisfy private offering safe harbor conditions. 
That is, general securities private placement exemptions are also applicable to 
private funds, and private funds can avoid the onerous securities registration 
process to promote fund securities to certain eligible prospective investors.  
The policy rationale for this private offering exemption is exactly the same 
as that under the U.S. securities regime.443 The Korean private fund and private 
offering regimes permit unsophisticated investors to invest in the funds on a 
limited basis (i.e., up to 49 persons) subject to suitability requirements, which is 
similar to the U.S. regime in that unaccredited investors can access the private fund 
if they go through the sophistication test.444  
Some may doubt why private funds can enjoy private placement safe 
harbor rules while they are subject to paternalistic fund regulations and registration 
requirements in Korea. The securities registration requirement is a mandated 
disclosure regime to help prospective unaccredited investors make informed 
decisions, while fund registration requirements are not a disclosure regime, but 
rather is in place for regulator’s supervisory or information gathering purpose.445 
The fact that non-professional investors have access to private funds to some 
                                                          
443 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40. 
444 Only difference between the two regimes is that there is no clear rule for the sophistication test 
requirement in Korean private funds and private offering safe harbor rules, while the U.S. regime 
expressly requires it.  
445 See e.g., Arthur B. Laby, S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1051, 1069-70 (2011).  
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extent is also likely to encourage legislators and regulators to support imposing 
private fund registration requirements. 
As illustrated above, it appears that the Korean regime takes a bit more of a 
paternalistic and cautious approach in regulating private funds by putting them 
within regulatory oversight, and that they did so primarily because of investor 
protection concerns. There are also counter-arguments to this approach that are 
worth exploring. 
First of all, the investor protection issue can be handled to a large extent by 
strictly applying the suitability rule to non-professional investors. That is, access to 
the private funds by retail investors can be effectively filtered out through the 
suitability check process if strictly applying the rule.446 
Second, the market may be hindered from developing into a more 
innovative and competent alternative investment market by regulating them 
directly through structuring investment portfolios and by making both the 
managers and investors heavily rely on the regulators, which often times will be 
more likely to result in a moral hazard problem or less vigilant due diligence 
practice in the marketplace.447 
Finally, even from the systemic risk regulatory standpoint, the Korean 
regime seems to have an overregulation problem because the managers, not the 
funds, are the parties responsible for the day-to-day management of the funds; they 
should be the right targets for regulatory oversight in terms of systemic risk 
                                                          
446 See supra note 440. 
447 See supra Chapter III, Part B.2. 
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regulation.448 Overall, there seem to be few grounds for supporting direct fund 
regulation in Korea.449  
 
4. Offshore Fund Marketing Regulation  
While local private funds and their advisers are subject to stringent 
regulation under the Korean fund regime, offshore private funds and their 
managers are relatively free to market the fund units if they offer or sell them fund 
to certain Korean institutional investors. 450 Offshore private fund managers are not 
subject to licensing requirements under the Korean regime if they offer or sell the 
fund units through locally licensed fund distributors (e.g., locally licensed 
securities broker or dealer), and instead they are required to have the fund 
registered with the Korean regulator beforehand.451  
Instead, their target offerees and purchasers should be strictly limited to 
certain professional investors (excluding high net-worth individuals). 452  This 
                                                          
448 Id. 
449 It should be noted, however, that the goal of preventing systemic risk by direct size and/or 
leverage regulation is almost harder to achieve and is cost-inefficient because hedge fund failure 
could happen even under the stringent regulatory regime. It may be an unavoidable problem we 
face in extremely stressful financial situations. Accordingly, direct fund regulation may be assessed 
as overly conservative and unreasonably burdensome. See id. 
450 See FSCMA, art. 279. 
451 Id. Although it is not entirely clear, there appears to be an implied safe harbor in the FSCMA for 
offshore fund registration, if Korean investors voluntarily invest in offshore funds without any 
solicitation or advertisement from the offshore funds or their sales agents. See FSCMA, art. 279(1); 
PD, art. 7(3)(vi). 
452 The permissible scope of target investors for offshore fund managers is a lot narrower than those 
for locally licensed entities. This difference may be explained by the fact that Korean domiciled 
private funds are relatively less risky and complicated than offshore hedge funds because the 
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Korean offshore fund sales regime indicates that offshore hedge funds have easy 
access to potential Korean investors, provided that the target investors are limited 
to certain professional investors via an offshore fund registration route.453 Offshore 
fund registration requirements are imposed for the regulator only, however, not for 
the investors. Thus information regarding registered offshore hedge funds is not 
publicly available, but may be available on a limited basis only.454 
 
C. Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea: After New Hedge Fund 
Regime  
As demonstrated supra, hedge funds were not available under the FSCMA, 
except for offshore hedge funds, until the Enforcement Decree to the FSCMA was 
amended in 2011.455  
                                                                                                                                                                
former are heavily regulated by the Korean regulator while the latter are not regulated or lightly 
regulated under foreign jurisdictions. Regarding the scope of professional investors for offshore 
hedge fund sale, see FSCMA, art. 279(2); PD, art. 301(2). 
453 Locally licensed fund managers may set up hedge funds offshore and offer the units to Korean 
investors, theoretically speaking. But it may be practically and legally problematic because of 
regulatory arbitrage or extraterritorial application issues. Namely, it may be rejected by the FSC if 
locally licensed managers apply for fund registration with FSC with a view to marketing the fund 
units to Korean investors because under the FSCMA there is an extraterritorial application 
provision that FSCMA should be applicable even to offshore funds if it may affect the Korean 
market or Korean investors. However, it is permissible and no extraterritorial application issues 
arise if Korean domiciled managers set up offshore funds for offshore investors. See FSCMA, art. 2. 
454 The general information about the offshore hedge fund registered with the FSC may be available 
to the public because the Korean FSC and a Korean SRO called KOFIA provide some information 
about the registered offshore funds to the public. See FSCMA, art. 279(3), 280(4); PD, art. 303. 
455 See supra note 410. 
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However, the hedge fund concept in Korea is not a totally brand-new one; 
rather it should be understood as a modified form of qualified purchaser fund 
regime already in place under the old regime. That is, the Korean hedge fund 
regime went into place by re-defining the then-existing qualified purchaser fund 
regime.456  
Under the new hedge fund regime, qualified purchasers are redefined to 
cover the high net-worth individuals, and much more relaxed investment and 
management requirements are applied to accommodate the needs of the hedge 
funds to utilize various leveraged transactions, albeit hedge funds are still 
somewhat subject to investment limitations or restrictions.457  
 
1. Hedge Fund Manager Regulation 
(A)   Licensing requirements 
Under the new regime, hedge fund manager licenses have become available 
that focus on hedge fund business only, and the prior-existing licensed entities 
such as investment advisers, asset management companies, and securities firms 
have limited accessibility to the hedge fund business to the extent that they satisfy 
certain threshold requirements for hedge fund business.458  That is, hedge fund 
                                                          
456 See FSCMA, art. 249-2. 
457 Id. 
458 Only some of the regulated entities like investment advisers, asset management companies or 
securities firms are eligible to apply for the hedge fund manager license because there are some 
threshold requirements in place. For example, one trillion won or more in equity capital is required 
for the securities firms, 500 billion won or more in assets under management is required for the 
investment advisers, and 10 trillion or more in assets under management is required for asset 
management companies as a prerequisite for the license application. Later on, these threshold 
requirements have been repealed or relaxed, but similar entry barriers are still maintained. For 
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managers are subject to new licensing requirements with threshold limits in place 
for the license.459  
Thus, anyone who intends to carry on the hedge fund business, including 
previously licensed entities like investment advisers or asset management 
companies, should obtain the relevant license beforehand.460 Not all persons are 
allowed to apply for the license; only certain licensed entities like securities firms, 
investment advisers, asset management companies, and foreign hedge fund 
managers who satisfy certain threshold requirements are eligible to apply for the 
license.461  
It appears that the Korean government has taken a step-by-step approach in 
granting hedge fund licenses considering the fact that there was no track record 
and no sufficient experience in managing hedge funds among locally licensed 
entities; accordingly, among the licensed entities, some investment advisers, asset 
                                                                                                                                                                
instance, the assets under management requirement for the fully licensed asset management 
companies has been repealed, but instead new assets under management threshold requirement (i.e., 
1 trillion won) is in place for the securities fund only license holders, and for securities companies 
or investment advisers, the threshold requirement of equity capital or assets under management has 
been relaxed to half of the previous ones each (i.e., 0.5 trillion won for securities companies, and 
250 billion won for investment advisers). See FSC Press Release, Private Fund Regulatory Reform, 
Dec. 10, 2013, available at 
http://fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=사모펀
드&r_url=&menu=7210100&no=29506. 
459 Hedge fund manager licensing requirements are exempted to the asset management companies 
already fully licensed because the license they already obtained covers hedge fund licenses and as a 
consequence they are deemed licensed entities for hedge fund business. It is because the new 
regime defines the hedge fund as a type of “mixed asset fund” already in existence under the 
FSCMA, and the fully licensed asset management companies have no need to obtain the hedge fund 
license in addition to the previously obtained license. But they are required, instead, to file the 
relevant documents with the FSC before engaging in the business to make sure that they satisfy 
certain additional requirements like assets under management and investment management expert 
requirements. See Regulation on the Financial Investment Business, FSC Release No. 2011-22, 
Nov. 22, 2011, addenda art. 2(1), as amended (S. Kor.) (hereinafter FSC Regulation). 
460 The Korean FSC announced the plan to integrate current hedge fund manager licensing 
requirements into registration system in the foreseeable future. See supra note 458. 
461 Id. 
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management companies, and securities firms were allowed to engage in hedge 
fund business.  
Securities firms are required to have sufficient equity capital of 1 trillion 
won or more and to set up a separate company for their hedge fund business 
because of the conflict of interest concerns.462 As a result, only certain securities 
firms, investment advisers and asset management companies have access to hedge 
fund business through the locally licensed entities.463  
For foreign hedge fund advisers, the Korean government takes a much 
more flexible approach in that much less stringent assets under management, track 
record, and investment management expert requirements are applied. For instance, 
1 billion dollars in assets under management is required for the foreign managers 
to apply for the Korean hedge fund manager license, while 10 trillion won in assets 
under management is required for Korean licensed managers. 464  Despite the 
                                                          
462 Compared to other licensed entities like investment advisers, securities firms have a higher 
potential to have problems with of conflicts of interest because they are the the ones doing prime 
brokerage business via hedge funds, and they have a proprietary trading desk actively exercising 
hedge fund like strategies. 
463 Because of the aforementioned threshold requirements, only big-sized regulated firms are able to 
participate in hedge fund business, while small-sized regulated firms or newly established firms are 
not. It looks a bit unreasonable because the hedge fund market should be treated as niche market 
focusing on private fund business only, and for that reason it should be open for everyone who is 
willing to do creative or innovative business. However, it may be also understood as an inevitable 
choice from the Korean regulator’s standpoint in that while introducing the market in Korea in the 
wake of the financial crisis (and various concerns have been raised about their potential negative 
impacts on the market) the government would like to make sure that the newly established regime 
is safe and sound enough to deal with those concerns. The same criteria is applied to foreign hedge 
fund managers, and only some well-recognized and reputable managers who satisfy the threshold 
assets under management requirements are allowed to apply for a hedge fund manager license in 
Korea. The Korean FSC has announced the plan to change the hedge fund licensing regime into a 
simple and straightforward registration system in the near future. See supra note 458. 
464 It should be noted that the assets under management requirement for the Korean domiciled fully 
licensed asset management companies was repealed on November 22, 2012, and instead a reduced 
assets under management requirement (i.e., one trillion won) was imposed on the securities fund 
only license holders. But, there are still considerable differences between domestic companies and 
offshore private fund managers in terms of the threshold assets under management requirement. See 
FSC Press Release, First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, supra note 421. 
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counter-discriminatory concern against locally licensed managers, this approach 
may be understood as a policy decision to attract reputable foreign hedge fund 
managers to Korea.465  
In addition, the Korean FSC takes a different regulatory approach between 
investment advisers and asset management companies.466 Different assets under 
management requirements are imposed on investment advisers and asset 
management companies, largely because of the fact that some investment advisers 
have experience and expertise in hedge fund-like investment strategies, while asset 
management companies have insufficient experience in hedge fund-like 
strategies.467 
Unlike hedge fund managers, private equity fund managers are still subject 
to different rules and regulations than hedge funds even under the new hedge fund 
regime. That is, private equity fund managers are still not subject to stringent 
licensing requirements, but instead they are subject to registration requirement.468 
                                                          
465 Despite these preferential treatments of foreign hedge fund managers, there have been no foreign 
applicants for hedge fund business in Korea thus far. It may be explained that, from the foreign 
private fund manager perspective, current Korean licensing requirements is still very onerous and 
quite costly while the Korean hedge fund market size is relatively small (i.e., cost inefficient). On 
the other hand, it may also affect their decision not to apply for the license that they can market 
their funds on a cross-border basis even under the current regime, and there is no urgent need to 
obtain local licenses that require them to invest lots of capital and human resources in Korea. 
Further, it may also be taken into account that neighboring countries like Hong Kong and Singapore 
provide more flexible licensing requirements for hedge fund advisers. These concerns may be 
mitigated or resolved if the Korean FSC implemented the registration regime in the future, instead 
of the current onerous authorization regime. See supra note 458. 
466 Briefly speaking, investment advisers provide investment advisory or discretionary investment 
management services on an individual and segregated account basis, while asset management 
companies provide discretionary investment management services via a fund or collective 
investment scheme. For the statutory definitions, see FSCMA, art. 6(4)-(7). 
467 Unlike the U.S. regime, under the Korean regime (i.e., FSCMA) there is a clear distinction in 
licensing between investment advisers and asset management companies in that the former provides 
investment advisory services on a segregated account basis, while the latter provides investment 
management services on a collective basis targeting collective investment schemes or funds. See id. 
468 This registration requirement was newly introduced by the amendment of the FSCMA, and it 
has been in force since May 28, 2013. Before the amendment of the FSCMA, the private equity 
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The requirements for private equity fund manager registration are much less 
onerous compared to hedge fund managers.469  
This newly introduced registration requirement for private equity fund 
managers may be influenced by the apparently global regulatory consensus 
towards regulating PEFs and hedge funds as private funds in the U.S. or as 
alternative investment funds in Europe. The Korean FSC, however, took a bit 
different approach in terms of how to regulate them. Under the FSCMA, there is a 
clear distinction between hedge funds and private equity funds; private equity 
funds are defined to carry on primarily buy-out investment activities and special 
rules and regulations are separately in place for them.470  
 
(B)   Reporting Requirements 
In addition to the licensing requirements, hedge fund managers are subject 
to reporting requirements if there are material changes after the registration of the 
funds they manage. Also, they are subject to reporting requirements relating to 
leveraged transactions such as money borrowing and to over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions.471  
These requirements are in line with the U.S. regime and are in place to 
monitor risky activities and to mitigate potential systemic risk, although under the 
                                                                                                                                                                
fund only managers were exempted from licensing and registration requirements, unlike hedge fund 
or private fund managers. For the detailed registration requirements, see FSCMA, art. 272-2. 
469 As indicated earlier, under the old regime PEF managers used to not be subject to any licensing 
or registration requirements, but under the new regime they become subject to registration 
requirements. It is not clear why the Korean government takes the position to treat them differently 
but it appears that both are different in many ways. The PEF market was already in place in Korea 
while the hedge fund market is more newly established. With that in mind, it seems that the Korean 
government has taken a step-by-step approach to structuring the regulatory architecture for hedge 
funds and private equity funds for some period of time. 
470 See FSCMA, art. 9(18)(vii), 268 et seq. 
471 See FSCMA, art. 249-2(7), 270(9).  
166 
Korean regime there is no clear provision stating that the prevention of systemic 
risk is one of the goals of securities regulation.472 
It appears that the Korean FSC takes the position that, compared to hedge 
funds, there are not as many systemic risk related concerns for PEFs; however, 
they are still subject to reporting requirements for their leveraged transactions.473 
 
2. Hedge Fund Regulation  
 
(A)   Reporting Requirement 
Compared to general private funds, Korean hedge funds are relatively free 
to establish and market to investors because they are only subject to ex-post 
reporting requirements, while general private funds are required to register with 
the FSC and cannot market the fund before registration.474  
However, Korean hedge funds are also subject to some of the rules and 
regulations applicable to mutual funds to the extent necessary to protect investors 
and to mitigate systemic concerns.475 For instance, leveraged transactions476 are 
                                                          
472 Unlike the U.S. regime, the Korean regime tackles the systemic risk issue directly by providing 
an upper limit for leveraged transactions like borrowing and speculative derivatives transactions, in 
addition to the reporting requirements. In that regard, the Korean regime may be more concerned 
with potential systemic risks, although there is no express provision under the FSCMA asserting 
that preventing systemic risk is a goal. The licensing requirements applicable to hedge fund 
managers could be evaluated as being systemic risk focused because certain levels of capital and 
appropriate internal control systems should be in place to obtain the license. See FSCMA, art. 1. 
473 This two-tiered approach in Korea can be evaluated positively because at least in Korea there is 
a clear distinction between hedge funds and PEFs from a legal and practical perspective. Under the 
current PEF regime it is difficult to say that PEFs have great potential to pose systemic risk in that 
they primarily engage in private equity investments, they are not active traders in the secondary 
market, and there is a quantitative limit to their leveraged transactions in place. See supra Chapter 
II, Part B.3. 
474 See FSCMA, art. 249, 249-2. 
475 For instance, unlike the qualified purchaser fund under the U.S. regime, Korean qualified 
purchaser funds are accessible to only high net-worth individuals who are deemed to not be 
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limited to up to four times a fund’s equity capital,477 suitability rules are applicable 
to non-professional investors (but qualified purchasers) like high net-worth 
individuals, fund custody service must be provided by the licensed entity like 
trustee banks, and fund assets must be evaluated on a mark-to-market basis.478 
Thus, unlike the U.S. and U.K. regimes, Korean hedge funds are subject to 
direct regulation, which may not work properly on unique hedge fund investment 
strategies that largely depend on leverage and/or short sales.479  
Overall, the Korean hedge fund regime is unique in that Korean hedge 
funds are directly subject to rules and regulations like mutual funds; accordingly, it 
may be described as quasi-regulated funds.480 
                                                                                                                                                                
professional investors, and as a result the suitability rule is applicable to them. Also, quantitative 
leverage restrictions are imposed and periodic reporting of leveraged transactions is required. See 
FSCMA, art. 47, 249-2. 
476 Legally leveraged transactions entail borrowing money from third party creditors, but practically 
it means that every transaction in essence is borrowing in substance. They may include over the 
counter derivative transactions, repurchase agreements, and third party debt guarantees, in addition 
to the money being borrowed. See FSCMA, art. 249-2(4), (5). 
477 This quantitative leverage limitation may adversely affect funds who find it necessary to utilize 
leveraged transactions a lot (e.g., fixed income arbitrage fund), and may also make the local hedge 
fund market a bit unnatural. The Korean government takes a more conservative approach to make 
sure that no substantial systemic risk issues will arise and that there is no urgent need to allow 
unlimited leveraged transactions because most of the locally licensed managers are willing to 
manage traditional equity long-short fund, not fixed income arbitrage funds requiring considerable 
amounts of leverage at an initial stage. 
478 It should be noted that all these rules and regulations are mandatorily applied to hedge funds and 
hedge fund managers, and because of these rules and regulations the Korean regime may be 
described as taking a rule-based approach like the U.S., and not a principle-based approach like the 
U.K. 
478 Regulating hedge funds may have a negative impact on the market because it may give the 
wrong signal to potential investors that they should rely more on government (i.e., moral hazard 
problem), and from the regulator’s side they may have more pressure from the public and the 
political groups to be proactive or take preventive action to deal with potential hedge fund problems. 
To the contrary, it may also encounter criticism that the private market becomes somewhat similar 
to public mutual fund market, and because of that the regulator is too susceptible to political 
pressure when certain bad things happen. More than anything else, it may be problematic that there 
is no clear distinction between the private market and public mutual fund market and the regulator 
takes a somewhat unclear position in regulating the hedge fund market. It may also be harmful to 
every participant in the market because no one can have a clear understanding about what the 
rationale behind the regulation is. 
480 Registration or reporting may be mutually beneficial for both the manager and the investors in 
some respects. From the manager’s standpoint, it may be helpful to market the funds because it may 
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(B)  Hedge Fund Marketing Regulation 
Under the FSCMA, any offer or sale of fund units may be deemed 
securities dealing or brokerage business depending on a factual assessment; no one 
is allowed to market the fund targeting potential investors without obtaining the 
relevant license first.481  
Mandated disclosure (i.e., filing securities registration statement) can be 
exempted if the offer or sale were done on a private placement basis in compliance 
with private offering rules, and if no public solicitation or advertisement is 
permitted then they are allowed to market to certain pre-defined qualified 
purchasers.482  
Among the qualified purchasers, high net-worth individuals are not deemed 
professional investors under the FSCMA, but rather they are treated as non-
professional-unsophisticated investors; however, they are classified as qualified 
purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund definition.483 As a result, various 
rules and regulations applicable to securities brokers/dealers, including a suitability 
                                                                                                                                                                
enhance their reputation or creditworthiness with counterparties and investors. At the same time, 
from the investors’ perspective, it also may help them to access the hedge fund more comfortably 
because they may think it should be regulated enough to protect them by the regulatory authority. 
However, it is doubtful if mandatory registration or reporting requirements are really necessary in 
that the manager and the investors are able to choose registration on a voluntary basis if they think 
it is beneficial for them, and mandatory registration or direct regulatory intervention in designing 
their investment strategies may hinder them from pursuing financially innovative investment 
strategies, and may deter them from maximizing their positive roles in the marketplace. Further, 
considering the fact that the manager is already subject to regulatory supervision to some extent 
there is little practical need to regulate the fund because it may distort the market. 
481 See FSCMA, art. 7, 12,  
482 See FSCMA, art. 9(7), (8), (19), 249-2. 
483 See FSCMA, art. 249-2; PD, art. 271-2(1).  
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rule, would be applied if fund units were marketed to high net-worth 
individuals.484  
That is, high net-worth individuals are treated differently from other 
institutional investors in the qualified purchaser funds. They have more legal 
protection under the suitability rule because they are deemed to be non-
professional investors, requiring securities brokers or dealers to check their 
suitability before soliciting the fund.485 
Hedge fund managers are able to market the fund directly, but are subject 
to fund distribution license requirements. It is because the Korean government 
would like to ensure that high net-worth individuals are sufficiently protected by 
the suitability rule when they are marketed by the fund manager and not by third 
party intermediaries like securities firms.486  
Unlike hedge fund managers, PEF managers are eligible to market the fund 
units without any fund distribution license. Thus, the suitability rule, which is 
                                                          
484 This problem arises because high net-worth individuals are defined to cover non-professional 
investors as qualified purchasers under the hedge fund regime, but they are legally treated as non-
professional investors and no opt-in clause is available under the FSCMA. What that means is that 
under the FSCMA high net-worth individuals are not included in the category of professional 
investors (i.e., deemed sophisticated investors, and no suitability rule is applied to them), but they 
are intentionally and statutorily included as a type of qualified purchaser in defining the qualified 
purchaser fund. It is a bit contradictory to the private offering or qualified purchaser fund concept 
in the U.S. in that typical qualified purchaser thresholds are much higher or stringent than the 
accredited investor threshold under the private offering safe harbor rules. However, it may be 
understood that the Korean government is trying to take a compromised position to accommodate 
the market needs to cover high net-worth individuals as a potential hedge fund investors, while 
making sure to protect high net-worth individuals who do not meet the professional investor 
threshold requirement. See id. See also FSCMA, art. 9(5); PD, art. 10 (defining the scope of 
professional investors). 
485 See id. See also FSCMA, art. 46. 
486 For instance, think about the situation where hedge fund managers are not required to obtain a 
fund distribution license. That means they do not need to be in compliance with suitability rule 
because they are not deemed to be a securities broker or dealer, and only securities brokers or 
dealers are subject to the suitability rule. It is true that under the FSCMA there is a fiduciary duty 
and anti-fraud rule in place for the fund manager, but these are not sufficient to protect HNWIs (i.e., 
deemed non-professional and unsophisticated investors) proactively when they make investment 
decisions. 
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applicable to hedge fund managers when they sell the units directly, is not 
applicable to PEF managers if they sell the units directly to high net-worth 
individuals.487 
Korea domiciled hedge funds are exempt from securities registration 
requirements based on the private offering safe harbor rule, but are subject to a 
suitability rule for high net-worth individuals when they sell or offer the units 
directly or indirectly through third party fund distributors. By contrast, PEF 
managers are free from the suitability rule if they market the units directly to high 
net-worth individuals.488 
 
(C) Investors (Qualified Purchasers) 
Interestingly, the scope of who is deemed a qualified purchaser under the 
new hedge fund regime is a lot wider than the former regime in that certain high 
net-worth individuals are allowed to directly access the hedge funds. The former 
qualified purchaser funds used to be inaccessible to high net-worth individuals 
                                                          
487 It should be noted that, contrary to the PEF managers, any third party intermediary is subject to 
fund distribution license if they sell the PEF units on behalf of the PEF managers, and accordingly 
they are subject to suitability rule when marketing the units to certain HNWIs who do not satisfy 
the professional investor threshold requirement but who are eligible for the PEF investment. 
Because of the regulatory difference between direct marketing and indirect marketing of the PEF, 
regulatory gaps and loopholes will arise, needing to be fixed legislatively. 
488 The thresholds for high net-worth individuals for hedge fund and PEF are different in Korea: 0.5 
billion won of invested amount is applied for hedge fund while 1 billion won of investment amount 
is applied to PEF. Both HNWIs under the hedge fund and PEF regime are deemed to be non-
professional investors under the FSCMA because the general professional investor threshold for the 
high net-worth individuals is much higher than that for hedge funds and PEFs (i.e., at least 5 billion 
won of invested amount is required for individuals to be treated as professional investors). This 
regulatory differentiation should be reconsidered and amended by either treating HNWIs as 
professional investors or by lowering the general threshold requirement for wealthy individuals to 
include high net-worth individuals under the hedge fund and PEF regulatory regime. See FSCMA, 
art. 9(5), 249-2(1), 269(6); PD, art. 10, 271-2(1), 291(3). 
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despite the fact that hedge funds are much riskier due to access to highly leveraged 
transactions than the former qualified purchaser funds.489  
This may be interpreted as a policy decision that the Korean regulator (i.e., 
the FSC) has taken a more affirmative position to accommodate a larger investor 
pool so that hedge funds can build up the market during this initial stage, despite 
the increased risk inherent in hedge fund investment strategies.  
It seems reasonable that some professional investors, including institutional 
investors, are included in the qualified purchaser category. However, it is 
unreasonable for the threshold for high net-worth individuals for hedge funds to be 
much lower than the former threshold for the general qualified purchaser funds.  
Generally speaking, hedge funds deal in much riskier financial products 
than general securities or derivatives products. In addition, the threshold for high 
net-worth individuals under the Korean regime is in contradiction to that of the 
U.S. regime in that the accredited investor threshold under Regulation D is much 
lower than the qualified purchaser threshold for qualified purchaser funds under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940.490 
                                                          
489 See FSCMA, art. 249-2. 
490 Under the FSCMA, general threshold for high net-worth individuals (i.e., professional investors) 
is 5 billion won of invested amount while the threshold for qualified purchasers is 0.5 billion won 
(i.e., just one-tenth of the general high net-worth individuals threshold). The former is applicable 
when individual investors are willing to invest in general securities or derivatives, and it is also 
applicable to private offerings. On the other hand, the latter is applicable only when the high net-
worth individuals are willing to invest in the hedge funds. Under the private offering regime, non-
professional or unaccredited individuals are also accessible to the offering on a limited basis, and 
they are also accessible to the hedge funds if they meet the qualified purchaser threshold. In that 
respect, some may argue that the qualified purchaser threshold is a lot higher than that under the 
private offering regime, but it is untrue and misleading because qualified purchasers include some 
of the professional investors, not some of the general public. It is also consistent with the rationale 
that as a prerequisite the qualified purchaser fund must meet the private offering rule, and qualified 
purchasers should be selected from the general professional investors pool. See FSCMA, art. 9(5), 
249-2(1); PD, art. 10, 271-2(1).  
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Some high net-worth individuals (i.e., those in between 0.5 billion won in 
invested amount and 5 billion Won in invested amount) under the hedge fund 
regime should be treated as non-professional investors despite meeting the 
requirements of the qualified purchaser category, and should be treated differently 
under the private offering exemption as well.491  
They are treated differently from other qualified purchasers (e.g., 
institutional investors) who are deemed professional investors under the Korean 
securities regime even though they are classified the same as qualified purchasers 
under the new hedge fund regime. Theoretically, 49 high net-worth individuals or 
fewer can be marketed to and can directly invest in the hedge funds provided that 
they go through the suitability test in every private offering – despite not 




                                                          
491 Theoretically, putting those two regimes together, up to 49 high net-worth individuals are 
accessible to the hedge funds for a one time private offering, and the number of the them could be 
expanded more provided that they meet the private offering rule in every offering and also meet the 
qualified purchaser threshold. See FSCMA, art. 9(7), 249-2(1); PD, art. 11(1), 271-2(1). 
492 It is unclear whether, under the Korean private offering exemption, some high net-worth 
individuals, who are deemed non-professional investors, may be required to go through the 
sophistication test, because there is no express provision that an ex-ante sophistication test is 
required for the high-net worth individuals. But it should be reasonable to interpret that something 
like that test should be applied to high net-worth individuals even under the Korean private offering 
exemption because of the suitability rule applicable to them when fund distributors offer or sell the 
unit to them. However, the Korean private offering regime is different from the U.S. regime 
because no sophistication test is required for the non-professional high net-worth individuals under 
the Korean private offering regime, and the suitability rule is a bit different and less stringent 
compared to the sophistication test applicable to unaccredited investors under the U.S. private 
offering regime. This regulatory difference arises between the two countries because the qualified 
purchaser threshold under the Korean regime is a lot less stringent than the threshold for the private 
offering exemption under the U.S. regime. For the details of the U.S. private offering regime, see 
supra Chapter IV, Part B.2. 
173 
(D) Investment and Management Regulation 
Unlike the U.S. and U.K. regimes, the Korean hedge fund rule directly 
regulates the investment and management of hedge fund portfolios. As indicated 
supra, the Korean regulator takes a very conservative position in directly 
regulating both the funds and their managers to ensure mitigating potential 
regulatory concerns. Leveraged transactions like cash borrowing, third party debt 
guaranteeing and/or speculative derivative transactions are strictly limited to 400% 
or less of the fund assets.493 Also the fund managers are required to report the 
details of the leveraged transactions on a quarterly basis.494  
Regulation of leverage transactions under the Korean hedge fund regime is 
appropriate given that there is no precedent for how to manage leveraged hedge 
funds in Korea, and it is difficult to imagine how the leveraged transactions may 
adversely affect to the market during a stressed situation, if any. Thus, it may be 
concluded that the Korean regulator took a wait see approach at the beginning, 
despite the potential harm for hedge funds in fully exercising investment strategies 
that utilize leveraged transactions.495 In this regard, Korean hedge funds may still 
be regarded as quasi-regulated, as no full discretion is granted to the fund 
managers in terms of the investment activities. 
However, this regulatory strategy may deter market autonomy and financial 
innovation, and it is more likely that the Korean hedge fund market may fall 
                                                          
493 See FSCMA, art. 249-2(4), (5). 
494 See id. art. 249-2(7). 
495 It may also be taken into consideration that at the initial stage there is no urgent market need for 
more flexible leverage thresholds because there is no meaningful track record or experience with 
managing the leveraged hedge funds like fixed-income arbitrage funds that need more leverage, and 
most of the Korean hedge fund managers are willing to do traditional equity long-short strategies 
first because it is more comfortable and familiar to them. See supra note 464. 
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behind their global competitors. It is also problematic that the government is 
somewhat directly involved in the hedge fund’s investment activities; as a result, it 
is inevitable for the government to be the direct target of public blame if something 
bad happens from the hedge fund industry. At the same time, too much 
government intervention may cause a moral hazard problem from both the 
managers and their counterparties/investors.  
Therefore, it would be advisable that direct fund regulation and direct 
governmental intervention in fund investment activities should be minimized or 
refrained from in the long run in Korea, assuming that an adequate investor 
protection regime and systemic risk monitoring and risk management system is in 
place. 
 
(E)  Fund Assets Custody  
Segregation of fund assets is critically important for protecting investors, 
particularly against the situations of the fund or the manager’s bankruptcies. Under 
the hedge fund regime, there is no other practical way to protect the investors’ 
assets in the fund other than strict segregation of fund assets from others, and they 
are expressly required to do so under the Korean hedge fund regime. 496  The 
Korean regime requires the fund manager/custodian to separate fund assets from 
their own assets, and to have the fund assets under custody by an independent third 
                                                          
496 Unlike hedge fund managers, PEF managers are not required to segregate the fund assets from 
others under the FSCMA, and it is probably because there exists many differences in terms of 
raising capital from investors, there is no daily active trading taking place in PEF, and it is more 
common or typical for limited partners to be involved in making important investment decisions. It 
may indicate that there is no practical need to require them to split fund assets from others. See 
FSCMA, art. 272(4).  
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parties, like regulated custodian banks or prime brokers. 497 Traditionally, 
commercial banks, holding trust business licenses, provide the fund custody 
services for funds (including hedge funds); prime brokers are recognized as 
primary fund custody service providers under the new hedge fund rule. The prime 
broker is also allowed to delegate the fund custody services to a third party service 
provider with relevant license.498  
 
(F) Suitability 
Under the FSCMA, suitability rules are applicable to non-professional 
investors only. 499  Thus, generally speaking, qualified purchasers such as 
institutional investors are not protected by the suitability rule. As explained supra, 
however, certain high net-worth individuals are deemed to be non-professional 
investors under the new hedge fund rule even though they are also equally 
classified as qualified purchasers (like institutional investors). As a result, among 
the hedge fund investors, certain high net-worth individuals are treated differently 
from institutional investors in regards to the suitability rule.  
This unique phenomenon under the Korean hedge fund rule occurs because 
the Korean government takes the policy position that high net-worth individuals 
should be under the regulatory protection of the suitability rule, while classifying 
them as qualified purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund scheme. This 
                                                          
497 See FSCMA, art. 246, 249-2(1).  
498 Under the Korean hedge fund regime, the hedge fund manager is allowed to choose any prime 
broker as a fund custodian or to choose an independent third party custodian like a bank. In cases 
where the fund manager chooses a prime broker as a fund custodian, the prime broker has 
discretion to delegate some of the custody functions to licensed third party custodians. But it should 
be noted that it is not mandatorily required for the fund manager to choose prime broker as the only 
fund custodian, but instead they have discretion to appoint other fund custody service providers in 
addition to the prime broker. See PD, art. 50(1)(iii); FSC Regulation, art. 4-101(1). 
499 See FSCMA, art. 46. 
176 
approach may be possible because of the assumption that they are not sophisticated 
or professional investors in principle, but may be treated like quasi-professional 
investors by going through the suitability rule.  
This regulatory approach may be understood as a somewhat inevitable one 
in Korea considering the fact that the hedge fund market has newly emerged. It is 
highly likely to expect that it is difficult to raise capital from institutional investors 
from the start because Korean hedge fund managers lack a track record or 
reputation for hedge fund management; accordingly, high net-worth individuals 
are the primary sources or targets for funding at the initial stage.  
However, this approach may have inherent problem, from a theoretical 
perspective, because it is likely to confuse the nature of the accredited investors 
(i.e., professional investors) under the private offering exemption, and the 
relationship between accredited investors and qualified purchasers under the hedge 
fund regime.  
Under the private offering exemption in Korea, non-professional investors 
(certain high net-worth individuals) can be directly marketed and exposed to hedge 
funds, subject to the suitability rule. As pointed out supra, the problem here is that 
the threshold for high net-worth individuals who are deemed professional investors 
under the private offering rule is much higher than that for qualified purchaser high 
net-worth individuals.  
It is questionable, though, whether this two-tiered approach regarding high 
net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers is reasonable. The fact of qualifying 
high net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers should indicate that they are 
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presumably sophisticated enough to protect themselves without paternalistic 
governmental intervention.  
Given that the rationales of the accredited investor standard under the 
private offering exemption and qualified purchaser standard under the hedge fund 
regime are similar between the U.S. and Korea, it would be a more reasonable 
conclusion that qualified purchasers (including high net-worth individuals) should 
be treated as professional investors because that is the reason why they are defined 
as qualified purchasers.500 
 
(G) Periodic report 
Under the new hedge fund rule and private offering exemption, there is no 
mandated disclosure required to hedge fund managers regarding investors at the 
time of purchase of the fund securities. However, hedge fund managers are subject 
to periodic (i.e., quarterly) reporting requirement to both the investors and the 
regulators.  
Unlike the U.S. and the U.K., under the Korean regime the information in 
the fund related document, including the periodic report, is not legally accessible 
by fund investors, and it is only accessible to the regulators; instead, under the new 
                                                          
500 Some may counter-argue that non-professional investors should be allowed to access hedge 
funds directly as a matter of policy considering the fact that they are already accessible to hedge 
funds through fund of funds or pension schemes. This view may have some grounds to support it, 
but it is also true that defining high net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers, but treating them 
as non-professional investors, is a very uncommon regulatory approach that may cause unnecessary 
concern or confusion about the underlying rationale of why they are included to the qualified 
purchaser category for hedge funds. Thus I believe it is a more prudent and consistent regulatory 
approach to treat them as professional investors, or alternatively to lower the threshold requirement 
for accredited investors under the private offering exemption, so that high net-worth individuals are 
included under the qualified purchaser fund scheme. See SEC Staff Report, supra text 
accompanying note 223. 
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hedge fund regime, there is a special provision to force the fund manager to 
provide quarterly performance reports to investors. 501  This periodic disclosure 
requirement is equally applicable to both institutional investors and high net-worth 
individuals to ensure the equal treatment of information access among the qualified 
purchasers in the fund.502 
 
D. Summary and Comments 
As explained above, Korean hedge fund regime has been introduced in the 
wake of the financial crisis in 2008, and because of that it was considered to be an 
audacious and a counter-intuitive decision, because as with the financial crisis 
there was an international consensus made to regulate the hedge fund industry 
more stringently than ever.503 
Because of these unfavorable or even hostile circumstances worldwide 
relating to the hedge fund industry, Korean regulators have taken a very cautious 
approach. They have sought to make the local hedge fund market available by 
introducing a new hedge fund regime while, on the other hand, it placed a more 
stringent regime in place under which hedge funds and their managers are both 
                                                          
501 In principle, under the Korean private offering rule it is legally impermissible to disclose fund 
related information to the public because it would be in violation of the private offering safe harbor 
rule. Thus, a mandated disclosure idea may not be feasible under the Korean private offering 
regime even though some of the general information of the funds may be distributed by the 
regulator and accessible by the general public. It should be noted, however, that this general 
information disclosure can only be made by the regulator, not by the manager or distributors, so 
there is no law violation issue here relating to the private offering safe harbor rule. See FSCMA, art. 
249-2(1). 
502 This periodic disclosure requirement is also confusing and seems inconsistent in terms of private 
offering and private fund exemptions, because a mandated disclosure rule is in force in regard to 
periodic disclosure while it is not applicable from the private offering exemption or suitability 
perspective. Thus it should be advisable to make it clear that mandated disclosure rule is not 
applicable to professional investors or to qualified purchasers. 
503 See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102. 
179 
subject to regulatory purview. This is generally in line with the global consensus 
and at the same time may help mitigate investor protection concerns and/or 
systemic risk concerns.504 
However, this regulatory approach may have some potential problems 
calling for careful reconsideration.  
First, direct fund regulation is inadvisable because it is more likely to 
impair the competitiveness and efficiency of the local Korean hedge fund market, 
and at the same time it may also deter financial innovation. It would be less likely 
for the local hedge fund market to be fully functioning and it may influence the 
market in an abnormal way.505 
There is no doubt that proper control of the highly risky leveraged 
transactions by hedge funds is essential to ensuring market stability. However, 
direct fund size or leverage regulation are less viable options because there are 
more cost-efficient ways to deal with the problems – by regulating the fund 
managers, counterparties-financial institutions, and by enhancing market discipline 
through establishing best-practices.  
Moreover, it is less likely to promote all the possible benefits and 
simultaneously it may deter the market autonomy and creativeness, which should 
be the hallmark of this market if they are directly regulated. 506  Given these 
problems, the new hedge fund regime in Korea is less likely to be free from the 
                                                          
504 See id. 
505 See supra Chapter III, Part B.2. 
506 See id. 
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overregulation issue, and should be revised to enhance market flexibility to the 
extent possible in the long run.507  
Second, as for the manager regulation, the Korean hedge fund regime has 
also had problems because it requires close to the same (or even more stringent) 
licensing requirements for those who intend to carry on hedge fund business only 
as mutual fund managers.508  
Assume that hedge fund business should be done on a very limited basis 
with sophisticated investors including ultra-rich individuals, it is doubtful if such 
onerous licensing requirements are really necessary. Investor protection concerns 
become irrelevant or insignificant if all the investors are strictly limited to 
professional/qualified investors (i.e., deemed sophisticated investors), and systemic 
risk concerns can be effectively handled without creating an onerous licensing 
regime. Lighter registration and reporting requirements should be sufficient.  
In that regard, barriers to entry such as licensing requirements should be 
lowered to reflect the business nature and potential investors pool, while ensuring 
that an appropriate ex-post risk monitoring system in place.509 
Third, the definition of accredited investor under the private offering 
exemption regime and qualified purchasers under the new hedge fund regime 
                                                          
507 As discussed supra and observed in the U.S. and the U.K. regimes, it would be more advisable 
not to directly regulate the fund, instead but to eventually regulate the manager only. See id. 
508 Any entity could apply to be a mutual fund manager if they satisfy the relevant licensing 
requirements, but there is a prerequisite for the hedge fund manager applicants in addition to the 
general licensing requirements (such as assets under management or equity capital). It may be 
considered an unreasonable or a disproportionately excessive regulation because the hedge fund 
market is a niche market like the investment advisory market in Korea, and the participants in the 
market are restricted to certain qualified purchasers. See supra Chapter VI, Part B.1. 
509 The Korean FSC recently announced its plan to lower the entry regulation in regard to hedge 
fund management business in the near future, and it should be assessed as a positive regulatory 
policy change. See supra text accompanying note 458. 
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should be revised. The current qualified purchaser threshold should be higher than 
it is now and the general accredited investor (i.e., professional investor) threshold 
should be lowered to include high net-worth individuals, who are eligible to be 
qualified purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund scheme as professional 
investors. Because hedge funds are a much more complex and riskier product than 
other financial investment products the target investors (i.e., qualified purchasers) 
should be more limited than accredited investors under the private offering regime.  
Assuming that qualified purchasers are composed of institutional investors 
or ultra-rich individuals meeting the professional investor threshold conditions, 
there should be no serious investor protection concern raised and there is no 
practical need to have a stringent paternalistic regime in place.  
Fourth, as noted supra, under the Korean regime, it is unclear why there is 
a clear regulatory distinction between hedge funds and private equity funds, and 
why they are regulated separately and differently. Hedge funds have been treated 
more like mutual funds, not like hedge funds in offshore jurisdictions, and hedge 
funds and their managers both are heavily regulated in Korea. Private equity funds 
and their managers have been treated a lot differently from hedge funds and their 
managers. The private equity fund managers have been exempted from direct 
regulations, like licensing requirements, although the funds are subject to direct 
regulation in the form of registration and restrictions on investment activities.  
This PEF regime is very uncommon in other jurisdictions, and it may be 
understood as the result of the Korea unique regulatory consideration of the 
“Chaebeol” or conglomerate issue. That is, Korean regulators are concerned about 
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the possible misuse of the private equity fund scheme as a buy-out vehicle to 
expand the affiliates of the Chaebeol firms in Korea.510 However, this regulatory 
approach may be viewed negatively in terms of regulatory architecture because 
there are no crystal clear rationales to justify the different regulatory approach 
between hedge funds and private equity funds, and many regulatory 
inconsistencies exist between the two regimes. Thus it should be revised to 
minimize the regulatory disparities between the two regimes in the long run. 
Fifth, it is worth noting that there are considerable regulatory differences in 
regulating local private funds and offshore hedge funds. As pointed out supra, 
Korea based hedge funds and their managers are subject to onerous regulatory 
requirements in Korea, while offshore hedge funds are readily accessible to 
Korean investors by relying on offshore fund sales regime or fund of funds 
schemes. There is no doubt that this creates significant regulatory arbitrage 
problems for Korea based hedge funds and their managers, and it is likely to drive 
them offshore to carry on hedge fund business targeting Korean investors. 
In sum, the Korean hedge fund regime has insufficient legal justifications 
for its structure and it should be re-designed with reference to the major 
jurisdictions like the U.S. and the U.K. Korea needs to have clearer rationales for 
regulating hedge funds and to act consistently with those rationales moving 
forward.  
                                                          
510 See ganjeob tuja jasan woonyongeob beob [Indirect Investment Asset Management Business 




VII.   Similarities and Differences between the U.S., the U.K., and 
Korea 
A. Overview 
The unprecedented worldwide financial crisis in 2008 occurred primarily 
due to sub-prime mortgage related financial market failures, and it had substantial 
negative impacts on the global market as it lead to some big-sized financial firms’ 
failures. Some examples of the crisis driven failures include Bear Sterns affiliated 
hedge fund adviser’s failure and Lehman Brother’s demise in the U.S., and 
Northern Rock’s bailout in the U.K.511512 Unsurprisingly, powerful and stringent 
regulatory reforms followed around the world after the crisis, and they have been 
justified primarily based on the macro-prudential regulatory rationale (namely, 
preventing or mitigating the systemic risk or ensuring the market stability).513  
Hedge funds have been pointed out as one of the major players that caused 
the subprime mortgage market failure and subsequent worldwide financial crisis, 
among other things, while remaining unregulated or lightly regulated. 514  As a 
                                                          
511 For the details of the Northern Rock failure, see THE ECONOMIST, Northern Rock: Lessons of the 
fall, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/9988865/print.  
512 Korea was relatively safe from the crisis in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and it 
demonstrated no big failures in the financial market primarily because they had limited exposure to 
sub-prime mortgage related financial products. See THE HANKYOREH, US subprime crisis likely to 
have limited impact on S. Korea, Aug. 14, 2007, available at 
http://english.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=228595.  
513 See e.g., IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102 (discussing generally the securities 
regulator’s role regarding systemic risk). 
514 See e.g., Sants, supra note 311. See also Rebecca Christie & Ian Katz, Hedge Funds May Pose 
Systemic Risk in Crisis, U.S. Report Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/hedge-funds-may-pose-systemic-risk-in-crisis-u-s-
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result, regulatory efforts have been made to have them be subject to mandatory 
registration and authorization, as well as periodic reporting requirements based on 
the size and amount of leverage the hedge funds utilize.515 In other words, large 
sized hedge funds are presumed to be systemically important enough to negatively 
affect the markets when they fail or are in a seriously distressed market condition. 
Registration and reporting requirements are implemented to prevent or mitigate the 
market disruption created by hedge fund failures by monitoring their activities in 
the markets on a continuous basis, helping the relevant regulators be ready to take 
appropriate corrective measures in a timely manner when necessary.516 
In addition, rules and regulations are in place to address the traditionally 
well-recognized micro-prudential regulatory rationale of investor protection. 
Mandated disclosure to the investors in the U.K. and various business conduct 
regulations are some of the examples to that end.517 These regulatory measures 
have been justified based on the fact that the hedge fund market has been growing 
quickly and continuously over recent decades, that there has been a significant 
increase in unsophisticated investors’ access to the hedge fund market, and that 
                                                                                                                                                                
report-says.html (reporting on the FSOC report indicating that hedge funds may pose a threat to 
market stability, especially in a time of crisis). 
515 See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
516 See e.g., Tim Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Written Testimony for the House Financial 
Services Committee Hearing, March 26, 2009, available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg71.aspx. 
517 See supra note 515. 
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many market malpractices have been executed by hedge fund advisers while they 
were outside of the regulatory umbrella.518  
Because of these changes in the regulatory landscape around the world and 
the global consensus among local regulators,519  the newly adopted hedge fund 
regulatory regime is similar to a large extent, but some differences in regulating 
the hedge fund industry can be observed between the countries. Below is the brief 
summary of the regulatory similarities and differences observed in the hedge fund 













                                                          
518 See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 245. 
519 See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102. For a general illustration of the relationship 
of between hedge funds and systemic risk, see Ferran, supra note 265. See also Andrew W. Lo, 
Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Written Testimony for the 
House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds, November 13, 2008, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217; and Shadab, Hedge Funds and the 
Financial Crisis, supra note 196. 
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B. Similarities Between the U.S., the U.K., and Korea 
First and foremost, what can be observed in common among the three 
countries is that hedge funds and/or their managers have come under direct 
regulatory oversight with the new regulatory framework in one way or another.520 
As illustrated supra, hedge funds and/or their advisers were unregulated or lightly 
regulated in the U.S. and the U.K. until the recent regulatory reform driven by the 
global financial crisis, while they were completely prohibited from carrying on 
hedge fund business in Korea. But the global financial crisis arising from sub-
prime mortgage related financial market bubble urged the regulators around the 
world to regulate hedge funds and/or their managers more directly. As a result, the 
U.S. and the U.K. regulators have finally taken the position to regulate the fund 
managers directly, leaving the hedge funds outside the direct regulatory 
supervision, and focusing on the rationale of prevention or mitigating of systemic 
risk.521  
                                                          
520 As indicated supra, Korea is a bit of a unique example, and may be seen to take a relaxed 
position in terms of hedge fund regulation in that Korea has newly introduced a hedge fund regime 
in Korea to institutionally develop the market amid the global financial crisis and the global 
consensus to reinforce direct regulation against hedge funds and/or their managers. But what is 
important to note about the Korean example is that they are also trying to go in parallel with global 
regulatory consensus and exercise their legislative or regulatory authority within the scope of global 
consensus. That is, on one side, the Korean regime may be regarded as an example of a 
deregulatory effort because the local hedge fund market has been completely barred in Korea until 
the new hedge fund regime became available in late 2011. But, on the other side, it may be 
regarded as an example of relatively stringent hedge fund regime compared to the U.S. and the U.K. 
regimes because the Korean regime basically provides more stringent rules and regulations against 
both hedge funds and their managers. See supra Chapter VI, Part C. 
521 See supra Chapter IV, Part C and Chapter V, Part C. It should be noted, however, that systemic 
risk is not the only base for mandatory registration/authorization; rather it has also been grounded 
on the conventional rationale for securities regulation (i.e., investor protection and deterrence of 
market abuse). See e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, U.S. SEC director, Regulating Hedge Funds and 
Other Private Investment Pools, Feb. 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch021910ajd.htm. 
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The Korean example is basically same as that of the U.S. or the U.K. in that 
the Korean regulator would like to ensure that both hedge funds and their 
managers are within their direct regulatory purview, giving them a close watch 
over hedge fund investment activities and the potential impacts on the Korean 
financial market. The flip side here is that the Korean regulator has strived to build 
up the Korean hedge fund market, and has relaxed the then-existing rules and 
regulations that made the local hedge fund business practically impossible.522  
It is reasonable to conclude that hedge funds and/or their managers have 
become somewhat regulated entities, and that they are subject to onerous reporting 
and compliance obligations under the new regimes of the three countries.  
The private adviser exemption (namely, “fewer than 15 clients” exemption) 
is no longer available in the U.S., and they are required to comply with registration, 
reporting, and business conduct rules, as well as the SEC’s examinations under the 
Advisers Act. 523  The U.K. regime also requires hedge fund managers to be 
authorized, and hedge fund managers are subject to broad business conduct rules 
(although those rules may be applied a bit lightly to the hedge fund managers 
considering the nature of their limited business based on the proportionality 
                                                          
522 In that regard, it may be more accurate to say that Korea takes a relatively more conservative 
position than the U.S. or the U.K. in regulating the Korean hedge fund market considering the fact 
that it has been newly introduced in late 2011, while the global financial market turmoil had not 
been cleared yet, and they may need some time to wait and see how the hedge fund market goes 
locally and globally.  
523 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
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principle).524 Both countries take position not to directly regulate the hedge funds 
provided that they are marketed only to certain eligible investors.525 
The Korean regime provides a comparable regulatory framework to that of 
the U.S. and the U.K. in principle in that any hedge fund adviser carrying on hedge 
fund business in Korea is required to be authorized in advance like other regulated 
entities. It is different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes because hedge funds are 
also subject to direct regulatory requirements such as leverage limits or other 
investment restrictions, and in that regard the Korean regime may be viewed as a 
more stringent regulatory regime than that of the U.S. or U.K.526 
Second, regulatory focus has been shifted more to macro-prudential 
regulation (namely, systemic risk control or ensuring market stability) from micro-
prudential regulation (namely, investor protection), and many rules and regulations 
have been implemented from that perspective in the three countries in response to 
the mortgage bubble and accompanying financial crisis.527  
                                                          
524 See supra Chapter V, Part C. See also Dan Waters, U.K. FSA Asset Management Sector Leader, 
Hedge Fund Regulation 2009 Forum Speech, The European Regulatory Agenda for Hedge Funds, 
Sept. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0930_dw.shtml. 
525 See supra note 521. The U.K. private placement exemption is no longer available to hedge funds 
after 2018, and the uniform European passport regime will replace it. All hedge funds will be 
subject to approval or reporting requirements under the AIFMD starting in 2019. See AIFMD, 
explanatory note 4, 69; art. 42, 67. 
526 It should be noted, however, that the U.K. regime may be viewed as being more similar to the 
Korean regime, and thus different from the U.S. regime, in that both the funds and the managers are 
required to register to or be authorized by the relevant local regulatory authorities under the 
AIFMD, while the U.S. hedge fund regime still provides safe harbors for hedge funds to avoid 
many of the paternalistic regulations. See supra note 521. 
527 See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.  
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It does not necessarily mean that the conventional micro-prudential 
regulatory rationale has been disregarded or treated lightly, but it is more accurate 
to say that the then-existing regulatory regime based on the micro-prudential 
rationale has been supplemented by the new rationale of macro-prudential 
regulation. For instance, redefining the threshold conditions for accredited 
investors in the U.S., and having hedge fund advisers subject to mandatory 
registration/authorization, reporting/disclosure, and examination obligations in the 
three countries, among other things, are some of the regulatory measures taken in 
terms of investor protection or deter fraud from private fund advisers.528 
There was a consensus among the regulators to redesign the regulatory 
framework to prevent or mitigate the systemic risk from the hedge fund market and 
to have a close watch over them.529 A few of the new hedge fund regimes changes 
made to address systemic risk regulation include imposing authorization and 
registration requirements on the private fund manager and/or the fund, mandatory 
reporting, and compulsory implementation of appropriate compliance and risk 
management systems.530  
In the U.S., the then-existing private adviser exemption based on the 
number of clients has been repealed and replaced by a new size-based exemption 
                                                          
528 See e.g., Donohue, supra note 521; Waters, supra note 524. 
529 See e.g., Eilis Ferran, supra note 265, at 9-14 (summarizing the regulatory initiatives among the 
regulators from the global level in response to the global financial crisis). 
530 These rules may be also viewed as a regulatory regime with a micro-prudential regulatory 
perspective because it is in some ways connected with a mandated disclosure regulatory philosophy 
in that the information contained in the registration statement or periodic report are publicly 
available in whole or in part. See supra note 525. 
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(except for foreign private advisers) and new continuous reporting requirements 
based on this rationale.531 A new uniform alternative investment fund manager 
authorization regime has been transposed into the U.K. regime reflecting the 
AIFMD, and periodic reporting requirements are in place to monitor the systemic 
risk from the hedge fund market. The Korean regime also requires hedge fund 
managers to be authorized like other regulated entities and to report relevant 
information regarding system risk periodically such as cash borrowing or other 
leveraged transactions (e.g., OTC derivatives transaction).532 
Needless to say, regulating the fund’s leveraged activities is the most safe, 
easy and efficient way to deal with systemic risk concern from the regulator’s 
standpoint.533 The problem with this regulatory option, however, is that regulatory 
costs may outweigh the regulatory benefits in that it is more likely to deter 
financial innovation and prevent hedge funds from providing many benefits to the 
market, like supplying liquidity, portfolio diversification, price discovery, and 
market shock smoothing.534  
                                                          
531 What is noteworthy particularly in the U.S. is that big-sized hedge funds and/or their managers 
designated by the FSOC may be subject to macro-prudential based regulatory requirements like 
liquidity, capital, and leverage requirements, in addition to the general private adviser regulation 
under the Advisers Act. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank 
Financial Companies, supra note 104. 
532 See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C. 
533 See e.g., Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investors Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 110 
(2012) (suggesting, as one of the possible alternative regulatory options, that direct regulation of 
hedge fund’s leveraged transactions should be taken into consideration). 
534 See e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 203.  
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Therefore, the U.S. and U.K. approaches would be a more reasonable and 
less drastic regulatory approach than the Korean regulatory option because (i) 
systemic risk issue is something ex-post in nature that is difficult to deal with on a 
proactive basis, (ii) it is very rare and exceptional to observe the really high profile 
hedge fund failures, sufficient to pose systemic risk, and (iii) other viable 
alternative regulatory options are available by regulating the counterparties or 
institutional investors as well as the managers, most of whom are regulated 
entities.535 
Third, disclosure requirements for investors and the public are heightened 
in these three countries to enhance the transparency about the hedge funds and 
minimize informational asymmetry between the managers and investors. In the 
U.S., regulatory efforts to make the private fund industry more transparent have 
been made in the form of making the registration statement and periodic report 
publicly available, not in the form of mandating that the manager to provide the 
documents directly to the investors.536  
The Korean regime provides that all the Korean domiciled hedge fund 
managers be subject to periodic reporting obligations with the regulator, but there 
is no express provision that requires the hedge fund or its manager to provide its 
                                                          
535 See e.g., Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39 
RUTGERS L. J. 657 (Spring 2008) (arguing that not regulating hedge fund directly, but regulating 
the sources of hedge funds’ leverage is more appropriate). See also supra Chapter III, Part B. 
536 The information in the registration statement of the registered investment adviser is publicly 
available in part, and other information in the periodic report filed with SEC is also available to the 
public in case of the exempted reporting advisers. That is, they are exempted from the registration 
requirement, but still subject to recordkeeping and ongoing reporting obligations. See supra 
Chapter IV, Part C. 
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investors with private placement memorandum or periodic reports.537 In contrast, 
the U.K. regime (namely, AIFMD) explicitly requires hedge fund managers to 
provide periodic reports for the investors on a continuous basis in addition to the 
filing requirements with relevant local regulator. 538  Basically, the Korean 
disclosure regime is more like the U.S. regime than the U.K. regime.539 
Fourth, private equity fund managers, not to mention hedge fund managers, 
become subject to authorization/registration in the three countries. This new 
regulatory approach has been justified in the name of systemic risk control because 
like hedge funds, private equity fund managers also have the potential to disrupt 
market stability.540  
                                                          
537 As illustrated supra, any information filed by the manager in the authorization process or in the 
periodic report is not publicly available including the investors in Korea, and no private placement 
memorandum delivery is required at time of offering or selling the funds. But some high net-worth 
individuals in the hedge funds are indirectly protected through suitability and product guidance 
rules because they are treated as non-professional investors (non-sophisticated investors). It is still 
doubtful, though, if these rules are really in line with the legislative background for defining 
qualified purchaser to include high net-worth individuals. See supra Chapter VI, Part C. 
538 It may be a confusing regulatory approach because the investors in the fund are deemed 
sophisticated, and they are in the position to request relevant information from the adviser if 
necessary. Also it seems inconsistent with the idea that no mandated disclosure is required if the 
offer or sale is limited to certain professional investors. It is likely that express disclosure 
requirements may dilute the disclosure issue because it may give them the impression that they are 
free from liability if they merely comply with the disclosure obligation set forth in the statute. See 
supra Chapter V, Part C. 
539 It should be noted, however, that the Korean disclosure regime is somewhat different from the 
U.S. regime in that even the information in the fund registration statement or periodic report filed 
with the regulator is not publicly available under the Korean regime, while some of the hedge fund 
information filed with the regulator are publicly available in the U.S. See supra Chapter IV, Part C; 
Chapter VI, Part C. 
540 For the relationship of PEF and systemic risk, see generally Ferran, supra note 265; Tillman, 
supra note 264. 
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The U.S. regime treats PEF managers exactly the same as hedge fund 
advisers, while the U.K. and Korean regimes have tried to regulate them 
differently based on a proportionality principle. For instance, some rules regarding 
fund custody are relaxed for private equity fund managers considering the 
difference in their investment process and the assets they invest and hold in the 
U.K. Korea also provides lighter regulatory treatment for PEF managers by 
subjecting them to a more simplified registration.541 But the three countries take 
the same regulatory position in imposing periodic reporting requirements on both 
hedge fund managers and private equity fund managers for the purpose of 
monitoring their systemic risk.542 
Fifth, these countries take similar approaches in regulating offshore-based 
hedge fund managers. Under the U.S. regime, offshore hedge fund managers are 
subject to registration requirements under the Advisers Act if they conduct the 
business in the U.S. or with U.S. investors, unless they satisfy the private adviser 
or foreign private adviser exemption.543 Foreign hedge fund advisers, like U.S. 
based hedge fund advisers, used to rely on the then-existing “fewer than 15 clients” 
                                                          
541 See supra note 525. 
542 It is not entirely clear if private equity funds are more likely to pose systemic risk and many 
academics support the idea that there is a lot less likelihood that they pose systemic risk because 
their investment strategies are by far different from those of hedge funds. The leverage concern is 
also not as critical in the private equity fund industry because the leveraged transaction typically 
takes place in the level of the acquired target companies, not the fund level. See e.g., Tillman, supra 
note 264. See contra Ferran, supra note 265 (supporting the idea of regulating the PEF market like 
the hedge fund market from the standpoint that they are also big enough to pose systemic risk in the 
event they go bankrupt, and the leverage they take in the acquired portfolio company level could 
also negatively affect the market in the event of their collapse). 
543 See supra Chapter IV, Part C.1. 
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private adviser exemption to avoid the registration obligation under the Advisers 
Act.544  
Even under the Dodd-Frank Act, the same private adviser exemption is still 
available to foreign private advisers despite no longer being available to U.S. 
based private fund advisers. The “fewer than 15 clients” exemption remains 
unchanged in connection with foreign private advisers; U.S. domiciled private 
advisers no longer have access to the “number of clients” based exemption, but are 
now subject to new size-based safe harbor rules.545 Consequently, two separate 
safe harbor rules are in place under the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. based private 
advisers and foreign private advisers respectively.546   
Under the U.K. regime, foreign based advisers have not been legally 
required to be authorized unless substantial parts of their conduct takes place in the 
U.K. or with U.K. investors, but the U.K. regime does not provide clear safe 
                                                          
544 For the general overview of the extraterritorial reach of the Advisers Act before the Dodd-Frank 
Act, See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 221-236. 
545 See supra note 541. 
546 More precisely and legally speaking, the old “fewer than 15 clients” exemption has been 
officially repealed and a new registration regime has been implemented based on the size of the 
fund and the manager, and new safe harbor rules have been put in place including the foreign 
private adviser exemption under the Dodd-Frank Act. But in substance, the new foreign private 
adviser exemption is exactly the same as the old private adviser exemption, because the former 
exemption was narrowed down to only provide a foreign private adviser exemption. This U.S. 
regulatory approach may be understood as a way for regulators to measure and clarify the scope of 
the extraterritorial application for foreign based private advisers, and at the same time this safe 
harbor condition is in place to minimize the negative regulatory impact on U.S. based private 
advisers (with a goal of discouraging them from moving to an offshore regulatory friendly location 
to avoid onerous U.S. regulations). See Overmyer, supra note 301, at 2208-10. See also 
Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140, at 72,071. 
195 
harbor rules for foreign private advisers, and it has been typically been dealt with 
in the context of offshore fund marketing.547  
Likewise, the Korean regime does not provide express safe harbor rules for 
foreign-based private advisers, and instead provides a general extraterritorial 
application provision and offshore fund sales rules.548 Based on those rules, it has 
been understood that offshore private advisers are not subject to authorization 
requirements under the Korean regime if they market the offshore funds in 
compliance with the offshore fund sales rules, and unless there are any special 
factual circumstances to apply the general extraterritorial provision.549 Overall, the 
three countries provide some safe harbors expressly or impliedly for the offshore 
hedge fund managers in different ways.  
Sixth, the three countries take similar regulatory approaches in general 
relating to offshore hedge funds marketing to their local investors. That is, offshore 
hedge funds are not subject to registration requirements if the fund interests are 
offered or sold to certain eligible professional investors. The U.S. regime provides 
express safe harbor rules for the private offering of hedge fund interests,550 the U.K. 
regime provides that offshore hedge funds are not subject to the U.K. fund regime 
if not offered and sold to the general public,551 and the Korean regime provides 
                                                          
547 See supra Chapter V, Part B, C. 
548 See supra Chapter VI, Part C. 
549 Id. 
550 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2. 
551 It should be noted, however, that offshore funds become subject to approval requirements under 
the new U.K. regime (i.e., AIFMD) starting in 2019, although until that time the current private 
placement safe harbor regime is still available. See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
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similar safe harbor rules to that of the US in terms of private offerings.552 Until the 
new U.K. offshore fund marketing regime is implemented under the AIFMD in 
2019, the U.K. regime provides for a private placement safe harbor regime and 
offshore hedge funds have been outside of regulatory oversight as long as they are 
not marketed to the general public. The U.S. regime provides similar private 
offering safe harbors.553  
The Korean regime is positioned in between the two regimes. It is 
somewhat similar to the U.S. and U.K. regimes in that offshore hedge funds are 
exempted from securities registration requirements (in terms of the private offering 
exemption), but it is different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes (before the AIFMD 
is fully in force in 2019) in that they are subject to fund registration requirements 









                                                          
552 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
553 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2; Chapter V, Part B.2. 
554 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
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C. Differences between the U.S., the U.K., and Korea 
Overall, in principle, there is no substantial difference in the hedge fund 
regulatory framework because hedge fund regimes have been modified or newly 
introduced in the same direction – to reinforce regulations after the global financial 
crisis of 2008 by focusing on preventing or mitigating systemic risk from hedge 
funds. Nonetheless, some meaningful regulatory differences can be observed. 
First, the U.S. basically follows a rule-based approach, regulating hedge 
fund advisers with the Advisers Act (exactly the same as the mutual fund advisers); 
while the U.K. maintains its previous broad principle-based regime and provides 
the flexibility to loosely apply the rules considering the limited nature and scope of 
their business.555 In contrast, the Korean regulatory model goes between the two 
regimes in that Korean hedge fund managers are required to be authorized in 
addition to having many rules and regulations applicable to mutual fund managers 
being equally applied to them.556  
In terms of a micro-prudential regulatory perspective, it is disputable that 
hedge fund managers should be subject to the full scope of the Advisers Act in the 
U.S. like other mutual fund advisers, as they focus only on accredited investors. 
The current mandatory registration regime for private advisers is somewhat 
                                                          
555 See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.  
556 The Korean model looks somewhat similar to the U.K. regime because Korea based hedge fund 
managers are subject to authorization requirements. However, some of them may be applied to 
hedge fund managers more lightly than other regulated entities including mutual fund managers, 
and some of the rules applicable to mutual fund advisers are exempted from applying to hedge fund 
managers. But, on the other hand, it also looks like the U.S. regime because the Korean regime is in 
place on a rule basis, not on a principle basis, and there is no flexibility to apply the rules 
differently or more lightly to hedge fund managers other than through the licensing requirements. 
See supra Chapter VI, Part C.1. 
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inconsistent with the legislative intent or history that distinguishes the private 
market from the public market and from all the rules and regulations in place that 
focus on the public market. 557  Even from a macro-prudential regulatory 
perspective, it is still doubtful that the current regulations are appropriate and that 
all the rules in the Advisers Act are relevant to addressing systemic risk.558  
The Korean hedge fund regime is also problematic. It treats the hedge fund 
market as a regulated market in principle, at least for Korea based funds and their 
managers, because many of the rules applicable to mutual fund advisers are 
equally applied to hedge fund managers. Korean regulators meticulously define 
hedge fund and bar the investing public from accessing the market directly, and 
also keep them distinct from other heavily regulated markets such as the mutual 
fund market (and even from the general private fund where the general public can 
access on a limited basis).559 Furthermore, it tried to directly regulate hedge funds 
and to impose investment limitations on the fund’s leveraged transactions.560  
                                                          
557 See supra Chapter IV, Part D. 
558 This doubt is based on the observation that hedge fund counterparties or creditors should be 
regulated to control potential systemic risks in terms of credit channel regulation, while direct 
regulation of hedge fund’s risky investments (e.g., highly leveraged transactions like borrowing or 
speculative OTC derivative transaction) are more effective in terms of market channel regulation, 
and should be a matter of Investment Company Act, not the Advisers Act. As a matter of fact, most 
of the rules in the Advisers Act are in place to protect the general public and are more relevant to 
micro-prudential regulation. Therefore there is a mismatch between the rationale for private adviser 
regulation and the implemented rules to a large extent, assuming that there are no unaccredited 
investors involved directly in the hedge fund market and that there are no critical concerns for 
investor protection. See id. 
559 See supra Chapter VI, Part D. 
560 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
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Second, the three countries demonstrate differences in regulating the hedge 
fund itself. The U.S. regime remains unchanged in terms of the private fund 
exemption and allows hedge funds to avoid fund regulation while their advisers 
come under regulatory purview; the U.K. takes a similar position, even under the 
new regime (i.e., AIFMD).561 Both countries, take a bit different of an approach in 
designing the regulatory framework for hedge funds in that the U.S. provides 
express safe harbor rules while the U.K. does not. The U.K. achieves the same 
regulatory goal by providing not creating rules applicable to hedge funds unless 
they offer or sell the fund interests to the public.562 
Korea demonstrates vivid contrast from the other two countries in terms of 
hedge fund regulation in that they try to regulate the fund investment activities 
directly. For instance, leveraged transactions like money borrowing and 
speculative OTC derivative transaction are allowed on a limited basis. 563  This 
difference may arise because the Korean regime treats hedge funds like quasi-
regulated funds, and only some of the rules applicable to mutual funds are 
exempted to from applying to hedge funds.564 This approach may be working to 
some extent to mitigate the occurrence of market disruption from the Korea based 
hedge funds because the amount of leverage they may utilize is capped at the 
                                                          
561 See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
562 See id. 
563 See FSCMA, art. 249-2(3), (4). 
564 See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1). 
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outset. However, it is likely working incompletely and is easily avoidable by 
choosing an offshore jurisdiction not covered by the Korean regime.565 
Therefore, the U.S. or the U.K. approach seems more appropriate in that 
direct fund regulation cannot completely ensure the market stability, in part 
because most of the funds are based offshore giving them more power to influence 
the local market. Also, they are generally free from local regulation inevitably 
resulting in a regulatory arbitrage problem.566 
Third, the three countries take a somewhat different approach in regards to 
the disclosure requirement to the investors. The U.S. regime provides no specific 
direct mandatory disclosure regime for the purpose of investor protection. That is, 
the U.S. Securities Act provides hedge funds with a safe harbor rule that exempts 
them from registration requirements, and the U.S. Advisers Act also provides no 
rule to force the hedge fund advisers to provide disclosure documents for the 
investors.567  
Further, under the U.S. regime certain information in the registration 
statement or other reports filed by registered investment advisers is not publicly 
                                                          
565 This regulatory loophole may be curtailed or minimized if all the offshore funds were subject to 
registration and reporting requirements, but it is practically impossible and undesirable because a 
regulatory overlap or regulatory conflict problem may arise. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 544. 
566 See AIFMD, explanatory note 4. It would be best and ideal if we can make the hedge fund 
regime uniform and consistent to level the playing field between the countries around the world, 
and the E.U. AIFMD would be an example to that end. However, this is almost impossible for 
various reasons. Thus it is more prudent and more feasible for local regulators to coordinate in 
regulating the local hedge fund market and to share information relevant to systemic risk. See e.g., 
Anne Riviere, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 328-31 (Summer 2011). 
567 Some of the information in the Form ADV filed with the SEC may be publicly available, but 
still it is different from direct disclosure to the investors. See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
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available, while the information contained in the report filed by the “exempt 
reporting company” (namely, mid-sized private adviser or venture capital fund 
adviser) may be publicly available.568 
Korea takes a similar position to the U.S. in that there is no mandatory 
disclosure and prospectus delivery requirement for hedge funds.569 Instead, Korean 
hedge fund managers and their sales agents are required to comply with suitability 
rules and product guidance obligations for non-professional individual investors 
among the qualified purchasers when they market the fund interests to them.570  
In contrast, the UK regime (namely, AIFMD) expressly provides that 
hedge fund managers disclose material terms to the investors before investment 
                                                          
568 The reporting requirement imposed on the “exempt reporting adviser” may be justified on the 
ground that the mid-sized private advisers or venture capital fund advisers may also have potential 
to pose systemic risk on a collective basis because of their possible herd behavior. The regulator 
should be able to monitor their activities and be ready to take action if necessary. See Seth Chertok, 
supra note 201, at 24 (2011). However, it may be counter-argued that the distinction between 
registered private advisers and exempt reporting advisers becomes blurry, and treating them 
basically the same as registered hedge fund advisers would be appropriate. Even exempted private 
advisers are subject to same recordkeeping and reporting requirements as registered private fund 
advisers, and it undoubtedly entails a lot of disproportionate compliance burdens for the mid-sized 
private advisers or venture capital fund advisers, and impairs their business operation considering 
the relatively small size of their business. See e.g. Kathleen L. Casey, SEC Commissioner, 
Statement at SEC Open Meeting, Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act 
of 1940: Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with less than 
$ 150 Million in Assets under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, June 22, 2011, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm. See also Eisner Amper, 
Dodd-Frank Bill: A Year and a Half Later, at 25-28 (March 2012), available at 
http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/academics/colleges/zarb/zarb_paper_doddfrank.pdf (observing that due 
to the heightened reporting and compliance burden small private advisers are particularly required 
to reorganize their management system in one way or another).  
569 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2 
570 These suitability and product guidance rules are different from prospectus delivery or mandated 
disclosure rules, but it may be functioning indirectly as a regulatory tool to urge the managers to 
provide disclosure documents (like private placement memorandums) for the non-professional 
qualified purchasers in the hedge funds. See id.  
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and that they update any material changes made after the investment.571 It also 
provides that the manager is subject to continuous reporting obligation to the 
investors.572 That seems a bit confusing and in contradiction with the rationale for 
private offering exemption, though, because mandatory disclosure obligations are 
imposed on the hedge fund managers despite the fact that the investors in the fund 
are strictly limited only to professional investors.573  
There is no doubt that certain types of information should be provided 
before investment to the investors, and as a matter of market practice it is very 
common to provide certain disclosure documents called private placement 
memorandums to meet the investors’ due diligence requests, and at the same time 
to avoid the possible breach of fiduciary duty or anti-fraud rule. Thus, it may be 
more advisable not to expressly set forth rules for mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  
Fourth, the three countries also have taken slightly different approaches in 
regards to the coverage of the regime and the way to deal with private fund 
advisers (including hedge fund advisers). The U.S. private fund regime is 
applicable only to private funds, and it includes general private funds and qualified 
purchaser funds only under Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company 
Act. Other private funds (e.g., real estate funds or commodity funds) not falling 
                                                          
571 See AIFMD, art. 23. 
572 See id. art. 24 
573 See e.g., Sants, supra note 311. 
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within the definition of investment company under the Investment Company Act 
will remain outside the regime even under the Dodd-Frank Act.574   
In contrast, the U.K. and Korea take a quite different position based on the 
principle of functional regulation that any private pooled investment vehicles are 
subject to the private fund regime unless they can rely on the exemption clauses.575 
As a result, REITs or commodity funds are also subject to the new private fund 
regime.576 In addition, some differences can be observed in the way that different 
types of private funds (including hedge funds and private equity funds) are 
regulated between the three countries.  
The U.S. takes a very simple and straightforward position in regulating 
private funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, and the default rule 
is that all private funds should be subject to same rules and regulations under the 
Advisers Act; despite the diverse nature of the private fund market and despite the 
fact that the original legislative intent of the Act was to protect the general public 
from the managers.577 As a consequence, there is no different regulatory treatment 
                                                          
574 It may be assessed as an inevitable regulatory measure because the Investment Company Act has 
been in place to cover the pooled investment vehicles set up mainly for the securities investment 
purposes, and the private fund safe harbor rules were implemented to exclude those private funds 
from the reach of the Investment Company Act. Thus any other pooled investment vehicles 
primarily investing in something other than securities would be outside the regulatory purview 
under the Investment Company Act at the outset. See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
575 See AIFMD, explanatory note (2), (4) and (6); FSCMA, art. 9(18), (19) and 249-2. 
576 Private funds, such as REITs or commodity funds, have been subject to the U.K. and the Korean 
private fund regime even before the new regimes were implemented. Nonetheless, the new hedge 
fund regimes in the U.K. and Korea are meaningful to some extent in that a new uniform regulatory 
regime is in place focusing on hedge funds (or more broadly the alternative investment fund 
market). See supra Chapter V, Part B; Chapter VI, Part B. 
577 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., et al., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
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made between hedge funds and private equity funds based on the assumption that 
private equity funds may also have potential to pose systemic risk.578 
In contrast, the U.K. and Korean regimes take a proportionate approach in 
regulating hedge funds and private equity funds. Some of the rules applicable to 
hedge fund managers may be exempted or loosely applied to private equity fund 
managers. For instance, among other things, capital requirements are reduced for 
private equity fund managers who do not utilize leverage and for those who have 5 
years or longer lock-up period in place in the fund. Disclosure and reporting 
requirements are also more lightly applied to private equity fund managers than 
hedge fund managers under the U.K. regime (i.e., AIFMD).579  
Korea also takes a two-tiered approach in regulating hedge funds and 
private equity funds, with much lighter regulatory oversight on the private equity 
fund market. Simplified registration, instead of authorization, is required for the 
private equity fund managers and most of the rules and regulations applicable to 
hedge funds and their managers are exempted from applying to private equity fund 
managers under the Korean regime.580 The size, the level of leverage they utilize, 
the investment strategy and investment portfolio, the frequency of trading in the 
market, and the frequency of redemption are, among other things, different to a 
large extent between hedge funds and private equity funds; although there has been 
no clear legal distinction made between them in the past, there has also 
                                                          
578 See Tillman, supra accompanying text note 264.  
579 See AIFMD, explanatory note 17; Level 2 Regulation, art. 110(3)(d). 
580 See FSCMA, art. 268 et seq. 
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occasionally been convergence between them depending on the market 
circumstances.581  
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the private equity fund market 
should be treated differently from the hedge fund market, as observed in the U.K. 
and Korean regimes. Lighter regulatory oversight is needed in the private equity 
market than in the hedge fund market. For instance, simple registration and/or 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements would be sufficient for the regulator’s 
oversight of the systemic risk posed by private equity funds.582 
Fifth, there are some differences found in regulating offshore private 
advisers between the three countries. The U.S. provides an express safe harbor rule 
that offshore fund advisers can rely on to avoid registration and other regulatory 
obligations under the Advisers Act. To do so, the U.S. has utilized the former 
“fewer than 15 clients” safe harbor rule as a new foreign private adviser 
exemption.583 Relying on this new safe harbor rule, offshore private advisers are 
able to avoid the registration requirement under the Advisers Act to the extent that 
they satisfy such threshold conditions for “foreign private adviser” who: (i) have 
no place of business in the U.S., (ii) have, in total, fewer than 15 clients or 
investors in the U.S. in private funds advised by the adviser, (iii) have aggregate 
                                                          
581 For the distinctions between hedge funds and private equity funds, see supra Chapter II, Part C.2. 
For the convergence tendency between hedge funds and private equity funds, See e.g. Shadab, 
supra note 64. 
582 This may be comparable to the U.S. “exempt reporting company” under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
and it may be acceptable for the systemic risk monitoring purpose from the regulator’s standpoint. 
See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
583 Id.  
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assets under management attributable to clients in the U.S. of less than 25 million 
dollars, and (iv) neither holds itself out generally to the public in the U.S. as an 
investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to any registered investment 
company under the Investment Company Act or as a business development 
company.584  
That may be assessed as a regulatory effort to demarcate the line for 
whether or not offshore private advisers are required to register with the SEC in 
accordance with the Adviser Act, and it may have positive effects to some extent 
in that it makes a clear distinction between regulated non-U.S. based private 
advisers and unregulated non-U.S. based private advisers in terms of the outer 
reach of the Advisers Act.  
However, in some respects it is more likely to cause some problems. First, 
it fails to clearly explain why different safe harbor rules are necessary between U.S. 
based private advisers and non-US based private advisers, and why different 
threshold conditions are provided for them. 585  From the macro-prudential 
regulatory perspective, both onshore and offshore private advisers (conducting 
hedge fund management business in the U.S. or with U.S. investors) should be 
under the U.S. regulator’s oversight because they both have the potential to pose 
                                                          
584 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 402, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
585 As illustrated supra, US based private advisers are exempted from registration requirements 
depending on the size of the funds they manage, while foreign private advisers are exempted from 
the registration requirement based on the size and the number of the U.S. clients or investors in the 
funds they manage. Furthermore, the threshold conditions are also different in terms of the size 
between them. See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
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systemic risk in the U.S. 586  Furthermore, it may provide private advisers 
(especially startup companies) with the incentive to choose to be offshore to avoid 
onerous regulatory requirements under the Advisers Act if they intend to carry on 
the business on a limited basis in the U.S. or with U.S. investors. Thus at least 
from the systemic risk regulatory standpoint, it would be more prudent to set forth 
comparable safe harbor threshold conditions between them.587 
In contrast, the U.K. takes a much different position in regulating offshore 
private advisers. They are not subject to the authorization requirements of the U.K. 
regime unless there is special circumstances to treat them like a U.K. based adviser, 
depending on the factual circumstances (e.g., if they choose offshore merely to 
avoid the UK regulation).588 They are also free to choose the U.K. as a base for 
fund establishment.589  
Korea takes a more unique position in regulating offshore private fund 
managers. Offshore private fund managers are not allowed to set up the fund in 
Korea to raise capital from Korean investors, unless they are based in Korea and 
authorized by the Korean regulator.590 It is partly because private advisers and 
                                                          
586 See Overmyer, supra note 301. 
587 There are not any serious investor protection issues here because foreign private advisers are 
also subject to private offering safe harbor conditions, and only accredited investors would be 
allowed to invest in the funds they manage. Also, a regulatory overlap issue would be easily 
avoidable by limitedly applying the rules under the Advisers Act to the extent necessary to gather 
relevant systemic risk information from them. See supra accompanying text note 580. 
588 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
589 This implies that the private adviser is allowed to carry on the private fund business on a cross 
border basis without having a commercial presence in the U.K. and without obtaining authorization 
under the U.K. regime. See id. 
590 See supra Chapter VI, Part C. 
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private funds are both subject to regulation in Korea, and because only Korea 
based and Korea licensed advisers can set up Korea based funds.591 
It is not easy to clearly judge which regime is more appropriate and 
desirable. But what is clear here is that offshore private advisers should be subject 
to certain types of regulatory supervisions if they intend to carry on the business in 
foreign jurisdictions. Regulatory obligations for them should be mitigated provided 
that their business in a certain jurisdiction is done on a limited and private 
placement basis.592  
The U.K. approach seems more reasonable in that they provide implied 
safe harbor rules for foreign private advisers, and provide flexibility for offshore 
advisers to choose onshore or offshore as their fund base (subject to approval or 
reporting requirements when they intend to sell the funds to the investors in their 
territory). 593  This is a private market available only to certain sophisticated 
investors and there is no serious concern for investor protection accordingly, and 
systemic risk concerns from the offshore private advisers may be easily handled by 
imposing registration and reporting requirements on them if necessary.594 
                                                          
591 See id. 
592 It is because it is too disproportionate and cost-inefficient from the foreign private advisers’ 
perspective if they are subject to the full scope of regulation in certain jurisdictions, especially if 
their business is very limited in that jurisdiction. Unbearable regulatory burdens may discourage 
them from carrying on the contemplated business and may encourage them to try and find other 
loopholes to avoid the regulation. See supra Chapter VI, Part D. 
593 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
594 As emphasized supra, investor protection concerns should not be a sufficient ground to directly 
regulate hedge fund advisers because we have many other alternatives available to filter 
unsophisticated investors out from the so-called sophisticated investor market, and most rules and 
regulations already in place under the fund regimes are irrelevant to systemic risk. See supra 
Chapter III, Part C.  
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Sixth, these countries also take a bit different approach in regulating 
offshore fund marketing. The U.S. traditionally has handled this issue with their 
private placement or private fund regime. No mandatory registration is required 
where offshore funds are offered and sold to U.S. accredited investors, and no fund 
registration is required if the offshore funds satisfy the private fund threshold 
conditions.595 
The U.K. and Korea take a different approach from the U.S. The U.K. has a 
similar private placement regime in place and offshore private advisers are not 
required to be authorized by the U.K. regulator provided that they offer or sell the 
fund to certain professional investors only in the U.K. 596  This U.K. private 
placement regime, however, will no longer be available starting in 2019, and only 
the passport regime will be available under the AIFMD. Under the passport regime, 
offshore private advisers would be required to get approval from the U.K. 
regulator before selling the fund interests to U.K. investors, together with reporting 
and disclosure obligations.597 
Korea takes a similar position to the UK in terms of offshore fund 
marketing regulation. That is, offshore funds are required be registered in advance 
                                                          
595 See supra Chapter IV, Part B. 
596 See supra Chapter V, Part B.2. 
597 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
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before selling the fund interests to certain Korean professional investors, along 
with periodic reporting requirements.598  
 
D. Summary and Comments 
There has been a tendency to reinforce hedge fund regulation around the 
globe after the global financial crisis of 2008, and based on the global 
consensus, 599  these three countries show similar patterns in designing the 
regulatory architecture for the hedge fund market in the big picture, while some 
differences are observed in the details. 
First, the 2008 financial crisis has urged regulators to take appropriate 
regulatory measures to oversee the hedge fund market, paying special attention to 
the systemic risk they may pose. Both the U.S. and the U.K. have taken regulatory 
actions, among other things, focusing on the potential systemic risk from hedge 
fund industry and emphasizing the need to ensure market stability as a new and 
supplemental rationale for securities regulation.600 All three countries have taken 
similar actions to that end.  
                                                          
598 This Korean regime is somewhat confusing because there is no disclosure requirement at all at 
the time of purchase, while ongoing disclosure is required for existing investors. See supra Chapter 
VI, Part C.2. 
599 See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102. 
600 See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. Korea also takes similar regulatory posture to 
the U.S. and the U.K. by imposing authorization requirements on the managers, registration 
requirements, and express leverage restrictions on the funds, as well as continuous reporting 
requirements. However, they do not expressly declare that prevention of systemic risk is an 
additional rationale for securities regulation. See supra Chapter VI, Part C. 
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For instance, the U.S. has introduced a new registration and periodic 
reporting regime for hedge fund managers 601  and the U.K. has maintained its 
authorization regime for hedge fund managers and simultaneously has reinforced 
the periodic reporting/disclosure regimes. 602  Korea also has taken regulatory 
initiative to build up the new local hedge fund market, while ensuring market 
stability by imposing authorization and reporting requirements for the managers 
and imposing registration and quantitative limitations on leveraged transactions for 
the funds as well.603  
These regulatory approaches by the three countries should be positively 
assessed in principle because there is little doubt that hedge funds have become 
more important as active players in the financial market locally and globally, and 
from the regulators’ standpoint, there should be ways for the regulators to oversee 
their activities on an ongoing basis for systemic risk so that they may take 
appropriate regulatory action if necessary.604  
However, the current crisis-driven regimes in the three countries seem to 
have problems with overregulation, based on the belief that private markets (like 
the hedge fund market) should be carefully handled and that direct ex-ante 
                                                          
601 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
602 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
603 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.  
604 Regardless of the possibility of their posing systemic risk, the regulator should be in a position 
to get the information about the private fund market because their activities in the market may 
directly or indirectly affect market stability in various ways. See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
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regulatory intervention should be refrained from to the extent possible to avoid 
adverse impacts on the market.605  
That is the very reason why the private market is distinct from the public 
market – by relying on the various safe harbor rules. Considering the 
heterogeneous nature among them and their positive roles in the market, it is very 
important to implement a flexible regime that provides them with sufficient 
discretion in designing investment structure and the accompanying investment 
activities, while keeping them under regulatory oversight (from a macro-prudential 
regulatory standpoint).606  
The hedge fund market was formed and developed on a voluntary basis by 
relying on the various safe harbor rules. Hedge funds have played a constructive 
role in part because they have remained lightly regulated on the ground that it is a 
special market for accredited investors and because there is no need to heavily 
regulate the market like public market for the investing public.607 The systemic risk 
issue is critical for regulators and other market participants (including investors or 
counterparties), but it is still doubtful that direct government intervention into the 
market is a panacea to resolve the issue.608  
                                                          
605 For instance, paternalistic government intervention in the private market may give the wrong 
signal to the market as well as to investors that it is a quasi-regulated market, which may give rise 
to a moral hazard problem. See supra note 202. 
606 See supra Chapter III, Part C.  
607 See id. 
608 As pointed out supra, the regulator’s role is to mitigate the risk before and after crisis, but we 
have seen many cases of regulator failure in preventing occurrences of crisis, from even heavily 
regulated entities. The mere fact that the regulator is closely watching the market may itself have a 
smoothing effect by urging market participants to reinforce self-regulation and market discipline. 
See supra note 109. 
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Without a doubt, the most powerful and effective way to deal with the 
systemic risk concern is to regulate hedge funds and their managers directly like 
mutual funds and their managers, but it makes little sense because it means that 
there would no longer be a private fund market that parallels the public mutual 
fund market. It also becomes much harder to expect them to have a positive impact 
on the market. 609  Furthermore, it is in contradiction with the fundamental 
regulatory framework that has intentionally segregated the private market from 
public market, and leaving much of the things to be determined by the relevant 
parties on a negotiated basis.610  
Regulatory differentiation and lighter regulatory intervention have been 
justified based on the belief that there is no practical need to directly regulate the 
market if the counterparties and investors are institutional investors or highly 
wealthy individuals who are deemed sophisticated enough to protect themselves 
without government protection.611 This position for securities regulation is still 
valid and most of the rules and regulations based on this rationale remain 
unchanged.612  
The fundamental problem in the hedge fund regimes in those three 
countries is that there are too many specific rules in place for the managers to 
                                                          
609 See supra Chapter III, Part B.4. 
610 See supra Chapter IV, Part D. 
611 See id. 
612 For example, the private offering, private fund exemption, and accredited investor or qualified 
purchaser concepts are a few of the regulatory efforts to distinguish the private market from the 
public market at the outset. These different regulatory treatments have been justified based on the 
assumption that there is no need to protect them like there is with the general public. See id. 
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comply with, and consequently, the distinction between the public fund market and 
private fund market becomes blurry.613  
As indicated earlier, most of the existing rules and regulations have been in 
place to regulate the advisers providing investment advisory services to the 
investing public, and this investor protection concern could be easily handled by 
limiting the general public’s access to the market. So, even under the conventional 
securities and/or fund regime investor protection concerns could be effectively 
managed without the regulator’s visible hand. For example, the accredited investor 
and qualified purchaser threshold in the U.S., the professional investor and 
qualified purchaser threshold in Korea, and the eligible counterparty threshold in 
the U.K. may be regarded as regulatory initiatives to make the hedge fund market 
really private.614 
The systemic risk issue could be dealt with in a different and a less drastic 
way by imposing relatively simple authorization, registration, and continuous 
reporting obligations for information relevant to monitoring systemic risk, rather 
than having them subject to the full scope of regulations applicable to mutual fund 
                                                          
613 See Atkins, supra accompanying text note 251. 
614 At issue here is whether the investors are really sophisticated enough to make an informed 
decision without the help of a mandatory disclosure regime, or wealthy enough to assume the risks 
from the investment, and whether the current net worth threshold is really relevant for the 
sophisticated investor threshold. But it has been working relatively well for a long time and, 
without the objective or quantitative threshold condition, there could be no hedge fund market due 
to uncertainty and hardship in screening the investor’s eligibility for the investment. For example, 
unaccredited investors are not typically marketed to by the hedge fund managers and their sales 
representatives because of the difficulty in going through the sophistication test, although they are 
legally allowed to invest in the fund on a limited basis. See supra Chapter IV, Part B. 
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advisers.615 The hedge fund market is supposed to be a financially innovative and 
self-evolving market, mutually beneficial for investors and counterparties as well 
as the managers who pursue alternative investments and absolute return 
opportunities.616  
The government’s role in the market should be as a whistle blower in cases 
where market fraud and market failure happen, and to be ready to take proactive 
action to reduce the possibility of the occurrence of the failure in normal situations. 
In that regard, it seems that current hedge fund regimes in the three countries go 
too far by striving to heavily regulate the hedge fund market based on the rationale 
of systemic risk prevention, while many of the rules in place are more relevant to 
the rationale of investor protection, despite little need for the protection of 
investors in this market.617 
Second, the three countries have taken additional regulatory measures in 
response to the retailization concern (i.e., the increase in direct and indirect access 
to the hedge fund market from the investing public). The U.S. has leveraged the 
retailization phenomenon as a legislative background to subject private fund 
advisers to mandatory registration under the Advisers Act as a way to enhance 
their transparency.618  
                                                          
615 See supra Chapter III, Part C. 
616 See supra Chapter II, Part D. 
617 See supra Chapter III, Part C. 
618 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.4. 
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But in the U.S. regime, the new mandatory registration requirements are in 
place primarily for the purpose of gathering relevant information on systemic risk 
and not for the protection of investors. This is clear because it is not legally and 
explicitly provided that the information in the registration statement should be 
provided to investors.619 
This approach seems reasonable in that the transparency issue in this 
market is more relevant to the regulator than to the investors because the investors 
in this market are sophisticated and do not need the mandated disclosure to protect 
themselves.620 Instead, the investor protection concern has been dealt with by way 
of redefining the accredited investor threshold condition, particularly focusing on 
wealthy individuals.621 In addition, retail investors’ indirect exposure to the hedge 
fund market through fund of funds or pension funds would not be a serious 
concern for investor protection because they have a third party fiduciary, and they 
are subject to regulation directly or indirectly by relevant authorities.622 Thus, this 
retailization concern is an insufficiently justifiable ground to have hedge funds 
subject to full scope of the Advisers Act.  
The U.K. takes a similar approach to the U.S. in that it mandates that hedge 
fund managers be authorized and subject to continuous reporting requirements. But 
                                                          
619 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
620 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2. 
621 See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, supra note 274. 
622 For example, fund of hedge funds should be subject to the Investment Company Act as a type of 
mutual fund if the adviser offers or sells the fund interests to the investing public. See 15 U.S.C. § 
80a- 12(d)(1). 
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at the same time, they differ slightly from the U.S. in that they impose additional 
disclosure obligations on the manager requiring that certain information be 
provided to investors before investment.623 However, this mandatory disclosure 
regime is inconsistent with the private placement regime under which only certain 
professional investors are permitted to invest in the fund.624  
By contrast, Korea’s approach is somewhat unique in that even non-
professional individuals are allowed to directly participate in the hedge fund 
market as qualified purchasers. The Korean hedge fund regime tries to deal with 
investor protection concerns indirectly with suitability rules. 625  This regulatory 
approach should be reconsidered and revised to make the threshold for the wealthy 
individuals as qualified purchasers a lot higher than it currently is, and to treat 
them as professional investors without requiring suitability test. Also, non-
professional investors should be indirectly exposed to the hedge fund market 
through fund of funds.626 
Third, the three countries also demonstrate slight differences in regulating 
offshore fund marketing. Based on the U.S. private placement regime, offshore 
                                                          
623 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
624 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
625 It is somewhat similar to the U.S. in that, theoretically, even unaccredited investors are allowed 
to invest in the hedge funds (up to 35 persons and up to 100 persons in total) after a sophistication 
test under the U.S. private placement and private fund regime. Under the Korean private placement 
and qualified purchaser fund regime, non-professional individual investors are allowed to 
participate in the fund (up to 49 persons) while there is no limitation in the number of the qualified 
purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund regime.  See supra Chapter IV, Part B.1, 2; Chapter 
VI, Part C.2. 
626 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2(C).  
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funds are exempted from registration requirements under the Securities Act,627 and 
at the same time they can also avoid registration requirements under the 
Investment Company Act under the private fund exemptions.628 Thus there are no 
particular rules or regulations applied from an offshore fund level other than anti-
fraud provisions under the securities related statutes. 
The U.K. has taken a similar regulatory position in that offshore funds are 
free from approval requirements, and as a result are exempted from the onerous 
fund related rules and regulations, if the fund interests are offered or sold to certain 
professional investors on a private placement basis.629 It should be noted, however, 
that this U.K. private placement regime will be no longer available after 2019 in 
terms of offshore fund marketing, and it will be replaced by a uniform fund 
passport regime.  Offshore funds will be required to get advance approval from the 
local regulator in order to promote the fund interests to U.K. investors.630 This 
regulatory change in the U.K. private placement regime has been made in an effort 
to regulate the alternative investment fund market in a consistent way between 
European countries and between European countries and other countries.631  
This approach seems reasonable in terms of functional regulation, and it 
may help local regulators oversee offshore hedge funds’ activities in the local 
                                                          
627 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2. 
628 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.1. 
629 See supra Chapter V, Part B.2. 
630 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
631 See id. 
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market because this would be the only way for local regulators to monitor the 
offshore fund activities in the local market. It may also help deter any regulatory 
arbitrage effort from the offshore private fund managers.632  
The Korean approach is more like the U.K. regime in that offshore funds 
are required to register with the Korean regulator before they market the fund 
interests to certain eligible professional investors in Korea.633 This Korean offshore 
fund promotion regime may be regarded as an implied safe harbor rule for offshore 
private advisers to conduct hedge fund business on a cross-border basis, because 
they do not need to obtain a local license in Korea if they satisfy the offshore fund 
promotion rules.634 At the same time, this offshore fund registration regime may be 
functioning as an invisible hand to fill in the regulatory gaps between local hedge 
fund regimes and offshore fund promotion regimes.635 
Fourth, the three countries take similar positions in general in regulating 
offshore fund advisers, but there are some differences observed in the details. The 
U.S. provides express safe harbor rules for foreign private advisers that exempt 
them from registration requirements if they meet certain threshold conditions, such 
as fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors and less than 25 million dollars in assets 
under management from U.S. investors or clients.636  
                                                          
632 See supra Chapter V, Part D. 
633 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2(B). 
634 See id. 
635 See supra Chapter VI, Part D. 
636 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
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Unlike the private adviser exemption based on the size of the adviser and 
primarily available to U.S. based advisers, the foreign private adviser exemption is 
based on both the size of the adviser and the number of U.S. clients or investors in 
the fund.637 It seems to take into account the systemic risk concern as well as the 
U.S. investor protection concern in determining the threshold conditions for the 
outer reach of the Advisers Act on foreign private advisers.638  
This exemption may provide clear guidance as to whether foreign private 
advisers are required to register with the SEC. On the one hand, it is more likely to 
include too many foreign advisers under the U.S. regime, leading to an 
overregulation or regulatory overlap problem between the home jurisdiction and 
the U.S., because foreign private advisers become fully subject to the US Advisers 
Act unless they satisfy threshold conditions (even if they carry on business in the 
U.S. on a very limited basis with U.S. accredited investors).639 On the other hand, 
it is likely to cause a regulatory loophole in terms of systemic risk regulation 
because some foreign private advisers are missing from the regulatory oversight 
despite conducting private fund business in the U.S.640  
It would be worth amending the threshold condition to make the same 
threshold conditions applicable to the extent possible between U.S. based private 
                                                          
637 See id. 
638 See supra Chapter IV, Part C. 
639 See supra Chapter IV, Part D. 
640 See id. 
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advisers and foreign private advisers, and at the same time to mitigate the 
regulatory compliance burdens for registered foreign private advisers.641 
Unlike the U.S., the U.K. provides no clear safe harbor rule for foreign-
based private managers, and instead provides an offshore fund promotion regime 
with a general extraterritorial application clause. 642  What this means is that 
offshore private managers are not required to obtain licenses from the U.K. 
regulator unless there is a special factual circumstances evidencing that they chose 
offshore to avoid the U.K. licensing regime. 643  Instead, offshore-based private 
managers are required to get approval before marketing the funds (offshore or not) 
to U.K. investors under the new regime (i.e. AIFMD).644  
Therefore, it appears that the U.K. provides a less stringent regime than the 
U.S. in terms of licensing or other compliance requirements in general, and that the 
U.K. effectively deals with the regulatory loophole issue in that any private funds 
managed by foreign private advisers are subject to requiring advanced approval 
from local regulators when an offer or sale is made to local investors.645 
                                                          
641 For instance, it would be one of the possible ideas that foreign private advisers relying on the 
exemption be subject to reporting and recordkeeping requirements on a continuous basis like the 
U.S. based exempted private advisers. Instead most of the rules in the Advisers Act are exempted 
from applying to them. This idea is more like the offshore fund promotion regimes observed in the 
U.K. and Korea. It would be sufficient for gathering systemic risk related information, and the 
investor protection issue would be minimal here because only a limited number of US accredited 
investors have access to the offshore funds. See id. 
642 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
643 See id. 
644 See id. 
645 See id. 
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The Korean regime is similar to the U.K. regime. In Korea foreign private 
fund managers do not need to obtain licenses from the Korean regulator in 
principle, subject to a general extraterritorial application clause, and instead are 
subject to registration requirements in regards to the offshore fund marketing to 
certain eligible Korean professional investors.646  
Each of the three countries’ regimes has good points and weak points in 
regulating foreign-based private advisers. The U.K. and Korean offshore fund 
promotion regime seems more reasonable than the U.S. foreign private adviser 
regime, in that it is more likely that an indirect approach minimizes the 
overregulation issue; this ensures that local regulators have the necessary 
regulatory tools to oversee the foreign private adviser’s activities in the local 
market. 
Table 2: Comparisons of Hedge Fund Regimes between the U.S., the U.K., 
and Korea 
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. VIII. Recommendations 
A. Regulating Hedge Funds in the Future  
With their rapid growth in size and the negative potential impact created by 
market disruptions, hedge funds have been highlighted as a target for stricter 
regulation for several reasons.647 
First, in terms of investor protection, no direct regulatory intervention can 
be justified provided that the investors are wealthy and sophisticated enough to 
make informed decisions themselves. 648  This position should be maintained 
despite the tendency for retailization (both direct and indirect), unless there is a 
consensus that the regulatory distinction between the private fund market and the 
public fund market is no longer necessary.649  
The individual’s wealth itself does not necessarily mean that they are 
financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves, considering the increasing 
complexity of new financial products (e.g., hedge funds) and the risks inherent in 
the investment. 650  But sophistication should be one of the criteria in judging 
whether a particular individual is in the position to protect themselves at the time 
of investment because they have the financial resources to ask for assistance from 
financial intermediaries and to absorb the possible loss from the investment.651 The 
existing regime for sophisticated investor eligibility is not fundamentally flawed 
and should be maintained by redefining the threshold conditions in terms of assets, 
                                                          
647 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
648 See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2. 
649 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
650 See supra note 272. 
651 See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 223. 
225 
income and/or invested amount to reflect the changes in market circumstances over 
time.652 
In addition, the concern about retail investors’ participation in the hedge 
fund market through fund of funds or pension funds should not be treated as a 
critical one because (i) third party intermediaries (i.e., fund of funds managers or 
pension fund managers) should be between the hedge funds and retail investors, (ii) 
they are obligated to play a fiduciary role (e.g., conduct due diligence) for the fund 
investors and they are financially sophisticated enough to evaluate investments in 
hedge funds, and (iii) they are in the position to negotiate on an equal basis with 
hedge fund managers.653 
 Furthermore, managers are subject to regulatory requirements such as 
diversification and asset quality, and accordingly hedge funds can be indirectly and 
sufficiently controlled by regulating the investor-third party intermediaries – not 
by regulating hedge funds directly.654 
The investor protection concern could be handled well by making the 
hedge fund market truly private, denying direct access to unaccredited investors, 
and regulating intermediaries if necessary. 
Second, the ensuring market integrity issue should also be handled under 
the existing anti-fraud, inside trading, and price manipulation rules.655 Hedge fund 
fraud cases are likely to occur occasionally under the existing regimes, but it is not 
                                                          
652 See e.g., Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, supra note 274. 
653 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
654 See id. 
655 See id. 
226 
a problem unique to hedge funds; rather, it is a universal problem observable even 
in other heavily regulated entities like mutual fund advisers or broker/dealers.656  
What matters more is how to enforce the law against violators. Placing 
them under direct regulatory oversight cannot guarantee that no hedge fund frauds 
will occur in the future, rather more rigorous and strict law enforcement efforts 
may be a strong and effective enough regulatory tool to deter potential hedge fund 
frauds.657 
Third, unlike the micro-prudential regulatory concerns, current market 
consensus is that large leveraged hedge funds may have the potential to negatively 
affect the market in extreme situations and accordingly that they should fall under 
regulatory oversight. However, it is still debatable whether hedge funds really do 
pose systemic risk to the market.658 
Therefore, it is a more relevant and compelling issue of how to regulate 
them than whether to regulate them. Possible regulatory frameworks worth 
considering for the future include direct regulation, indirect regulation, or a market 
discipline based approach.  
First, a purely market discipline based approach is less plausible and is 
unsustainable because self-regulation cannot guarantee market stability in cases 
where high-profile hedge fund failures occur. Investors, creditors, and 
counterparties cannot efficiently and effectively handle the systemic risk issue 
when emergent market crisis happens because they are commercially self-
                                                          
656 See e.g., Nichols, supra text accompanying note 144. 
657 See supra Chapter III, Part B.1. 
658 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
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interested and because it is unlikely that they have sufficient information about the 
funds on a consolidated basis.659    
Second, the direct fund regulation approach is apparently reasonable in that 
the restriction of hedge funds’ leveraged activities may be the best way to prevent 
the potential negative impacts on the market from hedge fund failures.660 But the 
problem with this regulatory option is that it may overshadow the many positive 
roles that hedge funds play in the market, such as promoting financial innovation, 
providing market liquidity, and encouraging market stability during ordinary 
market situations.661 Thus the idea of direct fund regulation is not easily advocated 
for. 
Third, an indirect regulatory approach via investors, creditors, and 
counterparties may come into play because they of their self-interest in closely 
monitoring hedge fund activities on a continuous basis. Also, they are such a 
heavily regulated entity that they are legally required to have sufficient capital and 
proper risk management policies and procedures in place.662 The problem with this 
regulatory option, however, is that the systemic risk issue is not something that can 
be easily dealt with among market participants because each one of them is 
economically self-interested and because hedge fund counterparties have no 
effective tool to handle the overall market stability issue. Rather, it is something 
for the regulators to undertake.663 
                                                          
659 See supra Chapter III, Part B.1. 
660 See supra Chapter III, Part B.2. 
661 See id. 
662 See supra Chapter III, Part B.5-6. 
663 See id. 
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Fourth, regulating hedge fund managers and not hedge funds may be a 
more realistic and more feasible regulatory option, especially from the systemic 
risk regulatory standpoint, because they are the people in charge of the funds’ day-
to-day investment and management activities.664 Imposing mandatory registration 
or licensing obligations, together with periodic reporting, recordkeeping, and 
examination requirements, is understandable to that end.665  
Hedge fund manager regulation should be minimized to the extent 
necessary to deal with systemic risk matters because many of the current rules and 
regulations are irrelevant to systemic risk. Further, investor protection concerns 
may be tackled without much difficulty by redefining “accredited investors,” by 
reinforcing the creditor and counterparty regulations, and by encouraging 











                                                          
664 See supra Chapter III, Part B.3. 
665 See id. 
666 See supra Chapter III, Part C. 
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B. Which Country’s Approach is More Desirable? 
With the global nature of hedge funds in mind, and considering the discussions 
supra,667 it is worth exploring which country’s regulatory approach is the most 
reasonable, as evidenced with hypothetical situations below. 
 
1. What If a non-US person raises capital in the U.S.? 
The first possible scenario is a situation where a non-U.S. person intends to 
carry on the hedge fund business as a start-up company with prospective investors 
in the U.S., U.K., and Korea, with fewer than 15 U.S. investors and less than 25 
million dollars in assets under management from the U.S. investors. 
First of all, as for the fund jurisdiction, unlike Korea, both the U.S. and the 
U.K. provide safe harbor rules for hedge funds to avoid regulations unless they 
offer or sell the fund interests to the investing public.668 In that regard, it is more 
likely that a person would be relatively free to choose whatever jurisdiction they 
want with little regulatory differences whether or not they choose an onshore 
jurisdiction as a fund domicile.  
By contrast, Korea provides no safe harbor rules for onshore or offshore 
hedge funds. Korea-based hedge funds are directly subject to onerous fund rules 
and regulations including registration, reporting, and leveraged position cap 
                                                          
667 What it implicates is that hedge funds and their managers are quite flexible in choosing the 
relevant jurisdictions for the funds and their managers, and easily move offshore providing more 
regulatory-friendly environment assume that regulatory gap exists between the jurisdictions. See 
Azhar & Ullatil, supra note 13. 
668 As noted supra, the UK provides no specific hedge fund safe harbor rules, but UK based hedge 
fund may be free from the onerous fund investment restrictions relying on the UK private 
placement regime until the AIFMD replace it from 2019 and mandatory approval or report is 
required. See FSMA, art. 238(5); COBS, art. 4.12.1R. In contrast, the US provides express safe 
harbor rules for hedge fund, in addition to the general private offering exemption. See 15 U.S.C. 
80a-3(c)(1),(7); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
230 
requirements, while non-Korea-based funds are relatively free from fund related 
regulation.669 Thus, it goes without saying that the non-US person is highly likely 
to choose the U.S., U.K., or other jurisdiction that provides a more flexible 
regulatory regime for fund regulation than to choose Korea for their fund 
establishment purposes, unless there are no serious regulatory evasion or fund 
jurisdictional shopping concerns raised under the Korean extraterritorial 
application regime.670 
There is no doubt that Korea is less likely to be considered as an attractive 
jurisdiction in terms of fund regulation from both onshore and offshore managers 
if they intend to raise capital and invest in assets on a transnational basis. As a 
result, Korea is likely to lose its ground as a competitive venue for global hedge 
funds when you compare it to other jurisdictions that provide a more flexible 
regulatory environment for fund regulation. The regulatory arbitrage problem may 
inevitably arise due to the significant regulatory differences between Korea-based 
hedge funds and offshore-based hedge funds under the Korean regime.671  
The huge regulatory gap that exists between Korea and other jurisdictions 
is likely to unintentionally encourage Korea-domiciled managers and offshore 
                                                          
669 See FSCMA, art. 249-2. 
670 As explained supra, Korea provides no express safe harbor rules for Korea-domiciled hedge 
funds while offshore-based hedge funds are merely required to register with Korean regulator with 
no substantive regulation. During the offshore fund registration process, however, certain offshore 
funds are less likely to be registered based on the general extraterritorial application clause 
depending on the factual circumstances. For example, it is more likely that the application for the 
registration will be rejected on the ground that it is in violation of the general extraterritorial 
application rule if a Korean person intentionally or recklessly set up the fund offshore merely to 
avoid the onerous Korean hedge fund regulations, while primarily targeting Korean investors. See 
FSCMA, art. 2, 279. 
671 See FSCMA, art. 249-2, 279. 
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managers to choose offshore locations to set up their funds.672 This is a problem 
for Korean investors and regulators because it is less likely to ensure a level 
playing field between onshore funds and offshore funds.673 Accordingly it is likely 
to adversely affect the Korean hedge fund market and Korea-domiciled managers 
in the long run in that it makes it difficult for Korea-domiciled hedge fund 
managers to raise capital from offshore investors and to accommodate investors’ 
needs.  
Based on these observations, it may be strongly inferred that hedge funds 
should be left unregulated or minimally regulated if local regulators are unable to 
totally bar offshore fund managers from raising capital from local investors. 
Instead, it would be more advisable to regulate hedge fund managers to ensure the 
regulatory parity between onshore funds and offshore funds.  
Suppose that hedge funds (onshore or offshore) were to remain unregulated, 
the systemic risk issue could still be handled by imposing registration or 
authorization requirements on locally based managers and by mandating 
registration and approval obligations in connection with offshore fund promotion 
with local investors, regardless of whether the managers are domiciled onshore or 
not.674 Also, the investor protection concern under this regime could be handled by 
redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions and by prohibiting 
unsophisticated-unaccredited investors from directly partaking in the hedge fund 
                                                          
672 It should be noted that it is practically impossible for the regulators to prevent hedge fund 
managers from choosing offshore as a hedge fund domicile regardless of whether a local regulator 
put stringent fund regime in place, and it may be one of the primary reasons why the US and UK 
choose not to directly regulate local hedge fund. See e.g. Waters, supra note 524. 
673 See supra Chapter VI, Part D. 
674 See e.g., AIFMD, art. 31 et seq.; Sants, supra note 311. 
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market.675 In this regard, the Korean regulatory approach seems inadvisable in that 
some presumably non-professional or unaccredited investors are also permitted to 
directly invest in the Korea-domiciled hedge fund.676  
Second, in terms of fund manager regulation, all three countries currently 
have some type of licensing requirements (such as registration or authorization) in 
place, although there are some limited exemptions available under the current U.S. 
regime. There also used to be a more general private adviser safe harbor rule 
applicable to hedge fund managers before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in 
2010.677 
Concerning this factual scenario, the U.S. regime provides two express safe 
harbor rules for start-up companies. One is a small private adviser exemption (i.e., 
less than 25 million dollars in assets under management regardless of the number 
of clients or investors in the funds under management), and the other is a foreign 
private adviser exemption (namely, fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors and 25 
million dollars in assets under management from the U.S. clients or investors).678  
In contrast, the U.K. and Korea impliedly provide safe harbors for offshore 
managers and leave them free from advance authorization unless there are special 
factual circumstances to indicate that they are domiciled offshore to avoid the 
relevant local authorization regimes. 679  The U.K. and Korea provide similar 
                                                          
675 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
676 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2(C). 
677 As indicated supra, the U.S. used to provide a private adviser safe harbor rule (namely, the 
“fewer than 15 clients” exemption) for both onshore and offshore hedge fund advisers under the 
Advisers Act, while the U.K. has consistently provided a uniform authorization regime to U.K. 
based hedge fund advisers only. Korea also introduced new authorization regime for hedge fund 
managers in late 2011. See supra Chapter IV, Part B.4; Chapter V, Part B.1; Chapter VI, Part C.1. 
678 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3, 4(a); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4(b). 
679 See AIFMD, art. 37-42; FSCMA, art. 2, 279(1); FSMA, art. 2. 
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offshore fund promotion regimes; under the regimes offshore hedge funds and 
their managers are subject to approval and registration requirements when they sell 
or offer fund interests to U.K. or Korean investors. Also, the target investors are 
strictly restricted to certain professional investors only.680 
Based on the facts and the relevant rules and regulations illustrated above, 
the U.S. person is more likely to choose the U.S. as a jurisdiction for their fund 
management business because they have no legal barriers to doing business by 
relying on the (foreign) private adviser exemptions. There is no incentive for them 
to apply for a license in the U.K. or Korea either, because those jurisdictions 
provide less favorable regulatory environments compared to the U.S., and because 
they can raise capital from investors in the U.K. and Korean via an offshore fund 
marketing regime, even without obtaining local licenses under the U.K. or Korean 
regime.681 
What the three countries’ regimes implicate for a U.S. person seeking to set 
up a company to conduct hedge fund business on a transnational basis is that the 
person (namely, the hedge fund manager) will be inclined to choose a more 
favorable regulatory jurisdiction to avoid onerous manager regulations to the 
extent possible.  They can do that by satisfying the safe harbor rules under the U.S. 
regime and offshore fund promotion requirements under the U.K. and Korean 
regimes.682  
                                                          
680 What should be noted, however, is that under the U.K. regime offshore funds and their managers 
may be able to avoid the approval requirement for the coming years until the AIFMD will be fully 
in force in 2019. See AIFMD, explanatory note 67. 
681 See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.2(B). 
682 What is also noteworthy is that, unlike the U.S. or U.K., Korea provides no licensing exemption 
for offshore managers who seek to set up an onshore fund to market onshore investors. See FSCMA, 
art. 12, 279. 
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Overall, in terms of manager regulation, the U.K. and Korean regulatory 
models seem more desirable, especially from the macro-prudential regulatory 
perspective. Under the U.K. and Korean regimes, all onshore managers are subject 
to authorization requirements without exception, regardless of the size of the funds 
they manage or the number of investors they have. At the same time, all the 
offshore managers are subject to approval and registration requirements under the 
U.K. and Korean offshore fund promotion regimes.  
What that means is that the UK and Korean regulators would be in the 
position to oversee how many funds are active in the local market, how the funds 
are operated, and how much potential they have to adversely affect the local 
market. The U.S. regime provides insufficient regulatory tools for effectively 
monitoring the foreign private adviser’s activity in the U.S. market by allowing the 
foreign private adviser exemption and by choosing to impose onerous registration 
and reporting requirements on firms who go over the foreign private adviser 
threshold conditions.683  
The U.K. and Korean regimes also seem more advisable than the U.S. 
regime in that the U.K. and Korean regulators are more likely to be able to deter 
                                                          
683 This all or nothing approach under the U.S. regime is less advisable because it may inevitably 
entail overregulation and regulatory loophole problems. Some offshore managers are subject to 
overly burdensome compliance obligations, even if they contemplate carrying on the hedge fund 
business on a limited basis in the U.S. and focusing on marketing to U.S. accredited investors only. 
By contrast, the U.K. regime seem more effective and efficient in dealing with this overregulation 
and regulatory loophole concern by requiring onshore based managers to obtain local licenses with 
less stringent compliance obligations, and by imposing an approval and registration obligation in 
connection with the sale or offer of the offshore fund interests (in lieu of a more burdensome 
licensing obligation). See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
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regulatory arbitrage efforts while reviewing the offshore fund approval and 
registration application, depending on the totality of the factual circumstances.684 
In terms of offshore fund marketing regulation, the U.S. and U.K. regimes 
seem more desirable and more consistent than the Korean regime. The U.S. and 
U.K. regimes treat onshore and offshore funds equally based on a micro-prudential 
policy rationale; unless the fund interests are marketed to unaccredited or 
unsophisticated investors it allows them to operate free from paternalistic fund 
regulation.685 The Korean regime treats onshore hedge funds a lot differently from 




                                                          
684 The flipside is that, in terms of onshore hedge fund manager regulation in particular, there seems 
little difference in principle between the three countries because they all require onshore hedge fund 
managers to register and be authorized. But the U.K. and Korean regimes seem more appropriate in 
that they regulate the onshore hedge fund managers less stringently than they do mutual fund 
managers based on the principle of proportionality. The U.S. regime treats them the same as mutual 
fund managers under the Advisers Act. There is little doubt that, from the micro-prudential 
regulatory perspective, hedge fund managers should be subject to a lighter regulation than mutual 
fund managers because it is a private market open to the accredited investors only, and systemic 
risk and macro- prudential concerns may be effectively handled with registration and reporting 
requirements – not by subjecting them to the full scope of the Advisers Act. In that regard, it 
appears that the U.S. regime has somewhat of an overregulation problem. See supra Chapter IV, 
Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C. 
685 Both countries’ approach in regulating hedge funds (onshore and offshore) may be viewed as 
slightly different in that under the AIFMD, onshore and offshore hedge funds will be required to be 
approved or reported while the U.S. regime completely lets them fall outside the fund regulation if 
they meet the private fund safe harbor conditions. What should be noted, however, is that both 
countries basically take the same regulatory position to not regulate hedge funds directly unless 
there is an exceptional situation where the regulator believes they may pose systemic risk to the 
overall market. See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. 
686 This may be an inappropriate and disproportionate regulatory approach because under the 
Korean regime, Korean institutional investors are exposed to both onshore and offshore hedge 
funds. There is no legal barrier for them to choose offshore hedge funds instead of onshore hedge 
funds, based on whichever is pursuing a more attractive alternative investment opportunity. In that 
sense, the disparate regulatory treatment between the two is unreasonable and is likely to have an 
unexpected, and negative effect by driving the fund/managers offshore in the long run. See FSCMA, 
art. 249-2, 279. 
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2. What if a US Private Adviser raises capital in the US, UK, or Korea? 
The second scenario is the situation where a new U.S. based Private 
Adviser, who remains unregulated based on the Private Adviser Exemption, 
intends to raise capital of more than 150 million dollars from investors in the U.S., 
U.K., and Korea, among other countries. 
First of all, from the U.S. fund regulatory perspective, U.S. based private 
fund advisers have no legal problem with raising capital from U.S., U.K., and 
Korean investors of more than 150 million dollars in assets under management 
based on the private offering and private fund exemptions.687 It also makes no 
legal difference whether the U.S. based private adviser chooses an onshore or 
offshore fund to raise capital, or if they utilize both funds at the same time. 
Onshore and offshore funds are treated the same, allowing funds to avoid 
registration requirements by relying on the safe harbor rules under the relevant 
securities and fund statutes.688  
Thus, under the U.S. regime, both onshore and offshore private fund 
information may not be available to the U.S. regulator other than through the Form 
D report, unless the manager is required to register with the SEC.689 From the U.K. 
fund regulatory perspective, U.S. based private advisers are obligated to be 
approved by (or report to) the U.K. regulator before they offer or sell fund interests 
to U.K. investors, regardless of whether the fund is based in the U.K. or not.690  
                                                          
687 It is because there are no offering size limitations and no limitation on the number of investors if 
offered or sold to accredited investors only under Reg D. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506. 
688 See id.  
689 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3; 17 C.F.R. § 230.503(a). 
690 As noted supra, however, the same analyses, applied under the U.S. regime, are also applied 
under the U.K. regime before the AIFMD comes into force in 2019, effectively ending the local 
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The same conclusion may be reached if the U.S. based private adviser 
determines to move to the U.K., or to set up a new company for hedge fund 
business in the U.K., because under the AIFMD U.K. based private advisers are 
also subject to same approval and reporting requirement regardless of whether the 
fund is located in the U.K. or not.691  
A similar analysis is possible under the Korean regime. That is, the U.S. 
based private adviser is required to register the fund with the Korean regulator 
before marketing the fund interests to certain Korean professional investors.692 U.S. 
private advisers are allowed to market offshore funds only, and it is strictly 
prohibited for them to set up onshore funds and to market them to Korean 
investors.693  
Second, from the manager regulatory standpoint, the three countries 
demonstrate differences in some respects. Under the U.S. regime the formerly 
unregulated private adviser becomes subject to registration requirements under the 
Advisers Act because it no longer satisfies the mid-sized private adviser threshold 
                                                                                                                                                                
private placement exemption. Meanwhile, the U.S. based private adviser is able to freely market the 
fund interests to certain U.K. professional investors without being subject to approval requirements 
by relying on the existing U.K. private placement safe harbor rule, which is equally available to 
U.K. based funds and non-U.K. based funds. See AIFMD, explanatory note 65, 66; art. 37-42. 
691 What is noteworthy, though, is that under the new U.K. regime (i.e., the AIFMD), U.K. based 
private advisers are subject to authorization requirements in addition to the fund (onshore or 
offshore) approval and reporting requirements. Non-U.K. based private advisers are only subject to 
fund approval and reporting requirements. See AIFMD, art. 31 et seq. 
692 The offshore fund would be exempted from the securities registration requirement under the 
Korean private placement regime, but is still subject to fund registration requirements. In that 
regard, the Korean regime is uniquely positioned and different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes. See 
FSCMA, art. 9(8), 119(1), 279(1). 
693 The same conclusion may be reached in a situation where a Korea based private adviser intends 
to set up offshore funds to market them to Korean investors, because the offshore fund registration 
regime is available only to offshore advisers. Doing so may be viewed as a violation of the 
extraterritorial application rule under the Korean regime. See FSCMA, art. 2, 12(1), 279(1). 
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conditions. It does not matter whether the funds are domiciled in the U.S. or if the 
private adviser is based in the U.S.694  
The flipside here is that U.S. based private advisers are likely to think about 
setting up affiliated companies offshore to raise capital from the three countries’ 
investors, so that the U.S. based adviser can remain unregulated. This is unlikely to 
be a viable option for them, however, because the foreign private adviser 
exemption is by far narrower and a lot more stringent than the mid-sized private 
adviser exemption available to U.S. based private advisers.695  
Therefore, under these factual circumstances, U.S. based private advisers 
are more likely to choose to register with the U.S. regulator, and to market the fund 
interests to the investors from the three countries based on the private offering safe 
harbor rules available to them under each countries’ regimes.696 
In contrast, under the U.K. regime, U.S. based private advisers are required 
to be approved by the U.K. regulator before marketing the fund interests to U.K. 
investors, and it does not matter whether or not the fund is domiciled in the U.K. 
Also, U.S. private advisers are not required to obtain a private adviser license from 
                                                          
694 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.  
695 It may provide incentive for U.S. based private advisers to establish an offshore affiliated 
company to avoid the onerous U.S. registration requirements if they intend to focus more on 
offshore investors, to limit the number of U.S. investors, and to ensure that the amount of capital 
raised from U.S. clients complies with the foreign private adviser threshold conditions. See 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30). 
696 As illustrated infra, It should be noted that the U.S. private adviser is subject to registration and 
approval requirements under the Korean and U.K. regimes in connection with the sale or offer of 
the fund interests to Korean and U.K. investors, because the two countries provide no private fund 
exemptions to offshore based private advisers. However, the U.S. based private adviser is not 
obligated to be authorized under the Korean or the U.K. regime. See FSCMA, art. 279(1); AIFMD, 
art. 42. 
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the U.K. regulator if they meet certain fund promotion requirements.697 Therefore 
the U.S. based private adviser should only need to be mindful about the offshore 
fund promotion rules under the U.K. regime.698 Korea takes a similar regulatory 
approach to the U.K. in that offshore private fund advisers are required to register 
with Korean regulators in connection with the purchase or sale of fund interests to 
certain Korean professional investors. However, they are exempted from licensing 
requirements.699  
The only difference between the two countries is that the U.S. private 
adviser is not allowed to set up the fund in Korea to raise capital from Korean 
investors under the Korean regime, while the U.S. private fund adviser is free to 
choose the U.K. as a fund domicile for marketing to U.K. investors.700 
In terms of manager regulation, the U.S. regime provides private adviser 
safe harbor rules for both onshore and offshore private fund advisers, although 
different threshold conditions apply to them. Both the U.K. and Korean regimes 
subject onshore advisers to licensing obligations without an exception, while 
providing offshore fund promotion regimes and exempting offshore private fund 
advisers from licensing requirements. 701  The primary difference, in terms of 
private adviser regulation, between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea is that the U.S. 
                                                          
697 As indicated supra, a non-U.K. based private adviser is completely free from licensing and 
approval obligations in regards to the offshore fund marketing based on the U.K. private placement 
regime (until the AIFMD is fully in force in 2019). See supra Chapter V, Part C.  
698 Extraterritorial application issues regarding the U.K. licensing requirement may be ignorable 
under this situation provided that the U.S. based private adviser has been doing business in the U.S. 
for some period of time, and has some U.S. investors in the funds they manage prior to marketing 
the fund interests to U.K. investors. See FSMA, art. 2. 
699 Extraterritorial application issues regarding the U.K. licensing requirement may also be 
ignorable in this situation because of the reasons mentioned supra in note 624. See FSCMA, art. 2, 
279(1). 
700 See FSCMA, art. 279(1); AIFMD, art. 42. 
701 See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C. 
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excludes certain private advisers (onshore/offshore) from regulatory oversight 
while the U.K. and Korea place every private adviser (onshore/offshore) under 
their regulatory purview in some way.  
As noted supra, the U.K. and Korean regimes (especially the U.K. regime) 
seem more appropriate than the U.S. regime in terms of systemic risk and macro-
prudential regulation because the U.K. and Korean regimes include all the onshore 
and offshore managers in one way or another. As a result, the U.K. and Korean are 
better positioned to monitor all private adviser activities in the local market while 
imposing less burdensome regulatory requirements. 
On the other hand, both the U.S. and the U.K. take the regulatory position 
not to regulate the fund directly and to let private fund advisers choose onshore or 
offshore as a fund domicile. Korea takes a more conservative regulatory approach 
to only allow locally licensed private advisers to set up funds onshore to market 
fund interests to Korean investors. 702  It is obvious that the U.S. and U.K. 
regulatory approach is advisable because hedge fund related regulatory concerns 
can be properly controlled through adviser regulation and because the fund itself 
can easily move offshore to avoid fund regulation if necessary.703 
It is likely that the Korean regime provides less incentive to offshore 
advisers to be domiciled in Korea due to their relatively strict fund regulation. At 
the same time the Korean regime may even force onshore advisers to move 
offshore or to set up offshore based affiliated companies to market offshore funds 
to Korean investors by relying on the offshore fund promotion regime. In that 
                                                          
702 See id. 
703 See supra Chapter III, Part B.2. 
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regard, it is more likely that the Korean regime produces less productive results 
than the U.S. or U.K. regimes. 
 
3. What if an offshore manager raises capital via offshore funds in the 
US, UK, or Korea? 
The third scenario is the situation where a non-U.S., U.K., or Korea based 
hedge fund manager set up a hedge fund offshore to raise capital from U.S., U.K., 
or Korean investors. 
First, from the manager regulatory standpoint, offshore managers are in 
principle not subject to local regulation, including licensing requirements, if they 
satisfy the safe harbor conditions or the offshore fund promotion rules under the 
U.S., U.K., and Korean regimes.  
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. expressly provides a foreign private 
adviser exemption for non-U.S. based private advisers, and unlike “exempted 
reporting advisers,”704 they are free from the U.S. private adviser regulations (such 
as registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and examination requirements) by relying 
                                                          
704 This includes U.S. based mid-sized private advisers and venture capital fund advisers exempted 
from the registration requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4. 
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on the threshold conditions available for foreign private advisers;705 also because 
they do not fall within the definition of “exempted reporting adviser.”706  
By contrast, the U.K. and Korea take a slightly different approach from the 
U.S. by basically relying on their offshore fund promotion regimes. Under the U.K. 
and Korean regimes, offshore managers do not need to obtain a license from the 
local regulatory authority and as a result are not obligated under the same rules and 
regulations as locally licensed entities (as long as they comply with the offshore 
fund promotion rules and regulations).707  
The U.K. regime (namely, AIFMD) provides a kind of indirect safe harbor 
rule for offshore managers and exempts them from licensing and other compliance 
requirements if they meet certain threshold conditions under the U.K. private 
placement regime (i.e., restricting the investors to certain professional investors or 
equivalent). 708  Under the AIFMD offshore managers are subject to disclosure 
obligations to investors both before and after investment and have reporting 
                                                          
705 To rely on the foreign private adviser exemption, any foreign private adviser need to show that (i) 
it has no place of business in the U.S., (ii) it has, in total, fewer than 15 clients and investors in the 
U.S. in private funds advised by the investment adviser, (iii) it has less than $25 million in 
aggregate assets under management that are attributable to clients in the U.S. and investors in the 
U.S. in private funds advised by the investment adviser, and (iv) it neither holds itself out generally 
to the public in the U.S. as an investment adviser nor act as an investment adviser to any registered 
investment company or business development company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30). 
706 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4. See also Exemptions for Advisers to 
Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets under 
Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Release No. IA-3222 (July 2011), at note 5, 21, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3222.pdf. 
707 See FSMA, art. 238(5); FSCMA, art. 279; COBS, art. 4.12.1R. 
708 For the detailed threshold conditions for private placement, see supra Chapter V, Part 2.B(1). 
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obligations to the U.K. regulator, even though the offshore fund is strictly limited 
to certain professional investors.709  
This U.K. regulatory approach is different from the U.S. and Korea, where 
there is no express provision to force the managers or the funds to disclose relevant 
information to investors before or after investment, although some of the 
information in the registration statement may be available to the public under the 
U.S. and Korean regimes.710  
The regulatory approach in the U.K. seems inconsistent with the rationale 
for the private placement exemption. It is likely to cause duplicate regulation and 
an overregulation problem because the distinction between public offerings and 
private placements becomes blurry due to the mandatory disclosure obligations, 
which are supposed to be applied during public offerings. It may also be viewed as 
an unnecessary and overly paternalistic regulatory intervention into the private 
market, which is presumably available only to accredited and sophisticated 
investors.711 
                                                          
709 See id. 
710 Under the Korean offshore fund sales regime, periodic (quarterly) performance reports should be 
provided to existing investors and offshore fund managers are obligated to supply fund related 
information to existing investors upon their request. This is different from the mandatory disclosure 
requirement under the U.K. regime in substance and in nature. In addition, under the U.S. regime, 
foreign private advisers are completely free from direct mandatory disclosure obligations to 
investors if they meet the threshold conditions for the foreign private adviser, private fund, and 
private offering exemptions. However, there is an implied obligation to disclose relevant 
information to the investors at the time of investment and thereafter based on the general anti-fraud 
rules in the securities laws. See FSCMA, art. 280(2), (3); AIFMD, art. 23. See also supra Chapter 
IV, Part C. 
711 Regardless of the controversy of whether sophisticated investors are really financially savvy 
enough to understand every potential risk entailed in the investment and the complex investment 
strategy to be utilized by the manager, they are presumed to be sophisticated enough to protect 
themselves from the managers. Sophisticated investors are also in a position to request relevant 
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Korea takes a similar regulatory position to the U.K. in regulating offshore 
fund managers in that they regulate offshore fund managers indirectly through 
offshore fund sales regulation. Korea takes a different position from the U.K., 
however, regarding the mandatory disclosure obligation. Like the U.S., Korea 
imposes no mandatory disclosure obligation against offshore funds or their 
managers if they meet the private offering safe harbor conditions.712  
Korea takes a somewhat unique position by putting rules in place regarding 
disclosure to investors by imposing a periodic reporting obligation and a fund 
information provision on offshore fund managers. 713  In addition, the Korean 
regime seeks to deal with the investor protection concern by applying the 
suitability and financial product guidance rule to certain non-professional and 
unsophisticated investors who are categorized as qualified purchasers under the 
hedge fund rule (i.e., some high net-worth individuals not satisfying the threshold 
conditions for professional investors), and by eliminating any differential treatment 
between the investors when providing relevant fund information.714 However, this 
Korean regulatory approach is problematic because it makes it hard to understand 
the rationale for the rule and it shows inconsistency in regulating hedge funds (also 
known as qualified purchaser funds) despite the fact that hedge funds are supposed 
                                                                                                                                                                
information from the manager if necessary. Considering the fact that the current regime is still in 
place based on this rationale, a likely conclusion is that it is a somewhat strange and 
disproportionate regulatory intervention into the private market. See supra text accompanying note 
612. 
712 See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
713 See id. 
714 See FSCMA, 46, 47, 249-2(1). 
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to be treated specially and that only certain qualified purchasers and sophisticated 
investors are allowed to directly invest in the fund.715 
Second, in terms of the fund regulation, the U.S. exhibits certain 
differences when compared to the U.K. and Korea. The U.S. regime provides that 
offshore funds are not subject to mandatory registration or disclosure requirements 
if they meet the private offering safe harbor conditions and are not subject to fund 
regulation if they satisfy the private fund (or qualified fund) exemption.716  
In contrast, both the U.K. and Korean regimes provide that the offshore 
fund (or its manager) is subject to approval and registration requirements before 
selling the fund interests to local investors, although the offering must be made 
strictly in compliance with the private placement rules.717 By doing so, the local 
regulator is able to gather fund information being used to actively advertise to 
investors in the local market.  
The primary distinction between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea in terms of 
offshore fund marketing regulation is that the U.S. aims to regulate offshore fund 
managers directly by mandating that foreign private advisers register with the U.S. 
regulator (subject to limited exemptions), while the U.K. and Korea endeavors to 
regulate the fund managers indirectly via an offshore fund approval/registration 
                                                          
715 This explanation is what qualified purchaser should mean. It is more in line with the private 
offering exemption and the accredited investor definition under the private offering exemption 
because it is one of the prerequisites that the hedge fund must satisfy to be entitled to special 
treatment under the hedge fund rule. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7). 
716 See id. 
717 See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.2. 
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regime. Both the U.K. and Korean regimes avoid regulating offshore managers 
directly.718  
The basic regulatory positions between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea are 
totally opposite, and unfortunately, it is not entirely certain which regulatory 
approach is more effective or efficient. But, at least from macro-prudential 
regulatory perspective, the U.K. and Korean example seems more desirable in that 
it is more cost-effective (i.e., less burdensome for offshore managers to comply 
with) and it is more likely to minimize regulatory loopholes. The U.K. and Korean 
regulators are more likely to be in a position to take regulatory action against 
offshore fund managers in a timely manner, if necessary, while the U.S. regulator 
has few measures to take against foreign private advisers who meet the safe harbor 
conditions. Also, the direct regulation of foreign private advisers is likely to create 
an overregulation problem considering the fact that they merely market the funds 
on a limited basis to accredited investors (by relying on the private offering or 
private fund exemptions).719 
Although still debatable, it seems like the offshore fund sale regulatory 
regimes in the U.K. and Korea are more reasonable and more cost-efficient than 
the approach in the U.S., both from a systemic risk and a macro-prudential 
regulatory perspective.  
However, the mandatory disclosure requirements in the U.K. offshore fund 
promotion regime should be reconsidered. It would be better to let the disclosure 
                                                          
718 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30), 3; AIFMD, art. 42; FSCMA, art. 279. 
719 See id. See also Overmyer, supra note 301, at 2211-19. 
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issue be resolved between the parties considering the fact that hedge fund investors 
are strictly limited to certain professional and sophisticated investors.720 In this 
regard, the U.S. and Korean regulatory approaches seem better. 
 
4. What if an offshore manager raises capital via onshore funds in the 
U.S., the U.K., or Korea? 
The last scenario is the situation where a non-U.S., -U.K., or -Korea 
domiciled hedge fund manager set up a hedge fund in the U.S., the U.K., or Korea 
to raise capital from U.S., U.K., or Korean investors. 
The U.S. and U.K. regimes do not prohibit offshore managers who do not 
obtain relevant licenses in the U.S. or U.K. from establishing locally domiciled 
hedge funds to raise capital from local investors. The U.S. regime even provides 
several safe harbor rules for offshore managers to establish U.S. domiciled funds 
for that purpose.  
First, offshore managers can avoid registration requirements under the 
Advisers Act by relying on the “foreign private adviser” exemption, allowing them 
to raise capital from 14 or fewer U.S. clients and investors, and up to 25 million 
dollars in assets under management.721 In addition, offshore managers are able to 
avoid registration obligations under the Advisers Act if they satisfy the general 
mid-sized private adviser exemption. Under the mid-sized private adviser 
exemption they are only permitted to raise capital from U.S. clients and investors 
                                                          
720 See supra Chapter V, Part D. 
721 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30). 
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through “qualifying private fund(s)” of up to 150 million dollars in assets under 
management.722 The offshore managers are also able to avoid fund and securities 
registration requirements under the Investment Company Act or Securities Act if 
they meet the private fund or private offering exemption.723  
In short, the offshore managers are allowed to raise capital from U.S. 
clients or investors directly or indirectly through qualifying private funds, and to 
some extent without worrying about the adviser or fund registration requirements. 
This is possible because the U.S. provides clear and express safe harbor rules for 
offshore managers and the private funds they manage. 
The U.K. regime indirectly removes the legal barriers from offshore 
managers who set up U.K. domiciled funds to raise capital from U.K. investors on 
a private placement basis. This is done by stipulating that the offshore managers 
are required to get approval from the U.K. regulator for the onshore funds they 
intend to manage, before they can promote the fund interests to professional 
investors.724  
Thus, at least from a legal point of view, the offshore managers have full 
discretion on whether to choose an onshore or offshore fund jurisdiction. This 
regulatory framework may be justified based on the belief that there is no 
regulatory difference between onshore funds and offshore funds, because both 
                                                          
722 What should be noted is that, unlike the “foreign private adviser” exemption, under this mid-
sized adviser exemption the offshore managers have no limitation on the number of the U.S. clients 
provided that their clients invest “qualifying private funds.” Only the size of the funds they manage 
matters here. See 17 C.F.R. §275.203(m)-1(b). 
723 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
724 See supra Chapter V, Part C. See also AIFMD, explanatory note 66, art. 42. 
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funds are basically free from local fund regulation under the U.K. private 
placement regime. Instead, onshore and offshore funds they both are subject to 
approval requirements for fund promotion.725  
This regulatory approach, however, may have regulatory arbitrage and 
regulatory gap problems in that U.K. domiciled private fund managers are required 
to get authorization from the U.K. regulator, while offshore managers are not.726 
That may create an unintended adverse effect by inducing onshore managers to 
move offshore to avoid authorization obligations under the U.K. regime. With this 
regulatory concern in mind, the U.K. regime provides general rules that prohibit 
any evasive regulatory avoidance, and it may be filtered out or prevented by the 
fund approval and offshore manager authorization processes.727 
Unlike the U.S. or the U.K. regime, this scenario may be concluded to be 
totally infeasible or legally impermissible under the Korean regime, because the 
Korean regime provides no rules relevant to this situation. In other words, Korea 
domiciled hedge funds must report to the Korean regulator, and the Korea 
domiciled fund must be managed by a Korea domiciled and licensed entity.728 
                                                          
725 See AIFMD, explanatory note 10. 
726 See supra Chapter V, Part C. 
727 For instance, the local regulator that reviews the relevant fund application documents may be 
able to block this regulatory arbitrage attempt, depending on the factual circumstances, by 
identifying cases where the offshore manager chose to be based outside the U.K. just to avoid the 
authorization process. See FSMA, art. 2. 
728 See FSCMA, art. 12, 249-2. 
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Offshore managers are allowed to market offshore based funds to Korean investors 
on a limited basis, but not Korea domiciled funds.729  
Other than those two scenarios, there are no other alternatives like this 
available under the Korean regime. There is no cross-border or transnational fund 
management business is allowed in Korea from the offshore fund manager 
perspective. The only thing offshore fund managers can do is to market the 
offshore fund to certain Korean institutional investors.730 Otherwise, if they intend 
to set up a Korea domiciled fund to raise capital from Korean investors they need 
to obtain the relevant fund management business license under the current Korean 
regime. Undoubtedly, it is overly burdensome and very difficult for them to choose 
to do so because they need to be fully subject to Korean hedge fund regulation for 
their limited business in Korea, and there are other options for them to market the 
offshore funds to Korean investors without the heavy regulatory burdens under the 
offshore fund sales regime.731  
The U.S. and U.K. regimes seem more reasonable than the Korean regime 
regarding this scenario because they provide both express and implied safe harbor 
rules for offshore managers to set up onshore funds to raise capital from onshore 
                                                          
729 See FSCMA, art 279. 
730 See FSCMA, art. 279(2). 
731 In fact, there is little incentive for them to set up locally licensed entities to engage in hedge fund 
business in Korea in that their track record or expertise must be primarily on offshore investments, 
not local investments, and they may be more interested in raising capital from certain Korean 
institutional investors. Thus the offshore fund sales regime may be the only feasible option for them 
to accommodate their business needs in Korea, unless there are significant deregulatory measures 
taken by the Korean regulator. In this regard, the Korean regulator’s announcement to deregulate 
the licensing regime in the foreseeable future would be positive. See supra text accompanying note 
458. 
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investors, while the Korean regime provides no safe harbor rules for this scenario. 
This regulatory difference between the three countries arises primarily because 
hedge funds are subject to direct regulation in Korea while they are not in the U.S. 
or the U.K.732 
Considering the fact that Korean managers are allowed to set up offshore 
funds to raise capital from offshore investors, that offshore managers are 
already allowed to market their funds to certain Korean institutional investors 
(in accordance with the offshore fund sales regime), and that offshore hedge 
fund businesses operating in Korea already focus more on marketing than on 
fund investment and management, it would be prudent and reasonable to adopt 
the offshore fund sales regime utilized in the U.K.733 
  
                                                          
732 It is unlikely cause serious regulatory concerns if offshore managers set up onshore funds and 
raise capital from Korean investors, assuming that onshore hedge funds are exempted from 
registration and reporting requirements (besides having to market the fund interests through a 
Korean licensed entity and to obtain the fund distribution license themselves). This inference is 
possible because offshore managers likely do not intend to manage onshore funds in Korea (as most 
of the investment and management functions are operated offshore), allowing offshore managers to 
rely on the private securities offering exemption and the private fund exemption. 




Five years have elapsed since the global financial crisis struck the financial 
markets, and a couple of years have passed since the unprecedented, draconian, 
crisis-driven financial regulatory reforms and hedge fund regulations made their 
way around the world.  
There is no doubt that it is too early to assess whether or not the current 
crisis-driven hedge fund regime is necessary (or sufficient) to prevent another high 
profile financial market failure in the future. Therefore, it would be prudent to wait 
and see how effectively and efficiently the paternalistic hedge fund regimes in the 
major jurisdictions deal with the hedge fund problems raised during the crisis.734   
It is worth thinking about whether the current hedge fund regulations are 
reasonable or if they go too far, because we may not have had enough time to think 
about the cumulative scope of the regulations while undergoing the crisis, and 
because identifying the appropriate level of regulation will ensure sustainable 
growth in the marketplace and will minimize potential negative impacts on local 
and global markets.  
Consensus has built around the idea that hedge funds provide a positive 
effect on the financial markets, but the regulations imposed on hedge funds should 
be legally and practically distinct from the other types of funds available to the 
investing public.735 However, the policy rationales behind regulating hedge funds, 
                                                          
734 See supra Chapter III, Part A. 
735 See supra Chapter II, Part B, C.1. 
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i.e., investor protection, deterrence of market fraud, and ensuring financial market 
stability, are still valid and should be fully respected.  
The question now is whether those rationales are appropriately reflected in 
the current hedge fund regulatory regimes. It appears, in terms of micro-prudential 
regulation, that the regimes in the U.S., the U.K., and Korea have overregulation 
problems. All three countries were overly responsive to investor protection and/or 
market fraud concerns by subjecting hedge funds managers (and hedge funds in 
Korea) to a broad array of mandatory regulations that used to only be applicable to 
mutual fund managers.736  
The autonomy of the accredited investor hedge fund market should be 
respected to the extent possible, assuming that all the participants in this market 
are sufficiently sophisticated to make informed investment decisions and to protect 
their own interests. Redefining accredited investor threshold conditions, mandating 
that hedge funds comply with broad principles of business conduct, and enforcing 
regulations in cases where fraudulent or deceptive practices take place should 
serve the minimize the need for regulatory intervention.737 
From a macro-prudential regulatory perspective, there is little doubt that 
hedge funds should be subject to stronger regulatory oversight than ever. It seems 
reasonable and desirable to subject hedge fund managers to licensing/registration 
and reporting requirements, because it is hardly deniable that they have the 
potential to pose systemic risk during extreme market situations; regulators should 
                                                          
736 See supra Chapter III, Part C. 
737 See id. 
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be able to take appropriate corrective measures in a timely manner when 
necessary.738 
The problem under the current hedge fund regimes though is that detailed, 
paternalistic, line-by-line rules and regulations have been implemented and 
justified under the policy rationale of preventing systemic risk and ensuring market 
stability. There are other more delicate, more responsive, and more flexible 
regulatory alternatives available739 that should be pursued if we can agree that the 
hedge fund market should exist as a private market, clearly distinct from the public 
market. The hedge fund market would also be more likely to survive and to stay 
financially innovative if lighter regulatory oversight is allowed.740 
It should be noted that, in this dissertation, I do not take into consideration 
such other hedge fund related issues as hedge fund activism,741 money laundering, 
insider trading or market manipulation, and unethical or illegal investments, 
among other things. Instead, what I have endeavored to cover is how to efficiently 
and effectively deal with hedge fund problems from the securities or fund 
regulatory perspective, and how to regulate the hedge fund market accordingly 
under the relevant local securities and/or fund regimes.  
                                                          
738 See id. 
739 As briefly mentioned in supra note 163, the Volcker Rule may be a good example of an indirect 
regulatory alternative that may be utilized as a powerful and effective regulatory tool to control the 
hedge fund market, because the Volcker Rule directly and significantly limits the banking 
industries’ exposure to private funds. As a consequence it may also adversely affect the growth of 
the hedge fund market. See supra Chapter III, Part B. 
740 See supra Chapter VIII, Part A. 
741 See e.g., ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, at 84-90. 
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Therefore, I do not believe my arguments or recommendations in this 
dissertation are absolutely correct or infallible in every situation. Undoubtedly the 
aforementioned issues need to be dealt with separately and from different 
regulatory perspectives. Some regulatory issues and concerns have already been 
touched on by the regimes covered here, and others may be dealt with through 
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